► For the immediate future, Korea’s role is likely to be limited to the “Quad Plus” arrangement, which joins regional partner countries in issue-specific subgroups, such as supply chain, technology, space, cyber, and vaccines due to Japan’s and China’s disapproval. But given some recent progress in Seoul-Tokyo relations, there is a prospect for deeper Korean involvement in the road ahead. The May 2022 Joint Leaders’ statement reaffirms the members’ “resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.” 

► The timing of Korea’s enhanced engagement will be shaped by domestic political factors, changes in the regional security environment, and the preferences of the Quad member countries. The early members will have a larger impact on determining the scope and direction of the Quad.

► Korea’s ability to engage in this emerging security group will not merely be a test of its ambitions, but will also serve as a measure of the Quad’s durability and effectiveness.

South Korea is ratcheting up its global security engagement, peeking its head beyond the immediate neighborhood to envision a broader application of its foreign policy muscle. One litmus test for this ambition is whether and how Seoul will be able to join the Indo-Pacific’s ascending security group, the Quad. At the same time, the manner in which the Quad responds to Korea’s interest will foreshadow the emerging institution’s future trajectory and reveal its adaptability and effectiveness.

The Quad, a regional multilateral security organization consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, was first promoted by the late former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe around 2007. It took over a decade for the group to come to fruition. The current iteration, an informal group committed to collective action on shared challenges, has convened two in-person leader-level summits and is less than two years old. In April of 2022, then President-elect Yoon said he would “positively review joining" the Quad given an invitation. This was a reversal of the Moon administration’s posture, which deferred on the question of the Quad, and overall struck a more conciliatory tone with China. Yoon’s turn toward the U.S. Alliance is supported by shifting public sentiment in Korea. Multiple surveys show increasingly negative views of China. For the first time, Koreans rated their favorability of China lower than Japan. Importantly, polling by Dr. Kuyoun Chung demonstrates that the shift is bipartisan: both progressives and moderates prefer the U.S. over China as Korea’s main foreign policy partner and support Korea joining the Quad. Hinting that the feeling is mutual, President Biden welcomed Korea’s “interest in the Quad” at his May 2022 summit meeting with President Yoon.  

Unfortunately, the course since has not been smooth sailing. When asked if Korea will be officially invited to join the Quad, a White House official said “down the road, there may be some of that,” but only after the grouping “finds its legs” and “harmonizes the existing efforts.” There was some expectation that President Yoon would be invited to attend the Quad leaders’ summit in Tokyo as an “observer” or “partner,” but that didn’t happen either. It is possible that the Kishida administration in Tokyo put that idea on cold ice. “The opposition to Korea joining the Quad is… coming from Japan at the moment,” according to Dr. Victor Cha. For the immediate future, Korea’s role is likely to be limited to the “Quad Plus” arrangement, which joins regional partner countries in issue-specific subgroups, such as supply chain, technology, space, cyber, and vaccines. But given some recent progress in Seoul-Tokyo relations, there is a prospect for deeper Korean involvement in the road ahead. This possibility raises important questions. Do experts from the U.S. and Korea share perceptions about the scope for Korea’s enhanced engagement with the Quad? Do they agree on Korea’s potential contributions? To what extent, are their visions for the Quad aligned?

To find out, the author conducted an expert survey as part of a Pacific Forum fellowship, including 16 Korean respondents and 14 American respondents from academia, think tanks, the current government, media, former military, and intelligence officers, and former National Security Council staff, and former Commerce Department officials. Though the surveys are not statistically representative, they nonetheless highlight important takeaways. In terms of U.S. and Korean expert perceptions, the survey results show areas of both considerable symmetry and stark differences. It will be important to interrogate these divergences to optimize the Quad’s success.

