- Three out of the four IP4 partners (South Korea, Japan, Australia) declined the invitation to attend on short notice.

- Efforts to move the IP4 partnership from dialogue to action in operational, defence industrial, technology cooperation, and maritime security risks faltering, thereby weakening its intended deterrence, particularly to prevent a ‘Taiwan contingency’.

- President Lee's absence due to urgent domestic matters could be beneficial for South Korean politics.

Volatility and change are the defining characteristics of contemporary politics. Rather than focusing on the outcomes of President Lee's participation in the NATO Summit in The Hague, this analysis centres on the implications of non-participation.

Three out of the four IP4 partners (South Korea, Japan, Australia) declined the invitation to attend on short notice. Only the New Zealand Prime Minister proceeded with the visit, as it was part of a larger trip that included Beijing, Brussels and the Flanders Fields. This non-attendance deviates from the tradition established at the 2022 Madrid Summit.

First, there is a valid logistical reason: having just returned from the G7 Summit in Canada, another long-distance flight would keep key decision-makers out of domestic politics at a crucial time. While this fact was known from the outset, it weighs in stronger for President Lee Jae-myung, who is only a few weeks into his presidency.

Second, expectations have changed. Unlike previous summits, The Hague summit focused more on ‘internal’ matters rather than programmatic issues. NATO members struggled in advance to agree on a 5% of GDP defence spending increase by 2035, dividing it into 3.5% for defence and 1.5% for related infrastructure to reach a compromise. President Trump, known for his lack of enthusiasm for NATO, made organisers arrange a lavish dinner, an overnight stay in the Dutch royal palace, and only one brief working session to keep him engaged.

Avoiding a direct discussion of Article 5, NATO's core deterrence principle, to prevent Trump from questioning it, was not only uninspiring but spread doubt about the Alliance’s cohesion, although finally confirmed as “ironclad commitment”.

Third, all IP4 leaders were disappointed that at the G7 Summit the planned meetings with President Trump did not materialise because of his premature and abrupt return to Washington, allegedly because of the Israel-Iran war. Another disappointment would have conveyed the message of US disinterest and gone down badly with the respective publics and therefore had to be avoided. Kiwi PM Christopher Luxon suffered this fate; despite attending the NATO summit, he was not granted an audience. This aspect was especially important for President Lee as he is looking for the opportunity for his first personal encounter with the US president to discuss economics, security and the alliance.

A missed opportunity or a smart move?

The short Summit statement did not refer to the Indo-Pacific, Asia, China, North Korea and Russia, in stark contrast to the 2024 Washington Declaration (“The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.”). This is also contrary to the preceding G7 statement which contains a whole paragraph on the Indo-Pacific and China. While this can be explained away by the above-described specific nature of this summit, there remains a stale taste. NATO’s outreach to the Indo Pacific and a considerable public diplomacy effort to present itself in the region aimed at conveying the message that the Trans-Pacific and the Trans-Atlantic theatres are closely linked as there is only one security; China had been singled out as being of special concern.

This narrative certainly damaged trust in the US as a reliable alliance partner and main security provider, not only in Europe but also in Asia.  This spurred a discussion in the IP4 countries: South Korea’s public sees value in going nuclear; Japan as well as New Zealand are planning a conventional upgrade; Australia worries about an announced AUKUS review impacting its nuclear submarine project, which came at a significant diplomatic cost after shifting away from France.

If the non-participation aimed to avoid discussing the increase in defence budgets, it will not stop the topic from being imposed by the US. South Korea had tried at the closing days of the Biden Administration in October 2024 a pre-emptive strike in settling with the US for on a new five-year deal, consisting of an increase of 8.3% in the first year (reaching $1.125 billion) with further annual increases at maximum of 5%. The likelihood that President Trump returns to the Korean “money machine” is high. In addition, South Korea has already built Camp Humphrey, the largest US overseas military base, at the considerable cost of US$11 billion. The other three IP4 partners will not be spared either.

Efforts to move the IP4 partnership from dialogue to action in operational, defence industrial, technology cooperation, and maritime security risks faltering, thereby weakening its intended deterrence, particularly to prevent a ‘Taiwan contingency’.

This is in stark contrast to the statement on the official NATO website: ”In today’s complex security environment, relations with like-minded partners are increasingly important to address cross-cutting security issues and global challenges. The Indo-Pacific is important for the Alliance, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.”

A lower-level meeting of officials from the IP4 with SG Rutte confirming in a statement everything one had expected the leaders to confirm, is an exercise of damage control but cannot conceal the return of the Transatlantic focus, not least as the US regards the Transpacific as its main domain.  

Domestic politics in South Korea

President Lee's absence due to urgent domestic matters could be beneficial for South Korean politics. Already candidate Lee Jae-myung had hinted in May that he might not participate in the NATO summit and was critical of the foreign policy of his by now disgraced predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol who had attended three NATO summits.

Thus, he appeals to parts of his former Democratic Party that are wary of closer US ties and want to avoid upsetting China and Russia. At the same time in counterbalancing the presidential absence and making good use of the damage-control exercise mentioned, the National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac, acting as special presidential envoy, established with NATO Secretary General Rutte a working-level consultative body on defence industry cooperation to discuss specific measures to enhance cooperation in the sector. Considering South Korea’s multibillion dollar arms sales to backfill Ukraine, this move appears to be an early expression of President Lee’s ‘pragmatic foreign policy’, based on South Korea’s national interest.

Finally, President Lee as the host of the 2025 APEC Sumit at the end of October in Gyeongju, has a strong interest to attract leaders. This includes Chinese President Xi for a long-awaited summit. The APEC summit also serves as an alternative opportunity for a meeting with President Trump to discuss trade and security issues, if neither an earlier bilateral meeting nor one in the margins of the UN General Assembly are feasible. This assumes that Trump's interest in trade deals may motivate him to attend the APEC Summit.