Historically, North Korea’s time-tested tactics has been to welcome a new U.S. administration with a provocative weapons test; the North greeted both the Obama and Trump administrations only weeks after their inaugurations with long-range missile and nuclear tests. But seven months after the Biden administration entered the office, we have not seen the kind of provocation we...

      Ever since North Korea’s nuclear development program first came under increasing international scrutiny in the early 1990s, it has dominated the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula for thirty years. Despite all the possible measures taken so far, both the South Korean and American governments have failed to prevent North Korea from advancing its nuclear weapons program. Simply put, N...

      On March 25, North Korea carried out a test-launch of two upgraded KN23 short-range ballistic missiles. Presumably this was the same SRBM that was highlighted in the January 15 military parade, which unleashed much speculation within the Pyongyang watching community about new North Korean capabilities and expectations of tests to come. After all, it had been over a year since the last North Korea...

        Since the US-DPRK negotiations in Stockholm broke down in October 2019, North Korea’s attitude towards the United States has exhibited two unusual characteristics. First, North Korea has refused to partake in negotiations over denuclearization despite the Biden administration’s relatively flexible approach to the issue. Second, eve...

The Biden administration has rolled out what it is describing a “calibrated and practical approach” to negotiations with North Korea, with seemingly more realistic expectations about the pacing and sequencing of negotiations once they resume. However, there appears to be no real strategy for how to restart negotiations—at least not one that recognizes how political dynamics have changed since the last round. Gi...