Over 90% of American and Korean experts perceive a value in the Quad, and both anticipate that Korea will increase its engagement. However, there’s a perception gap on the reasons for Korea’s motivation to do so. Americans tend to overestimate the role of strengthening ties to regional powers. Both groups of experts agreed that strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance was the single most important motivation driving Korea’s interest in the Quad, but Korean experts tended to rate it as a higher priority. 

When it comes to the future shape of the Quad, there are again differences. U.S. experts want to further develop the Quad Plus format, with flexible, issue-specific subgroups including the original four members and additional partners. Korean experts are more likely to favor increasing membership to include Korea. And, in the working groups, Koreans see more of a leadership role for Korea than the Americans tend to.

With regards to China, Korean experts are more likely to perceive the purpose of the Quad as containing China. It makes sense therefore that they are also more likely to anticipate a military response as a result of Korea’s engagement with the Quad. And it also makes sense that Korean experts are less willing to participate in security aspects of the Quad in the face of Chinese blowback. Compared to their U.S. counterparts, Korean experts were significantly more likely to want public assurance from the U.S. about protection against Chinese retaliation.

Going forward, the timing of Korea’s enhanced engagement will be shaped by domestic political factors, changes in the regional security environment, and the preferences of the Quad member countries. The early members will have a larger impact on determining the scope and direction of the Quad. As noted earlier, Japan’s opposition has slowed Korean engagement, but there have been some positive developments, including a leader-level trilateral U.S.-Korea-Japan meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid, a trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting on the sidelines of the G20 in Indonesia, and a Tokyo bilateral meeting in July. These are all productive steps to rebuilding Korea-Japan relations, but questions linger about how significant and quickly any rapprochement can be achieved. If Korea engages early, it will have a better chance to shape the Quad’s agenda. As the survey reflects, Korea feels like it has a lot to contribute to the Quad (more than U.S. experts perceive).

China may impose costs on Korea as punishment for Quad engagement, just as it did in 2017 when Korea installed a missile defense system aimed at defending rockets from North Korea. The Beijing leadership likely views the other Quad countries - the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia - as lost causes, countries that it has a limited ability to exert influence on, but it views Seoul differently. There are historical ties, a strong economic relationship, and a shared interest (if not agreement on how to address it) in the division of the Peninsula and North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Korea’s engagement in the Quad would signal to China that its grasp over regional security is slipping and that states seeking to escape its orbit are finding means to do so. The use of informal sanctions as a form of political coercion is a well-documented page from Beijing’s playbook, so we should anticipate that response.

For Korea, the short-term pain of informal economic sanctions from China could be offset by the added autonomy achieved through Quad engagement over the long term. Seoul will benefit from demonstrating that it will not be held hostage and pressured to abandon measures needed to shore up its security. For the existing Quad members, the time is now to contemplate how the Quad can facilitate and direct assistance to states that are subjected to coercion, economic and otherwise, from China or any other state that violates the core principles of the Quad. The May 2022 Joint Leaders’ statement reaffirms the members’ “resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.” It’s important to develop a pragmatic means to turn that rhetoric into reality through forceful and principled measures that do not needlessly antagonize or escalate. Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, recommends the creation of a “counter-coercion coalition” to organize collective action that could change the calculus that encourages China to undertake these actions.  

Asia does not need another talk shop. For the juice to be worth the squeeze, the Quad needs to deliver real benefits that offset the costs of engagement. The joint statements and the topics of the working groups show us that the Quad is moving towards issues at the intersection of security and economics, including supply chain resilience, freedom of navigation, public health, climate change, critical technology, and cyber. The Quad could also go into new and emerging domains like space and satellite cooperation. Korea’s ability to engage in this emerging security group will not merely be a test of its ambitions, but will also serve as a measure of the Quad’s durability and effectiveness. A track record of delivering tangible benefits is the best recruitment tool one could hope for. It would attract more members and more active participation. On the other hand, if the Quad fails to deliver tangible benefits, it will wither on the vine. The key is to engage in active listening to create a nimble yet effective agenda that incorporates the priorities of the membership and focuses on deliverables.