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Key Takeaways:
- In Trump’s Oval Office, when politically
progressive leaders of allied countries challenge Trump, fireworks ensue. But
South Korea could turn out to be an exception.
- Lee administration appears to be more open to
discussing regional security under the alliance modernization framework than
the Yoon administration.
- If the two leaders are able to stabilize the
U.S.-South Korea relationship, the primary challenge may be whether both Trump
and Lee can abandon “America First” and “Korea first” instincts to “Make the
Alliance Great Again.”
U.S. President Donald Trump has taken a radical approach in
his efforts to transform the global economic and security order to align with
the rhetoric of his first administration. In the meantime, South Korea has been
embroiled in domestic political paralysis and a difficult power transition to
progressive leadership in the aftermath of Yoon Suk Yeol’s misguided
declaration of martial law in December 2024. The Lee Jae Myung administration
has thus far embraced continuity on foreign policy issues, despite Lee’s
rhetoric during the campaign trail. In Trump’s Oval Office, when politically
progressive leaders of allied countries challenge Trump, fireworks ensue. But
South Korea could turn out to be an exception.
A primary reason to expect cooperation rather than fireworks
between Trump and Lee is that Lee worked overtime during his presidential
campaign to bring his policy positions into alignment with Trump’s preferences.
Lee’s move to the center was motivated in part by steady South Korean public
opinion in favor of the United States and skeptical of China. Lee signaled his
support for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and for cooperative relations between
South Korea and Japan in interviews with foreign media in March, despite having
regularly criticized Yoon in previous years for being too solicitous of the
United States and too willing to overlook historical issues with Japan. Lee’s
newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun stopped first in Japan
before visiting the United States as part of his first overseas trip, and Lee
will meet with Japan’s prime minister en route to his first meeting with Trump.
A second signal of Lee’s support for continuity in relations
with the United States is his decision to promote seasoned pro-U.S. individuals
over pro-China individuals to senior positions in his new administration. The
U.S.-South Korea summit announcement stated that the two leaders would “discuss
ways to develop the Korea-U.S. alliance into a future-oriented, comprehensive
strategic alliance”—language that mirrors the rhetoric used by the conservative
Yoon administration. The main task for Trump and Lee is whether both sides can
find ways to “modernize
the alliance in a mutually beneficial manner,” a priority the Trump
administration has already begun to discuss with South Korea in response to
changes in the regional security environment.
Further evidence of Lee’s pragmatism is the early efforts by
his new cabinet to reach a bilateral agreement with the Trump administration on
a new tariff framework. A distinctive aspect of the tariff framework has been
South Korea’s pledge to support USD 150 billion in technologies and investments
to “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again,” a clear signal of Lee’s
willingness to center the country’s trade and investments around its
partnership with the United States.
Early discussions between Trump and Lee will likely focus
around the issue of “modernizing the alliance,” including pledges of increasing
South Korea’s defense spending levels, strategic flexibility for U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK) to pursue off-peninsula missions and expand its role to deter both
North Korea and China, and rebalancing defense cost-sharing between the two
countries in the context of a more comprehensive defense partnership.
Most notable in this regard is that the Lee administration
appears to be more open to discussing regional security under the alliance
modernization framework than the Yoon administration—senior officials under the
Yoon administration routinely deflected comments about South Korea’s role in a
Taiwan contingency. It remains an open question whether Lee’s views will evolve
from his controversial campaign statement that South Korea should say “thank
you” to China and stay out of a cross-strait conflict. But the recent public
acknowledgement by Foreign Minister Cho Hyun that aspects of China’s maritime
behavior are “problematic” suggests that Lee’s administration will be open to
coordinating with the Trump administration on policies toward China.
On the other hand, North Korea is an issue on which Trump
and Lee may already be in close alignment. Lee has already dismantled
loudspeakers along the demilitarized zone, made major cutbacks to radio
transmissions of South Korean broadcasts targeting the North, and signaled his
administration’s interest in renewing inter-Korean dialogue. Kim Jong
Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, initially responded with hostility to
inter-Korean contact but acknowledged that her brother’s relationship with
Trump is “not bad.” Both Trump and Lee may agree on the desirability of
engaging with Kim, despite the North’s clear expressions of disinterest in
denuclearization.
Most significant to alliance dynamics under Trump and Lee is
that Lee shows no inclination to challenge Trump. Although the two leaders come
from opposite ends of the political spectrum, they share a number of things in
common. They are both leaders who have survived assassination attempts at
campaign rallies, and both may regard themselves as having been persecuted by
political rivals and as predestined for a national leadership role.
Trump has acknowledged Lee as South Korea’s elected leader
despite efforts by both MAGA supporters and some Korean conservatives to lure
Trump into weighing in on the political crisis that resulted in Lee’s election
as president. If the two leaders are able to stabilize the U.S.-South Korea
relationship, the primary challenge may be whether both Trump and Lee can
abandon “America First” and “Korea first” instincts to “Make the Alliance Great
Again.”
Scott Snyder, author of The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not, is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), an organization registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and funded by the government of the Republic of Korea.