▶ The Wilmington declaration was candid in highlighting the constructive impact of the “personal” in political affairs

▶ The Quad’s minilateral characteristics, from flexibility to ad hoc nature, have highlighted it as an essence of the US pivot to the new “latticework” institutional approach for the emerging Indo-Pacific architecture

▶ What helps the Quad in establishing its soft security-focused framework is the lack of pressure on the hard security front

In late September, as the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met in Wilmington – US President Joe Biden’s hometown – the Quad (as the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” is formally called) summit was symbolic in more ways than one. Apart from being President Biden’s (and Prime Minister Kishida’s) last summit to mark 20 years since the four states came together after the 2004 tsunami, the Wilmington declaration was candid in highlighting the constructive impact of the “personal” in political affairs.

It also resolutely emphasized a future-oriented vision of the Quad as a harmonized group of global actors working specifically for the Indo-Pacific, the differences on certain integral policy perspectives, particularly with outlier India (e.g., supporting multi-polar world order or resistance to treaty alliances) notwithstanding.

Against this background, there is also merit in envisioning the Quad as a soft security framework drawn from the members’ political and economic cohesiveness, but perhaps not “ideological commonality.”  

But what does the continuing bonhomie mean for the constant debates about the Quad’s structural challenges? Or that India has many a time been highlighted as the “weakest” link? Could the Quad be expected to start to take stronger stances on the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan issues? What does the trajectory for the Quad look like in the near future?

Evolving Strategic Coherence

A clear winner post the sixth Quad leaders’ meeting was the show of unity among the member states on the strategic and diplomatic issues – covering a range of spectrum from health to technology – in the Indo-Pacific. More than that, the grouping, which arose out of the need for humanitarian concerns in the wake of the 2004 Tsunami and earthquake, has made such solidarity a running theme.

Three years after the Quad was revived in 2017, the four members included close “like-minded” partners like Vietnam, New Zealand, and  South Korea under the “Quad Plus” platform as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2024, the Quad has launched a vital initiative called the “Cancer Moonshot” to “strengthen the overall cancer care ecosystem in the Indo-Pacific.” In particular, it looks to eradicate preventable diseases like cervical cancer, which has a high rate of incidence and mortality in the region and is globally the fourth most common cause of cancer among women.

At the same time, important “soft” security announcements – from maritime security capacity building to high tech-oriented connectivity and resilience – have underscored the Quad summits. In this context, this year’s releases included a training module for building maritime capacities, an observer mission, and a logistics network project.

The stress is on building infrastructure and wide-ranging collaborations, including in research and with other stakeholders, in several sectors spanning traditional and non-traditional security. At the outset, such measures look relatively innocuous, or even lacking in substance as one critic put the Quad’s latest meeting, against a militarily aggressive China when compared to hard security agreements between states. Yet, in the long run, such ambitious projects will not only build strategic deterrence capabilities but also resilience.

For example, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) aims not only to increase information sharing and improve interoperability between navies but also to keep a tab on “dark shipping.” The IPMDA thus looks into both illegal fishing and unauthorized entry into another state’s territorial waters. It certainly highlights that the intent is to counter China’s militaristic activities at sea.

Moreover, in today’s era of hybrid warfare and authoritarian quasi-alliances (be it China-Russia or Russia-North-Korea), it is difficult to distinguish where hard or soft security begins or ends – particularly in avenues such as cyber security, space, energy, and technology.

Structural Challenges Are Not in the Way

Certainly, the Quad’s minilateral characteristics, from flexibility to ad hoc nature, have highlighted it as an essence of the US pivot to the new “latticework” institutional approach for the emerging Indo-Pacific architecture. In this context, even as the Quad is recognized for its informality, interest-based ideology, and wide ambit, it is gradually acquiring institutional features, including regularized high-level meetings between leaders and foreign ministers and an increasing number of working groups.

