► Certain references [of the Chairman Statement] were also conspicuously policy-specific, particularly on the adoption of CVID – complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation – reinforcing a growing trend seen in Statements from 2017, 2022 and 2023.

► For North Korea, the ARF has served as a neutral and politically acceptable platform, allowing for strategic flexibility and extensive diplomatic access to articulate and legitimise its national policies.

► Initial steps could involve exploring mutually suitable and constructive areas for Track-II minilateralism, involving neutral regional stakeholders – such as Vietnam or Singapore – willing to engage North Korea on non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) or climate change. 

Significant changes have developed in North Korea’s foreign policy since its lifting of lockdown restrictions in June 2023. Inter-Korean relations have deteriorated further, with North Korea announcing the deinstitutionalisation of its longstanding goal of peaceful reunification, while ties with Russia have strengthened considerably with the formalisation of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June.

However, a key regional dynamic that has yet to be fully explored is how, in light of these developments, Pyongyang may seek to alter its approach to Southeast Asia, and more specifically its commitment to multilateralism through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

North Korea formally joined the ARF in July 2000 at the Seventh ARF Meeting following the concerted efforts for their inclusion driven by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, alongside Cambodia and the Philippines. At the time, these three countries supported North Korea’s membership in part to enhance the ARF’s discussions on regional security issues, catalyse positive developments in diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, and reinforce ASEAN’s leadership through the Forum.[1]

Today, the ARF remains one of the few regional security arrangements that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to officially participate in. While the DPRK remains committed to Track 1.5/2 regional mechanisms such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security (UBD), their attendance has not been observed since 2017 and 2018 respectively.[2]

North Korea has historically instead shown a preference for prioritising bilateral relations, and this was especially the case in Southeast Asia. Enabled by the growth of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the early-1960s, geographical proximity and shared ideological sentiments saw states such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam progressively develop relatively closer ties with the DPRK.

It was thus notable that early into North Korea’s post-Covid diplomatic outreach, a North Korean delegation visited Vietnam and Laos in March 2024 as part of a three-nation trip including China, led by Kim Song Nam, Director of the Central Committee’s International Department in the Workers Party of Korea (WPK). Relevantly, meetings in Vietnam referenced strengthening coordination at “multilateral forums”. In Laos – currently the chair of ASEAN for 2024 – Kim also specified Pyongyang’s intent to “ramp up the comradely and strategic cooperation” with Vientiane.

Nevertheless, the 31st ARF in Laos in July largely reflected predominant elements of continuity. The participation of DPRK Ambassador to Laos, Ri Yong Chol, marked the fifth concurrent year since North Korea last sent their foreign minister to the ARF. As with past ARF Chairman Statements, participating members continued to affirm their commitment to core themes, such as the necessity for peaceful dialogue and recognition of the potential of ASEAN-led platforms like the ARF for regional stability and diplomacy.

Yet, several differences in this year's 2024 Chairman's Statement are prescient of shifting geopolitical sentiments toward the Korean Peninsula. In particular, differing perspectives were noticeably more pronounced, mirroring broader geopolitical tensions surrounding US-China relations and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Chairman Statements in the last decade tended to emphasise a unified tone on sensitive matters, often collectively referring to “the Meeting”, “the Ministers” or “most ministers” in issues regarding UNSC resolutions, denuclearisation, or missile tests. This year, the phrase “many Ministers” was used for the first time, suggesting nuanced support for these issues and greater consideration to acknowledging opposing positions raised. Certain references were also conspicuously policy-specific, particularly on the adoption of CVID – complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation – reinforcing a growing trend seen in Statements from 2017, 2022 and 2023. This contrasts with all other Statements in the past decade, which either referenced a more general “denuclearisation” or at most, a “complete denuclearisation”.

This shift is not entirely unexpected. Rooted in a shared antagonism of the Western-led liberal order, North Korea has increasingly found ambivalence from China and staunch support from Russia in other multilateral arrangements, such as the United Nations (UN). The last time the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on North Korea’s violations of international law was in 2017, with China and Russia vetoing a UNSC sanctions resolution for the first time in May 2022. More recently, in a vote to renew the mandate of the 1718 Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts’ (POE), China abstained while Russia voted against the resolution. Both countries’ ASEAN missions were likewise clear in their post-ARF press statements this year in pinpointing US strategic interests as running “counter” to regional stability and prosperity.

While the ARF’s institutional design poses certain limits for conclusive resolutions on sensitive regional security issues, it conversely enables its inclusivity and retains North Korea’s commitment to its Meetings. As highlighted in the 1994 ARF Concept Paper, fundamental principles of the institution consist of a non-coercive, voluntary basis of participation and decision-making based on consultation and consensus. For North Korea, the ARF has thus served as a neutral and politically acceptable platform, allowing for strategic flexibility and extensive diplomatic access to articulate and legitimise its national policies.

Toward this end, the ARF has been able to facilitate various informal sideline talks alongside formal meetings, providing opportunities for engagements that may have been otherwise difficult to arrange. At times, these have resulted in high-level developments, such as the US-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Joint Communique, which stemmed from a meeting at the 7th ARF Summit in 2000 between Paek Nam Sun with Madeleine Albright – the first exchange between both countries at the Foreign Minister level.[3] Additionally, North Korea has actively participated in the Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, as well as a number of Inter-Sessional Meetings, Workshops, and Defence Official Dialogues.[4] North Korea was also a regular contributor to the ARF's Annual Security Outlook, but has not submitted a chapter since 2021.

Despite the divisive geopolitical landscape, it is likely that the ARF will continue to retain its normative potential of catalysing diplomacy between North Korea and ARF member states. However, to better realise this potential, the ARF must manage its systemic limitations and expectations, be it in achieving basic consensus or advancing preventive diplomacy. Initial steps could involve exploring mutually suitable and constructive areas for Track-II minilateralism, involving neutral regional stakeholders – such as Vietnam or Singapore – willing to engage North Korea on non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) or climate change. By pursuing these avenues, the ARF can work towards developing robust and sustainable frameworks of cooperation, establishing clear benchmarks for future diplomacy and growth.