► Anchored by the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, combined military exercises on the Korean Peninsula have evolved significantly over the past seventy years, the ebb and flow of political tides on both sides of the Pacific Ocean resulting in a level of familiarity and intimacy unique in the history of military alliances. Despite numerous challenges, the oft-lauded blood alliance has endured.

► Moving forward, the ROK-US Alliance needs to pull back the curtain and do an honest assessment of military readiness and shape its training exercise to focus on areas previously neglected.

► While the ROK-US Alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression for the past seventy years, the war in the Ukraine has demonstrated that just because a country can put on flashy and headline grabbing displays of power, does not necessarily mean it can fight. Hopefully the ROK-US Alliance and the military exercises it employs can evolve into something more than just a demonstration of technological military might, but a mechanism for doing honest assessments of military readiness and to prepare for a world in which having a technological edge may not be enough to succeed on the battlefield. 

Nearly all modern militaries conduct training exercises to improve readiness. An important tool for any alliance, joint and combined military exercises allow political-military leaders to test and validate concepts, and to prepare their forces for operations. Nowhere is this truer than on the Korean Peninsula where the ROK-US Alliance regularly conducts large-scale training exercises to test capabilities, practice working together and to prepare for an uncertain future. Anchored by the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, combined military exercises on the Korean Peninsula have evolved significantly over the past seventy years, the ebb and flow of political tides on both sides of the Pacific Ocean resulting in a level of familiarity and intimacy unique in the history of military alliances. Despite numerous challenges, the oft-lauded blood alliance has endured.

But if the story of the ROK-US Alliance were a Shakespearean play, each act defined not by the stoic defensiveness of the hero but by the aggression and idiosyncrasies of the foil, then the reign of Kim Jong-Un signifies the third, final and perhaps most dangerous act of the play. Armed with weapons that can presumably now threaten the American homeland and backed by the tacit support of Russia and China, North Korea’s current position has never been stronger. As it has in the past, the ROK-US Alliance will have to adapt, its military exercises evolving to ensure that deterrence in the region is maintained.

The last eight months have demonstrated the willingness of the ROK-US Alliance to embrace this sort of change, even if much still remains to be done. The resumption of large-scale military exercises in South Korea for the first time since 2017 will undoubtedly improve readiness and allow the ROK-US Alliance to identify where some of the gaps and seams may have emerged in their combined posture after a five-year hiatus. The appointment of the deputy commander of Combined Force Command, General Ahn Byung-Seok, to lead the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in August of 2022 also demonstrates that the ROK-US Alliance is taking seriously the transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea.

Of greater importance are South Korea’s recent overtures to Japan for improved security cooperation and the resumption of naval exercises which demonstrate that the political leadership in Seoul has the will to try and move beyond historical grievances. The need for cooperation has never been more urgent. The recent spate of North Korean missile launches, and the maturation of its nuclear weapons program, underscore the importance of improved combined readiness between South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

But it is the war in Ukraine that should be the impetus for the most meaningful changes and how the ROK-US Alliance crafts its combined military exercises over the coming years. While the recent burst of literature and lessons learned from that yet-to-be decided war has not yet provided the clear roadmap most of us would like, enough exists now to begin shaping future joint military exercises in South Korea for the better.

Moving Beyond the Political Dimension

Perhaps no alliance in history has been influenced more by seesawing political interests like the ROK-US Alliance, its massive military exercises a political football used by competing political factions both on and off the Korean Peninsula. And yet this level of politicization has unexpected consequences on military readiness that might potentially be lost on the merry-go-round of American military leaders who cycle through Korea on their one- or two-year tours.

When the political dimension of joint military exercises supersedes their inherent purpose, namely, meaningful training, the danger exists for military readiness to slowly atrophy and for military leaders to lose sight of what is important. It also makes leaders on both sides of the military relationship less inclined to be critical of one another, the fear of political blowback, and the perceived harm it may bring to the alliance (and professional careers), quieting leaders from both sides.

Regrettably, this is the direction the ROK-US Alliance has been going in for the past decade. One need not look farther than the poor state of South Korea’s large reserve forces or the challenges faced by its non-commissioned officer corps to see what happens when leaders assume away military readiness and neglect the fundamentals. It took defeat on the battlefield for Russia, a country known for its highly publicized military exercises and acquisition of high-tech weapons platforms, to learn this hard lesson.

Moving forward, the ROK-US Alliance needs to pull back the curtain and do an honest assessment of military readiness and shape its training exercise to focus on areas previously neglected. Crafting exercises so that there is no room for embarrassment out of a fear such an embarrassment may signal a weakened deterrence posture could in reality result in the atrophy of the very deterrence it aims to uphold. Rather than reinforcing strengths, as has been the case with its command post exercises and limited number of live-fire exercises, the ROK-US Alliance needs to start digging into the weeds of military preparedness, even at the risk of causing friction.

Getting Back to the Basics

The recent shutdown of Kakao Talk service in South Korea is a recent reminder of what happens when there’s an overreliance on digital systems. The South Korean president, Yoon Suk Yeol even went so far as to state that its interruption could be a danger to national security. That an accidental fire at a data center for a messaging service would trigger such a visceral public reaction from the president of a country is alarming. But it is just this sort of overreliance that has come to define many of the world’s most modern militaries, perhaps none more significantly than those of South Korea and the United States.

In the 2015 article ““When the Screens Go Dark: Rethinking Our Dependence on Digital Systems,” author Marc Lindman writes:

“The less time a unit spends on non-digital training, the more dependent the unit’s operations become on its digital systems. When these systems fail, however, the drawbacks of an increasingly exclusive focus on digital-systems training – and the associated sacrifice of traditional training – become readily apparent. Thus, paradoxically, the more advanced the U.S. Army’s digital systems become, the more U.S. Army leaders will need to consciously and continuously emphasize non-digital fundamentals.  The availability of technology is no substitute for the tactical training of Soldiers.”

This statement should serve as a clarion call not only to those shaping future ROK-US military exercises, but also for South Korea’s civil defense and mobilization drills. And while much has been written over the past decade arguing for more realistic training that reflects an era of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), summoning the will to insert such training into the politically sensitive combined military exercises on the Korean Peninsula will require courage from senior military leaders and tolerance from political leaders who are accustomed to the choreographed certitude that has defined nearly all military exercises thus far. 

While the ROK-US Alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression for the past seventy years, the war in the Ukraine has demonstrated that just because a country can put on flashy and headline grabbing displays of power, does not necessarily mean it can fight. Hopefully the ROK-US Alliance and the military exercises it employs can evolve into something more than just a demonstration of technological military might, but a mechanism for doing honest assessments of military readiness and to prepare for a world in which having a technological edge may not be enough to succeed on the battlefield.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.