Indo-Pacific Strategy

The expectation of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Diversifying Issues, Partners, and Return to Middlepower Diplomacy

By Pongphisoot Busbarat [Professor, Chulalongkorn University]

 The changing geostrategic environment in the region has broadened South Korea’s attention. The rise of China has become a key factor in this development. In response to this development, the United States has paid more attention to the region since the Obama administration to rebalance the regional order.

 

The push for the new Indo-Pacific strategy continues to be a policy reality South Korea is facing. However, considering the current strategic rivalry between the US and China, South Korea may need to consider several aspects of its own Indo-Pacific strategy to maximize national interest.

 


 

 

 

South Korea’s foreign policy has primarily emphasized its relations with core regional powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. This reflects Seoul’s immediate interests, including the Korean Peninsula, China’s geostrategic and economic realities, the legacy of Japanese colonization, and South Korea’s security alliance with the United States. However, in the past decade, the changing geostrategic environment in the region has broadened South Korea’s attention.

The rise of China has become a key factor in this development. China’s growth certainly offers economic opportunities for the region and South Korea. At the same time, it also increases Beijing’s bargaining power and its assertive role in the region, notably through its ambitious Belt & Road Initiative. This shift in the political and strategic balance toward China causes many countries to worry about the disruption of regional order

In response to this development, the United States has paid more attention to the region since the Obama administration to rebalance the regional order. This policy was crystallized in the construction of the Indo-Pacific concept that encompasses broader US strategic interests stretching from the Pacific Ocean to Africa. This strategic competition has intensified in recent years, prompting the regional states to adjust their policy to navigate this new geopolitical reality and future uncertainties. It ultimately aims at preserving the regional status quo.

In fact, South Korea has long pursued such an approach to broader geographical areas, especially Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific, in its New Southern Policy (NSP) under the Moon Jae-in administration. The NSP was already in line with the broader Indo-Pacific concept, although heavily focused on the economic aspect. The push for the new Indo-Pacific strategy continues to be a policy reality South Korea is facing. However, considering the current strategic rivalry between the US and China, South Korea may need to consider several aspects of its own Indo-Pacific strategy to maximize national interest.

First, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy should aim at promoting regional peace, stability, and balance. Therefore, the strategy may have to avoid jumping onto one side of the US-China tension. Like other lesser powers in Asia, South Korea cannot afford to invite more tension near its border. For this reason, it may not be good timing for Seoul to actively participate in a US-led security arrangement with a clear anti-China image. For instance, joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) may put South Korea in an awkward position vis-à-vis China. There are more common interests that Seoul can cooperate with Beijing in the long run. Bandwagoning with Washington in the security area that directly targets China may jeopardize its ties with Beijing and limit South Korea’s room for maneuvering.

Therefore, it is wiser for Seoul’s Indo-Pacific strategy to focus on global and regional common issues such as regional economic cooperation, high-tech governance, regional connectivity, and post-pandemic recovery. By doing so, engagement with Beijing to seek solutions to these issues will be more constructive to regional stability. At the same time, South Korea’s active role in these low-political dimensions will ensure that rule-based international order is to be maintained.

Second, South Korea’s strategy should emphasize the existing regional arrangements, particularly those centered on ASEAN mechanisms. South Korea has been an important and active member of a larger ASEAN-led process since the end of the Cold War, including ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, importantly, ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3). It is undeniable that Seoul’s continued support of ASEAN mechanisms has been fruitful in building regional peace, stability, and prosperity. The conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is prime evidence of such an effort that helps promote trade liberalization, making the group the world’s largest trading arrangement. South Korea’s role in RCEP can also ensure that despite focusing on the regional members, the group will be inclusive and develop in line with WTO’s guidelines.

A policy focus on ASEAN mechanisms will also advocate Seoul’s active role in the broader region. Through ASEAN, South Korea will have a wider platform to seek regional solutions to common transnational challenges such as climate change, environmental issues, cybersecurity, and various transnational crimes. Such cooperation will secure South Korea a safer regional environment for its trade and investment. On the other hand, working on regional multilateral forums will help socialize member states and strengthen their political relations. Indirectly, it is to support South Korea’s relations with not only Southeast Asia but also help improve ties with China and Japan. 

Furthermore, Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy should continue its focus on India and South Asia at large. India’s economy is a dynamic, fast-growing, and massive market comparable to China’s. Therefore, cooperation with India will help diversify and expand Korea’s the trade and investment. This also helps alleviate uncertainties and risks caused by China’s pressures, such as during the THAAD incident. For example, South Korea’s cooperation with India in the high-tech industry has a high potential as it will maximize both countries’ expertise and resources in this area. Promoting regional connectivity is another area for cooperation with India as it also serves India’s plan to connect the subcontinent with Southeast Asia. So, South Korea can synergize its Mekong-ROK Cooperation with the India-led Mekong-Ganga Cooperation for this purpose. Policy coordination between South Korea, India, and the Mekong countries will facilitate various economic activities and people exchanges.

Another focus of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy should highlight the importance of the Mekong sub-region. South Korea has already started to pay more attention to this geographical area, especially in trade and investment; therefore, it should be continued and expanded. Korea will undoubtedly benefit from the emerging economies in the Mekong subregion, considering the latter’s growing working-age population and cheap resources and supplies. Coupled with India, the Mekong subregion will also help absorb risks and uncertainties emanating from the disruption in the Chinese market.

At the same time, Seoul’s active role will offer the subregion an alternative to the two big powers that have increasingly been more confrontational. The Mekong subregion can offer different platforms for South Korea to participate, including the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Strategy (ACMECS). South Korea’s active role in these sub-regional arrangements, such as ACMECS Development Partnership, will help improve the sub-region’s economic development and resource management. With a constructive role of the external partner like Korea, it will help strengthen the subregion’s voice vis-à-vis great powers whose interests are increasingly shaped by their strategic and power competition rather than those of their smaller counterparts.

In short, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy should be built by strengthening its policy legacy of middle-power diplomacy and the southward approach in foreign policy. This strategy will be conducive to South Korea’s active role in promoting regional stability and will also ensure that South Korea’s national interest is safeguarded.

 

Author(s)

Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. He holds a PhD in Political Science & IR from Australian National University and postgraduate degrees from Columbia University and Cambridge University. His research interests include great power competition in Southeast Asia, (especially the Mekong subregion), Thailand’s foreign policy, and norms and identity in IR. Currently, Paul is working on several research projects including the study of a normative construct influencing Thailand’s foreign policy choices between the United States and China, and a study of China’s regional leadership consolidation in the Mekong subregion. His most recent publication is ‘China and Mekong Regionalism: A Reappraisal of the Formation of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation’ in Asian Politics & Policy.