Key Takeaways:

- Geopolitical & Criminal Fusion: The proliferation of "scam compounds" in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos is driven by the migration of Chinese organized crime into authoritarian states, where they leverage citizenship-by-investment schemes and post-pandemic real estate distress to establish secure criminal enclaves. 

- Corporate-Style Evolution: These criminal enterprises have evolved into multinational corporate structures where Chinese syndicates act as "masterminds" managing profits, while local gangs oversee operations and coerced victims (often trafficked under false employment pretenses) execute the scams. 

- Transnational Security Response: Recognizing that this has escalated from a domestic issue to a global security threat involving human trafficking and money laundering across 16 countries, South Korea has established a "Special Unit" in Cambodia and initiated international cooperation frameworks like "Breaking Chains."

A recent spate of violent crimes targeting South Koreans in Cambodia has provoked widespread outrage and mounting calls for prompt action. The South Korean government issued a special travel advisory and initiated an all-out response in cooperation with the Cambodian government. The establishment of a "Special Unit for Korea" within the Cambodian police force on 10 November 2025 marked a significant development in the ongoing efforts to combat transnational crime. In addition, the initiative titled Breaking Chains, in collaboration with over 10 countries and international organizations, including the United States, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Police Forces (ASEANAPOL), underscores the commitment to international cooperation in addressing online scams and related crimes. The issues currently unfolding in Cambodia indicate the emergence of a new type of security threat, rather than isolated incidents targeting individual victims. The criminal problem that has threatened the safety of citizens has now evolved into a regional security threat, and moreover, a global security threat.

Scam Compounds in Southeast Asia: A Fusion of Organized Crime and Geopolitics

At present, the hubs for scam crimes targeting the entire world are primarily located in Southeast Asia. Since such entities are known to engage in the commission of cyber-fraud, such organizations are also referred to as 'scam complexes', 'scam compounds' or 'scam centers'. It is evident that online scams are not a phenomenon unique to Southeast Asia. However, the online scams in Southeast Asai, centered in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR, have unique feature, a combination of organized crime and geopolitics.

The formation of collective crime complexes centered in Southeast Asia, which specialize in online scams, can be largely attributed to three factors. The primary factor contributing to this phenomenon is the influx of Chinese criminal organizations into the region. It is evident that foreign background organized crime perpetrates illegal activities targeting the same background diaspora. However, the case of online scams in Southeast Asia is distinct. This is due to the fact that it involves the migration of criminal organisations under the guise of investment. In response to the intensified enforcement measures by the Chinese government against online gambling, organized crime operating within this sector have relocated to Southeast Asian countries that share a border with China. Initially, these criminal organisations relocated to countries such as Thailand; however, as the scale of their illegal activities expanded, they sought out more secure locations for operation. The objective of these actors was to establish a stable breeding ground for crime by leveraging infrastructure investments, including real estate, and citizenship-by-investment schemes.

The second factor is indicative of the persistent political instability and the maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. In the case of Cambodia, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has been accused of monopolizing power and maintaining an authoritarian system that suppresses opposition parties, civil society, and the media. In the process of seeking funding sources for power succession and maintenance, a citizenship-by-investment scheme was introduced, which resulted in an influx of organized crime. As these organizations became patrons of the authoritarian regime, the corruption of public authority – a typical type of transnational crime – combined with online scams. A similar situation is observed in Myanmar, which has emerged as a significant hub for online scam crimes subsequent to Cambodia. The ongoing political turbulence and pervasive insecurity that ensued subsequent to the 2021 military coup have collectively engendered a milieu conducive to the proliferation of online fraudulent activities.

Finally, the impact of the pandemic caused by the Covid-19 pandemic must be considered. The global spread of the novel virus, Covid-19, has precipitated a profound digital transformation. This has resulted in a significant shift in many individuals' day-to-day activities, with a considerable proportion of these activities now being conducted within online spaces. The digitalisation of daily life also resulted in a considerable expansion of the operational arena for organized crime into the online sphere. This has led to the creation of an environment conducive to a substantial increase in online scams. Concurrently, the quarantine measures implemented to curtail the spread of the Covid-19 had particularly deleterious consequences in authoritarian states. Consequently, numerous facilities with the capacity to accommodate large groups encountered financial challenges, prompting Chinese organized crime to acquire undervalued real estate. These Chinese organized crimes began to establish connections with local organized crimes, leading to a diversification of scam s, perpetrators, and victims. Concurrently, there was an increase in demand for personnel to participate in these crimes. It is evident that resorts, casinos, and urban apartment complexes acquired by organized crimes provide a stable environment for the scams. Consequently, a criminal ecosystem was established that had the capacity to accommodate a significant number of individuals concurrently and was isolated from external access.

