►North Korea’s emphasis on massive nuclear production and missiles made South Korea prioritize deterring North Korea’s provocations by i) reinforcing the three-axis system and ii) enhancing extended deterrence through the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group.

►A so-called ‘arms to disarm’ approach is needed to develop conventional deterrence capabilities that render North Korea’s systems obsolete and better detect weapons. South Korea should also expand surveillance and closely monitor artillery rocket launchers.

►Diplomatic and economic strategies based on an international collaborative framework are crucial to dissuade North Korea's nuclear and missile development. 

►It’s crucial to continuously assess whether North Korea’s perspective and decision-making process is ‘rational’ for the dissuasion strategy to be viable.

In fact, North Korea has emphasized the massive production of nuclear warheads and missiles since Kim Jong-un came to power. Kim Jong-un has further stated the need to significantly expand war deterrent capabilities and operate them effectively. These capabilities are expected to enable North Korea to launch tactical nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan in the early stages of a conflict and demonstrate retaliatory capabilities against the United States, ultimately affecting the operation of the US extended deterrence on the Korean peninsula. The recent success of the satellite launch further improves North Korea's command and control, communication, intelligence, and surveillance capabilities, ultimately enhancing the country's targeting capabilities. Finally, North Korea's recent legal codification lowering the threshold for nuclear first use and the establishment of the nuclear command and control system are interpreted as demonstrating an escalate-to-de-escalate strategy. It's worth noting that these actions are not unrelated to the precedent set by Russian President Putin, who repeatedly mentioned the potential use of nuclear weapons during the invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, given that North Korea will continue to launch multiple satellites to create layers of reconnaissance satellites orbiting around the Earth, it is vital to block any connections that could provide North Korea with technical assistance, thus facilitating the speed of launching additional satellites.  

Overall, the current situation on the peninsula makes it South Korea's top priority to explore measures to deter North Korea's provocations. This may involve reinforcing the South Korean three-axis system – Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), and enhancing extended deterrence through the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group, among others. This is a fundamental step for South Korea to convince the North that the capabilities it pursues will not survive, and the North’s offensive capabilities will not deliver the anticipated effectiveness vis-à-vis South Korea and its allies and partners.

Simultaneously, as a dissuasion measure, a so-called 'arms to disarm' approach is needed. This aspect of the strategy focuses on changing the nature of competition. This strategy not only develops and fields new capabilities that render the North’s system obsolete but also increases the probability of detecting the North’s weapon systems. In addition to further strengthening conventional deterrence capabilities, South Korea needs to expand surveillance and reconnaissance activities near the demarcation line. In fact, the South Korean Ministry of Defense's recent suspension of Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the September 19 Military Agreement, which suspended the effectiveness of the no-fly zone, is a highly appropriate measure. Also, considering that the North operates long-range artillery rocket launchers, it is critical to monitor their locations and movements around the demarcation line.

On the diplomatic and economic strategy front, it is crucial to elaborate on measures to dissuade North Korea’s continuous development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Dissuasion measures aim to minimize the benefits North Korea can gain through nuclear and missile development while simultaneously increasing the costs of such developments. So, what benefits could North Korea potentially gain? Examples include securing regime stability and military dominance on the Korean Peninsula, exporting weapons and technology to a third party, increasing U.S. attention on North Korea, and fostering domestic divisions in South Korea regarding perceptions of the North. These are some of the potential gains that North Korea might seek through its nuclear and missile activities. These gains that the North might conceive need to be addressed by imposing export control, strengthening the alignment between South Korea and its allies and partners, strategic communication to the domestic audience in South Korea, etc. It should be noted that all these countermeasures need to be consistent for the long term, regardless of leadership changes.

While dissuasion measures in the defense and military domain are important, they may fall short in addressing the various 'gray zone' threats posed by North Korea, which exist in the intermediate space between military deterrence and crisis management. In reality, North Korea has expanded its illicit activities, such as cryptocurrency theft, cyberattacks, illegal transfers, and exports of weapons to third-world countries. By aligning these activities with military provocations and aggressive rhetoric toward the South, North Korea has broadened its scope of action. Clear measures must be outlined to address these gray-zone provocations, and the establishment of an international collaborative framework is crucial. Recent developments, such as the creation of the trilateral cooperation system between South Korea, the United States, and Japan, expanded cooperation with NATO and Asia Pacific Four member countries, and attempts to resume cooperation with ASEAN and China respectively, are essential foundations for South Korea's global central role. These efforts can also serve as valuable assets in creating a cooperative framework for dealing with North Korea.

On the international cooperation front, it is necessary to prepare in advance for discussions on preventing and reinforcing unnecessary third-party involvement in the Korean Peninsula and sharing relevant information and intelligence in case of a crisis. Domestically, there is a need for continuous platforms for communication that can alleviate the politicization and polarization of the North Korean issue. Examples like these constitute diplomatic and security measures, particularly those aimed at reducing the benefits of North Korea's nuclear and missile development and threats.

Indeed, a crucial aspect of the deterrence and dissuasion strategy is the shared understanding of rationality. The dissuasion strategy presented by South Korea relies on the assumption that South Korea's rationality and decision-making based on that rationality can be applicable to North Korea as well. It is essential to continuously assess whether North Korea's perspective and decision-making process can genuinely remain 'rational' and adjust and implement the dissuasion strategy accordingly. Constant verification and adaptation are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of these strategies of dissuasion and deterrence.