Key Takeaways:

- Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is positioning herself as Abe’s successor, advancing a pragmatic version of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” diplomacy while moderating her conservative instincts to build broad public support.

- Despite her strong early approval ratings, Takaichi faces immediate diplomatic challenges with China and South Korea, testing her ability to balance deterrence, stability, and political restraint.

- Her long-term success hinges on replicating Abe’s strategy of broadening her political base—avoiding ideological drift, managing regional frictions, and sustaining a stable, outward-looking foreign policy.

Since its inauguration in October 2025, Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has made clear her intention to continue the foreign policy trajectory laid out by the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Immediately after taking office, Takaichi met with U.S. President Donald Trump during his visit to Japan. Walking arm in arm with him, Takaichi sought to recreate the close personal relationship that Abe had forged with Trump.

Takaichi has also been energetically engaging in summit diplomacy to maintain and strengthen Abe’s vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”. Domestically, she has instructed a revision of the three key national security documents—the “National Security Strategy”, “National Defense Strategy”, and “Defense Buildup Program”—and has decided to frontload defense spending increases, thereby advancing Abe’s long-term ambition to make Japan a more “normal” state.

At the same time, Takaichi has demonstrated a pragmatic willingness to restrain her conservative ideological preferences. Notably, she refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine during the autumn festival—something she had repeatedly done while serving as a cabinet minister. During her trip to South Korea for the APEC Summit in October, she held meetings with both the South Korean and Chinese leaders. In her summit with President Lee Jae-myung, the two sides agreed to advance a future-oriented and stable Japan–Korea relationship and to continue shuttle diplomacy.

Positioning herself as a “moderate conservative”, Takaichi has deliberately distanced herself from far-right groups such as the Sanseitō, which has expanded its support base through xenophobic rhetoric. These pragmatic gestures have contributed to the administration’s strong start, earning high support especially among younger generations. In the most recent public opinion survey conducted in November, support for the Takaichi Cabinet reached 82 percent, marking the second-highest level in Japan’s postwar history—surpassed only by Junichiro Koizumi’s Cabinet.

Despite this favorable beginning, the administration has already encountered significant problems in Northeast Asian diplomacy. In Diet deliberations, Takaichi stated that a Taiwan contingency could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” permitting the exercise of collective self-defense—prompting strong backlash from China. Although her statement was broadly consistent with the Japanese government’s previous position, China responded with economic coercion, including urging its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan and effectively suspending imports of Japanese seafood.

In November, moreover, it was revealed that a South Korean Air Force aircraft had flown over Takeshima/Dokdo, which is claimed by the Japanese government. As a result, the planned refueling support by the Japan Self-Defense Forces was canceled, and subsequent scheduled joint naval exercises were also suspended—casting a shadow over bilateral defense cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul.

Can Takaichi really emulate Abe’s ability to pursue realistic and strategic diplomacy on the basis of stable political leadership? Here too, learning from Abe’s experience may be essential. During his first administration (2006–07), Abe foregrounded hawkish themes—such as “overcoming the postwar regime”—which provoked strong domestic and international criticism and ultimately contributed to the administration’s collapse. Drawing on that painful experience, Abe in his second administration deliberately moderated his rhetoric and broadened his political wings.

Unlike his first administration, which prioritized loyalists, his second premiership incorporated many liberal-leaning and female lawmakers into cabinet and key LDP positions, forming a cross-factional governing structure. Abe refrained from visiting Yasukuni immediately after taking office and limited his eventual visit the following year to “the first and the last,” minimizing diplomatic fallout.

In the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War Statement of August 2015, Abe upheld historical statements by previous cabinets—including the Murayama Statement—expressing the feelings of “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for Japan’s actions during the war. The statement also demonstrated sensitivity to women’s human rights, referring to the suffering of women whose dignity had been violated during the war. In November of the same year, he reached an agreement with South Korean President Park Geun-hye expressing “apology and remorse” to wartime comfort women, framing the settlement as “final and irreversible.”

Abe also pushed through participation in Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations despite opposition from LDP conservatives and agricultural interests, expanded the acceptance of foreign workers, strengthened welfare for younger and child-rearing generations, and advanced “liberal” labor reforms such as reducing long working hours and promoting women’s workforce participation. As a result, Abe succeeded in securing broad public support—including from young people and women—and maintained the longest continuous administration in postwar Japan.

Takaichi is undoubtedly aware of Abe’s success model, yet key differences remain. Unlike Abe—born into a political dynasty and leader of an LDP faction—Takaichi comes from a non-political family and belongs to no faction, leaving her without Abe’s robust political base. While Abe excelled at building relationships and was often described as a “master of personal diplomacy,” Takaichi is known for avoiding social gatherings and is sometimes characterized as introverted or reclusive.

The weakening of the LDP and the withdrawal of Kōmeitō, traditionally the party’s electoral machine, from the coalition have further destabilized the administration’s political foundation. Many observers also express concern about Takaichi’s lack of experience, as she has never held key cabinet posts such as foreign minister or finance minister. The above-mentioned Taiwan-related remarks arguably reflect her inexperience especially in diplomacy. Several top posts in her cabinet, who won their positions due to loyalty to Takaichi, are also filled by relatively inexperienced figures.

Being a woman, moreover, does not necessarily provide an advantage in Japan’s heavily male-dominated political world. Should these vulnerabilities erode her political base, Takaichi may face pressure to cater to conservative hardliners, risking a drift toward simplistic or extreme policies.

For now, the Takaichi administration rests on the volatile foundation of public popularity. To maintain this support, she must pursue balanced policies—both foreign and domestic—much like the Abe administration. In its China policy, the Takaichi administration need not capitulate to Beijing’s economic coercion. However, it must at the same time restrain provocative rhetoric within the government, avoid any escalation of tensions, even marginal, and work toward stabilizing and normalizing the bilateral relationship.

In relations with South Korea, it is essential to maintain the positive atmosphere that has continued since the Lee Myung-bak administration. In this regard, the late-November meeting between Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi and the South Korean ambassador to Japan—where both sides agreed to advance bilateral defense exchanges—should be welcomed. Although complex issues, including historical disputes, continue to persist between the two countries, both sides must exercise wisdom to ensure that these issues do not spill over into the diplomatic or security realms.

The Takaichi administration should also continue strengthening its commitment to maintaining a free and open international order, avoiding any drift toward xenophobia or “Japan First” nationalism. Ultimately, the key to her success lies in “spreading her wings” from the right to the left, broadening her support base beyond ideological boundaries and stabilizing her political footing in an increasingly complex strategic environment.