Multinational corporate transformation of organized crime and the evolution of the criminal business model

The formation of a stable criminal ecosystem provided the foundation for online scam organizations to diversify their operations and seek various types of victims. This development subsequently led to a three-stage evolution of their criminal business model. At the inception of Chinese criminal organizations' presence in Southeast Asia, their primary objective was the operation of illegal gambling websites targeting their own citizens in mainland China. Consequently, the perpetrators were identified as Chinese nationals from the mainland, while the victims comprised individuals engaged in online gambling activities located within the same geographical region. The second stage occurred during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, as profits from online gambling sites decreased due to the Chinese government's cryptocurrency regulations, they modified their business model to pursue more sophisticated and fabricated online scams. While Chinese organized crimes remained the primary perpetrators, the victims expanded beyond mainland China to include individuals from countries within the region. The geographical distribution of these fraudulent enterprises has been observed to extend from China's border regions to countries such as Cambodia and Myanmar.

In the present third phase, there is evidence to suggest that Chinese organized crimes, local organized crimes or gangs, and organized crimes from other countries are combining to form a multinational corporate structure. The nature of online scams has become increasingly diverse, encompassing a wide range of fraudulent activities. These include voice phishing, investment fraud, stock market pump-and-dump schemes, romance scams, and recently, employment scams with human trafficking. In order to attract victims from a range of nationalities, fraudulent scenarios are being developed on a daily basis, with consideration given to the cultural, social, and linguistic characteristics of the target countries. It is evident that online scam organizations do not exclusively prioritise fraudulent activities. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that these groups are rapidly integrating with traditional transnational crime areas, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and corruptions. In a manner analogous to the pursuit of business diversification by corporations, organized crimes too explore various avenues for expansion.

A further division of labour is emerging, based on the origin of the scammers in the organization. Chinese organized crimes have been identified as the high-level actors of the fraudulent ecosystem. These groups have been observed to acquire citizenship in the host country for the purpose of establishing permanent residence. They then function as the "masterminds" of the operation, overseeing the management of the bases and the distribution of profits. Concurrently, local organized crimes establish an organizational structure that oversees direct operations. Furthermore, evidence suggests that organized crimes from other countries are also integrated as sub-organizations in order to attract victims. It is important to note that the perpetrators of such crimes do not necessarily come from traditional organized crimes. This phenomenon encompasses individuals who, having already been enticed into online fraudulent schemes, proceed to seek new victims within their personal networks. It is also important to note cases where some victims arriving in Cambodia are coerced and threatened by local organizations into participating in online scams. This finding suggests the presence of an overlap between the victims and perpetrators.

Scam Pandemic from the Global Spread of Cybercrime from Southeast Asia

The case of online scams in Southeast Asia demonstrates that crimes, typically perceived as domestic issues, have the potential to escalate into threats to international security. Concurrently, it demonstrates how a domestic security concern can evolve into a matter of foreign policy.

As of 2024, Cambodia is not the only Southeast Asian country in which criminal activities involving Chinese and local organized crimes have been detected. Myanmar and Laos are significant hubs for online scams, as are the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore. The phenomenon of extensive damage is occurring not only in Southeast Asia but also in East Asia, throughout Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas. The profits generated from online scams are routed through or accumulated in 16 countries, including adjacent Southeast Asian nations, as well as the United Arab Emirates, Uganda, and Kazakhstan. In a manner analogous to the advent of Southeast Asian scam compounds in the aftermath of the global pandemic of the Covid-19, online fraudulent activity is proliferating on a transnational scale.

Challenges and the Way Forward

As articulated by a police officer formerly deployed to Korean Desk in the Philippines, "evil is diligent." In a manner akin to bona fide actors, fraudulent activities perpetrated online are perpetually and methodically evolving. In order to combat the proliferation of online scams, including those operating within the Cambodian context, a multifaceted, organized, and diligent response is imperative. The notion of evil as a concept that is characterized by diligence prompts the question of how individuals and societies ought to respond to it.

The swift and certain punishment of perpetrators of scams that have already occurred is essential for delivering justice and as a preventive measure against similar incidents. In the context of mutual legal assistance, it is imperative to consider diplomatic and security measures that can elicit active cooperation from Cambodian authorities. Concurrently, measures for the recovery and support of victims of Cambodian online scams must be deliberated. In view of the constantly evolving nature of online scams, there is a need for continuous collection of trend information and consistent tracking of their potential links with domestic organized crimes. While the response to scams themselves is important, an effective response must also include the eradication of other types of crimes that frequently accompany scams. In this regard, the establishment of whole-of-government approach against online scams and the creation of a coordination agency also need to be considered.