Yet, the Quad does not have a secretariat, no intention of allowing bigger membership or expanding the scope to other potential actors in the region to be a part formally, and categorical denial of turning it into a military or even security forum. The lack of such multilateral-oriented structures is not necessarily a negative thing: Despite its “mixed assessment,” the grouping seems much more effective, albeit via a limited collective action, than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the United Nations (UN), which have both failed spectacularly (e.g., Myanmar and West Asia, respectively). Or even a military alliance like NATO, to which the Quad is often erroneously compared, and which by its own former chief’s admission could have done more to prevent the war in Ukraine.

Nor Are AUKUS & Squad Diluting Quad’s Impact

What helps the Quad in establishing its soft security-focused framework is the lack of pressure on the hard security front. Over the years, the US has extended its alliances and partnerships in a manner where its treaty allies are successfully working in tandem with US partners like India, which opposes formal alliance building.

Moreover, India’s policy reservations and multi-aligned diplomacy that strides between the US-led Quad and non-Western forums like BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) “Plus” provide the Quad a unique inclusive character, which would be more palatable to the Global South, too. Today, India is certainly no less a partner than the US treaty allies, and certainly not the oft-quoted, but said, “weakest link,” given the scope of high tech-oriented defense cooperation with all Quad partners, not just the US. Wider, inclusive partnerships are certainly a boon for the US, which is facing a global leadership crisis.

At the same time, the defense pacts like AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) or the Squad (a new grouping between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US) with the US treaty allies look to strengthen the hard security options against China. However, the formation of these new groups with “clearer” strategic goals is not aimed at diluting the Quad, as some critics have vehemently argued. As the Wilmington Declaration and the new US pivot away from the traditional “hub-and-spoke model” suggests, both types of groupings are an integral part of the Indo-Pacific approach. They must be viewed as complementary minilaterals serving broader goals for a secure and stable Indo-Pacific.

Way Forward: More of the Same or Pointed Embrace of Thorny Issues?

Undoubtedly, the Quad is looking to enhance its footprint. For example, the release of a roadmap for increasing manufacturing capacity for clean energy technologies and components after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with President Biden focused on the Quad expanding its outreach in third countries, particularly partnerships in Africa. Such a goal attempts to counter China’s investments in Africa with a focus on green energy ties.

In terms of directly addressing controversial and delicate questions like the Taiwan issue, the Quad has been silent. In the past, on the question of whether to “embrace” Taiwan, all four member states have been more ambiguous about taking an aggressive stand vis-à-vis the crisis in the Taiwan Strait to not enrage China and its insistence on the “one China” policy/principle. However, in the last couple of years, the Quad states have increased their bilateral strategic engagement with Taiwan as the threat from China has substantially increased.

For example, Japan’s top officials have voiced their support for a democratic Taiwan, signaling a shift. And India, too, has stepped up its outreach to Taiwan, signaling an impetus to ties. However, in the Quad, it has come to naught. For that would be interpreted as “containing” China, contravening the official line about the Quad “not directed” at China.

At the same time, on North Korea, all four leaders have reaffirmed the commitment to “complete” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They also indirectly pointed to the recent Russia-North Korea defense pact when expressing “deep concern about countries that are deepening military cooperation with North Korea.” So much so that North Korea denounced the Quad in response – the Kim Jong Un regime’s antipathy to the Quad underscores the impact. But the Quad’s insistence on not increasing its membership to turn formally as a ‘Quad Plus’ mechanism, at least not yet, means that South Korea’s entry into the core forum remains doubtful. As a result, the North Korea issue will remain on the sidelines of the Quad’s more acceptable broader ambit in the near future.   

Nonetheless, such a vision is consistent with the Quad’s evolution that “red lines” on security will not be crossed, not just to prevent China from retaliating but also to assuage broader Indo-Pacific such as Southeast Asian states – where the Quad’s fortunes are on the up – who worry about escalations in this fragile region due to US-led minilaterals.

Perhaps, the Quad’s very minilateral approach – consolidating on common security-oriented issues that matter in the long run while appearing inclusive – as exemplified by the 2024 Declaration seems just what a war-ridden world needs today.