Lee Jae-myung’s victory on the June 3^rd election marked the end of six months of instability in South Korea following the still-shocking decision by Yoon Suk-yeol to declare martial law on  December 3^rd of last year. Importantly, Lee’s victory also opens the door for South Korea to resume leader-level diplomacy, which had been interrupted following Yoon’s martial law declaration.

And what a way for South Korea to come back: by having Lee attend the G7 summit hosted by Canada. This way, Lee becomes the third president in a row to represent South Korea at a G7 summit, following from Moon Jae-in’s presence at the summit hosted by the UK in 2021 and Yoon’s attending the summit hosted by Japan in 2023. Furthermore, there is news that Lee has also been invited to attend the NATO summit to be held in the Netherlands later this month. Yoon already attended the three previous NATO summits.

The invitations for South Korea to attend the G7 and NATO summits, regardless of who is the country’s president, symbolise a structural change in Seoul’s international position: South Korea has now made it to the ranks of globally significant countries. Its diplomatic, economic, technological, military and even soft power resources mean that other countries want to partner with South Korea, and stand ready to listen to its views on global matters.

The flip side is that the rest of the world now expects South Korea to have a position and play a role on issues where in the past it wasn’t expected to, from hostilities in the Middle East to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to China’s challenge to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The idea that South Korea can focus its foreign policy on Northeast Asian regional matters alone is an illusion—never mind circumscribing itself to the Korean Peninsula. Whether South Korean policymakers like it or not, their country today needs to have a global outlook because it has become a global actor.

In this context, the Lee government has promised to pursue a “pragmatic” foreign policy focusing on South Korea’s “national interest”. There is nothing particularly surprising about the leader of a democracy putting the interests of their country first. Ultimately, democratic leaders serve their country’s people. Yet, the question is what South Korea’s national interests are.

As the twelfth largest economy in the world, a trade and tech leader, an increasingly relevant diplomatic actor, and an influential security and military powerhouse, South Korea benefited from the liberal international order in place for decades following the end of the Second World War. That order, however, is now a thing of the past and isn’t coming back any time soon. Neither the US nor China, today’s two superpowers, are going to uphold a system that they think weakens them. Even the EU, the third economic superpower of the 21^st century, is taking a more protectionist approach to trade and investment.

Instead, we live in an era of superpower competition and minilateralism. Organisations such as the G7/G7+, NATO-IP4, South Korea-US-Japan trilateral, AUKUS or CPTPP are increasingly relevant to today’s international relations. Crucially, these organisations allow middle powers such as South Korea to have a voice and shape the policy of other countries—including the US, which cannot completely ignore its allies and partners even under an “America First” approach to foreign policy. This explains why it makes sense for the Lee administration to continue to work within and with the minilaterals that boost its global standing and influence.

Certainly, South Korea will need to continue to prioritise the ROK-US alliance as the key basis of its foreign and security policy, as Lee has repeatedly indicated in recent weeks. After all, the alliance not only benefits South Korea directly but also indirectly by opening the door for Seoul to join minilaterals involving the US and/or countries with a similar foreign policy outlook to Washington’s. (At least, pre-Trump administration.)

The view that working together with the US and fellow democracies will antagonise China and perhaps also Russia misses two crucial points. The first is that cooperation with these countries provides South Korea with yet another bargaining chip in its dealing with China. Would Beijing feel more comfortable with a Seoul isolated from Washington, Tokyo, the G7 or NATO or with a Seoul working together with these and other partner and institutions? The answer to this question should be clear. South Korea is stronger by working together with countries with a similar worldview. This doesn’t mean isolating China. Diplomacy and dialogue with Beijing are crucial. But South Korea should approach this relationship from a position of as much strength as possible.

The second crucial point is that Beijing will find a reason to be displeased with Seoul no matter what South Korean leaders do. Under Xi Jinping, this was the case with Park Geun-hye and her decision to allow the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system, Moon and his decision to criticise Beijing’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and Yoon and his decision to attend the NATO summits. This is another reason why Lee should put South Korea’s national interest over China’s possible reactions when implementing policy.

Considering the above, it seems clear that Lee will pursue a foreign policy that doesn’t differ much from that of his predecessors. As I have argued elsewhere, this is unsurprising. South Korea has a well-defined grand strategy dating back to its democratic transition of 1987. Certainly, each new president brings in a new rhetoric. But South Korean actions tend to remain fairly constant across administrations. And as South Korea becomes a more prominent global actor, its room to make sudden changes to its foreign and security policy is more constrained than when the country was weaker. Lee’s attendance of the G7 summit thus symbolises both that Seoul has arrived and that there is an expectation that it will behave in a certain way. Overall, this is positive for South Korea.