►Due to North Korea's persistent commitment to nuclear armament, achieving denuclearization through international cooperation is unrealistic.

►Although the parties involved prioritize denuclearization through cooperation between the US and North Korea, the longstanding enmity and mutual distrust between the two countries are making it difficult for future coordination. China and Russia, who share responsibility for North Korea's denuclearization, have shifted the burden onto the US.

►Containing North Korea through both nuclear and conventional deterrence could serve as an alternative strategy for achieving denuclearization. Implementing a rigorous set of techno-economic sanctions specifically aimed at impeding North Korea's nuclear weapons program would also be a crucial aspect of this approach. For such containment to succeed, Seoul and Washington must coordinate efforts to broaden international cooperation.

► If attempts are made to achieve denuclearization through cooperation, China and Russia should lead the initiative as it would be the most feasible option.

It has been over three decades since North Korea's nuclear armament became a global concern. This article addresses two critical questions: (1) How feasible is the denuclearization of Pyongyang? and (2) What viable strategies exist to achieve this goal?

I believe that achieving denuclearization through international cooperation is an unrealistic prospect. One significant factor is Pyongyang's steadfast commitment to nuclear armament. North Korea has consistently pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons or the means to produce them. Despite signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, Pyongyang managed to acquire enough plutonium to potentially create one or two nuclear devices. Following the 1994 Agreed Framework inked in Geneva, North Korea clandestinely pursued uranium enrichment, disregarding commitments made. This persistence in secretive uranium enrichment led to the breakdown of implementing the September 2005 joint statement from the Six-Party Talks. Even during the 2019 Hanoi summit with Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un insisted on excluding any nuclear facilities outside the Yongbyon nuclear complex from a potential deal.

Another reason is that involved parties prioritize denuclearization through US-North Korea cooperation. All past denuclearization endeavors predominantly featured the US and North Korea as primary collaborators. The Agreed Framework was exclusively negotiated and finalized by Washington and Pyongyang. While the 2005 agreement had six signatories, it was evident that Americans and North Koreans were the principal contracting parties, with the other four countries serving as mere guarantors. The move towards bilateral summit meetings between Trump and Kim dismantled the multilateral facade. Given the longstanding enmity and intense mutual distrust between the US and North Korea, sustaining cooperation has proved exceedingly difficult. Consequently, both the 1994 and 2005 agreements ceased implementation after several years. The deep-seated distrust prevented Trump and Kim from striking a deal in 2019, despite their exchanges of “love letters.” Each failed attempt at cooperation further exacerbated mutual mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang, making future collaboration increasingly arduous. While the 1994 agreement lasted a decade until 2003, the 2005 agreement collapsed as early as 2008. The former took a month to negotiate, while the latter required two years to conclude. Even the high-level talks during the Trump presidency failed to yield a deal.

Additionally, China and Russia have engaged in passing the buck. As major signatories to the NPT, China and Russia share responsibility for North Korea's denuclearization. Moreover, China is a treaty ally of North Korea, and Russia holds a key partnership. Consequently, Beijing and Moscow are the least distrusted by Pyongyang and possess considerable leverage over North Korea, which is asymmetrically dependent on them. Nevertheless, both China and Russia have shifted the burden of denuclearizing North Korea onto the US. This led to Washington assuming leadership in the denuclearization processes, with limited success, as discussed earlier.

Equally unfeasible is the endeavor to denuclearize Pyongyang through international coercion. One factor lies in North Korea's resolute will and capacity to resist such attempts. Any military strike against North Korea would likely provoke armed retaliation from its militaristic regime, carrying the imminent risk of escalating into a catastrophic war on the Korean Peninsula. The fear of such dire consequences has dissuaded all post-Cold War US administrations from resorting to military action against North Korea's nuclear pursuits. Despite belligerent rhetoric such as "fire and fury" and "bloody nose," even Trump refrained from military intervention. Moreover, North Korea has adeptly adjusted to economic sanctions. Enduring prolonged economic duress, North Koreans have developed resilience to economic pressures and shortages. Their economy has displayed remarkable resilience as officials devised techniques to evade sanctions, while black markets thrived among the populace.

Another impediment is the efforts of China and Russia to curtail international pressure on North Korea. Beijing and Moscow have been reluctant to entertain the risk of a state or regime collapse that could destabilize the northern Korean Peninsula, even during periods of strained relations with Pyongyang. China, re-evaluating North Korea's strategic significance during the Trump presidency, became more averse to witnessing North Korea succumb to military or economic pressures. Meanwhile, amid its engagement in the conflict in Ukraine, Russia is hesitant to relinquish its partnership, including arms trade, with North Korea. Consequently, it is unsurprising that Beijing and Moscow currently obstruct the United Nations Security Council from issuing the chairman's statements condemning Pyongyang's weapons-related activities, not to mention sanctions resolutions.

Given the impracticality of achieving Pyongyang's denuclearization through international cooperation or coercion, what alternative strategies could be effective?

I believe the most pragmatic approach lies in containment. At its core, containment relies on robust deterrence. The alliance between Seoul and Washington should possess the capability to deter any nuclear aggression or coercion from Pyongyang. For this purpose, deterrence by nuclear punishment must play a primary role. However, deterrence by nuclear and conventional denial also holds significant importance. Equally vital is a comprehensive set of stringent techno-economic sanctions specifically targeting Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. These sanctions should aim to impede and delay the progression of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities, preserving US nuclear superiority. This measure is crucial in ensuring the credibility, effectiveness, and reassurance of US extended deterrence.

By containing Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington can patiently anticipate significant shifts within North Korea, akin to those witnessed in South Africa in the early 1990s, and pivotal changes in Chinese and Russian policies, similar to those that influenced the Soviet Union in its final years. To enhance the probability of successful containment, Seoul and Washington must closely coordinate efforts to broaden international collaboration.

Rollback proves to be an unwise approach. Compelling North Korea to diminish or eliminate its nuclear capabilities can be counterproductive, as such efforts are likely to heighten Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity, reinforcing its determination to maintain nuclear arms. Additionally, rollback initiatives might provoke a backlash from Beijing and Moscow, potentially undermining their support for containment strategies.

If pursuing denuclearization through cooperation is deemed desirable, an initiative led by China and Russia emerges as the most feasible option. Under this framework, Beijing and Moscow jointly offer Pyongyang security guarantees, including nuclear assurances. This approach holds two distinct advantages over initiatives led by Washington. Firstly, China and Russia are the great powers that North Korea distrusts the least, facilitating easier negotiation and implementation of agreements. Secondly, joint security guarantees allow North Korea to mitigate the risk of abandonment and diversify its security reliance. The probability of simultaneous abandonment by two patrons is lower than that by a single patron. Additionally, Pyongyang can avoid excessive dependence on any one power, thereby evading potential political subjugation. Historical instances reveal that most successful cooperative denuclearization efforts stemmed from agreements between clients and patrons. Notably, the American success in denuclearizing South Korea in the early 1980s exemplifies this pattern. The only exception lies in Libya’s denuclearization through cooperation with the US—a scenario challenging to replicate, given Kim Jong-un’s awareness of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s tragic fate after being betrayed by Washington.