Key Takeaways:

- Trump's cannibalisation of the summit also meant that there were no specific points devoted to reaffirming the importance of enhancing NATO’s ties with its Indo-Pacific partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

- The decision of Australian PM Anthony Albanese, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese PM Shigeru Ishiba to skip the NATO gathering in The Hague—leaving New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon as the only IP4 head of government in attendance—expectedly drew criticism from opposition parties at home and raised concerns abroad about how these countries perceive the value of their partnerships with NATO.

- Yet, in the absence of the Biden administration acting as an honest broker insistent on an inclusive and holistic approach to partnerships management, the IP4’s downgraded presence in The Hague underscores the perception that the United States is stepping back from the NATO-Indo-Pacific partnership framework.

Passing by the skin of one’s teeth. This is how the NATO Summit in The Hague could probably best be characterized. In the weeks leading up to the two-day meeting, it had become clear that preserving internal cohesion was going to be the North Atlantic Alliance’s utmost priority. Trump’s unpredictability and his ambivalence towards the United States’ traditional allies meant that the agenda had to be reduced to the bare minimum. Consequently, the outcome also represented the lowest common denominator, an agreement to increase defence spending in a way consistent with NATO deterrence objectives while keeping Washington unequivocally committed to collective defence. In trying to anticipate any curveball from Donald Trump, concerted efforts by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and national leaders to appease and comply with the US President clearly reflected their anxiety regarding the upcoming review on US global force posture. The direct consequence of such a singular focus on Trump’s budget demands was that no room for either long-term vision or ambition could be expected. Every potential cause of friction with the Trump administration was left out. No word about climate change, hybrid threats, tougher strategy towards Russia and of course China can be found in the final declaration, which represents a mere 10% of the length of last year’s Washington declaration.

Trump's cannibalisation of the summit also meant that there were no specific points devoted to reaffirming the importance of enhancing NATO’s ties with its Indo-Pacific partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) were once again invited to the annual NATO summit as they have been every year since Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Under former President Joe Biden, Washington actively pursued enhanced cross-regional defense cooperation between Indo-Pacific and European allies and partners. In a marked departure from the previous administration, current US officials have regularly reiterated their focus on transactional relationships and region-specific strategies. At the last Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth reaffirmed his administration’s lack of support for increased collaboration between European and Indo-Pacific allies, emphasizing that Europe should prioritize concerns in their backyard and allow the United States to take full responsibility for Indo-Pacific security. Gone are the days of a US president embracing the Transatlantic Alliance’s traditional diplomatic symbolism and bridging the IP4 with NATO under the framework of a global democratic coalition. This comes in spite of continuous reporting that North Korea has seemingly no intention to scale down its support in terms of soldiers, workers, and arms to Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine. Pyongyang’s entanglement in the conflict in Ukraine is in fact, yet another demonstration of just how deeply intertwined the European and the Indo-Pacific security theatres are.

The decision of Australian PM Anthony Albanese, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese PM Shigeru Ishiba to skip the NATO gathering in The Hague—leaving New Zealand PM Christopher Luxon as the only IP4 head of government in attendance—expectedly drew criticism from opposition parties at home and raised concerns abroad about how these countries perceive the value of their partnerships with NATO. While Deputy PM Richard Marles had stepped in for Albanese at last year’s NATO Summit as well, Lee Jae Myung and Shigeru Ishiba’s cancellations have been framed as a missed opportunity to double down on efforts under their predecessors to present South Korea and Japan as responsible and trusted partners in global security. In the case of President Lee, his participation held further salience after protracted domestic political uncertainty amid the leadership vacuum following Yoon Suk Yeol’s imposition of martial law and his consequent impeachment. While optics matter in international politics and diplomacy, for South Korea and Japan the stakes were not high enough to rush bilateral meetings with Trump on burden sharing and trade tariffs on the sidelines of the NATO Summit. Trump's inconstancy, on full display at the G7 meeting in Canada, has made current leaders in Seoul and Tokyo more cautious about investing diplomatic resources in potentially unproductive engagements in the midst of pressing domestic issues and Middle Eastern instability. All the more so, President Lee should wait for better conditions for his long-anticipated inaugural talks with President Trump instead of risking a potential ambush in a hastily organised meeting.

Attempts to read the IP4 leaders’ non-attendance as indication of their commitment (or lack thereof) to NATO and vice versa, have somewhat overshadowed some of the important initiatives agreed in The Hague with respect to its relationship with Indo-Pacific partners. Among them, Australia managed to sign a Partnership Agreement with NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency while National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reached an agreement to create a director-general level consultation mechanism between South Korea and NATO tasked with identifying concrete ways to strengthen defense sector collaboration. Publicity and optics aside, the bulk of NATO relationships with individual IP4 countries is built not just around summit diplomacy but more concretely through regular contacts. Last April, for instance, saw the ROK Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) Minister Seok Jong-gun holding his first ever meetings with senior officials from both NATO and the EU in Brussels, which arguably contributed to Wi securing the agreement with Rutte.

As NATO allies have pledged substantial commitments to increase defense spending, the focus must now shift to maximizing the effectiveness of these investments, which should translate into improved capabilities that justify increased financial commitments. In this sense, like-minded partners with advanced industrial ecosystems like some of the IP4 countries can provide substantial value in terms of efficiency and flexibility to these efforts. NATO Secretary-General Rutte has expressed willingness to involve the Indo-Pacific partners in upcoming initiatives designed to bolster the Alliance's defense capabilities as it expands operational commitments. Participating with NATO member countries in collaborative procurement efforts in turn can offer Indo-Pacific national defense industries the opportunity to leverage economies of scale, access NATO-managed supply chains, and contribute to the development of shared capabilities in support of collective security.

Significant progress has been made in developing concrete pathways for cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions since the symbolic meaning of having the IP4 leaders at the NATO Madrid Summit in 2022. Yet, in the absence of the Biden administration acting as an honest broker insistent on an inclusive and holistic approach to partnerships management, the IP4’s downgraded presence in The Hague underscores the perception that the United States is stepping back from the NATO-Indo-Pacific partnership framework, challenging structural incentives for continued engagement between the two regions. As European allies must learn how to set priorities and advance integration without US leadership so too should NATO sustain the momentum for cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners without robust American support. This means consistent messaging that working as closely as possible with NATO is very much in the advantage of Canberra, Wellington, Seoul, and Tokyo in terms of how they assert their national interests within the Indo-Pacific region.

As Secretary-General Rutte pushes for more practical cooperation, it can be expected that the bulk of NATO’s engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners will continue to be pursued bilaterally. This is also a reflection of the fact that aside from the joint recognition that what happens in Europe affects the security of the Indo-Pacific and vice versa, the IP4 countries still hold distinct levels of ambition when it comes to deepening their relationships with NATO. Moreover, while there have been instances in which the IP4 have used their collective platform to coalesce support over issues that represent direct threats to their security—like North Korea’s missile launches and its military cooperation with the Russia Federation—sufficient interest in formalizing the IP4 grouping in the vein of NATO's Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative remains limited.