► What would be the strategic proposition for JMEs between the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and Singapore?

► There is increasing awareness amongst the policy elites of both countries that, despite being separated by more than 30 degrees of latitude, geopolitical developments in either region have far-reaching security ramifications.

► Singapore, being one of the smallest countries in the world, lacks any sense of geostrategic depth. South Korea may be a much larger country, but its political and economic center of gravity lies 40-odd kilometers from North Korea.

► As such, both countries’ armed forces have had to seek creative strategic measures to address these geostrategic weaknesses.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has been involved in bilateral military exercises, or joint military exercises (JME), across air, land and sea domains with a number of states: close to home, with their Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts; and further afield, with Australia, China, India and the United States, amongst others.

The Strategic Purpose of JME in SAF Strategic Thinking

The mission statement of the Singapore Ministry of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces has evolved over time. Its current iteration—"to enhance Singapore’s peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor”—is an evolution from its original mission statement, which was a message of pure deterrence. This emphasis on deterrence derives from a perception, widely shared by successive generations of Singapore’s political leadership, that the country resides in a geopolitical environment that is inherently problematic, something that is exacerbated by Singapore’s inherent geostrategic weaknesses stemming from its small size.

Its emphasis on the absolute centrality of deterrence means that everything that Singapore’s Ministry of Defence and the SAF has done has been designed to redress the country’s geostrategic weaknesses and to subsequently improve Singapore’s geopolitical conditions. Its strategic doctrines have evolved over time—from a “poisonous shrimp” to a “porcupine”, to a “dolphin”—and with each iteration, its military modernization has been designed to equip the SAF with the military capabilities that can realize these doctrines. At the same time, the SAF has approached JME with the same deterrent mindset.

To do so, the SAF approaches JMEs with 2 objectives. The first is to enhance the SAF’s deterrent capabilities, and it seeks to work with military organizations with proven operational capabilities, in particular the United States military. The SAF has a range of JME with its United States counterpart, in air, land and naval domains. JMEs with the United States military serves two purposes: to ‘learn from the best’, and thereby develop and refine its conventional war-fighting tactical and doctrinal concepts; and to benchmark and validate its growing competencies in 21st Century full spectrum military operations.

The second objective is to manage its relationships with its contiguous neighbors (and principal security concerns), by showcasing the SAF’s war-fighting competencies as a form of deterrence. It is instructive that the major JMEs with Malaysia and Indonesia were initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the SAF had become increasingly self-confident of its tactical and operational competencies in conventional war-fighting, at a time when their Malaysian and Indonesian counterparts were still predominantly focused on counter-insurgency operations and had not acquired mature conventional war-fighting capabilities. Furthermore, especially with more recent iterations of its various joint military exercises with both countries, the SAF’s willingness to deploy its recent weapons systems—from the army’s Leopard II main battle tanks, the air force’s F-15SGs, and the navy’s Formidable-class frigates—might even be seen as a form of swaggering, displaying its capabilities and its tactical prowess as part of its deterrent message.

Widening the South Korean National Security Perspective

It is undeniable that for much of its existence, South Korea’s security focus has been fixed on the existential threat posed by North Korea even before the latter’s nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, it can be argued that over the last decade, South Korea has developed an increasing recognition that its security calculus has to encompass a much wider regional element.

While South Korea almost certainly does not have any immediate strategic interests in Southeast Asia, it does have significant geoeconomic interests in the region:  much of its energy is imported from the Middle East through the South China Sea; furthermore, in the first eight months of 2022 alone, South Korea exported approximately USD18 billion through the South China Sea to Europe, Southeast Asia and South Asia. This means that the South China Sea constitutes a potential chokepoint and geopolitical vulnerability: any country that is able to control the South China Sea can pose an existential-level threat to South Korea’s economy and way of life. These geoeconomics and geopolitical stakes in the South China Sea are, arguably, reflected in the Republic of Korea Navy’s plans to acquire a blue-water fleet. Simply put, South Korea cannot be blind to how developments in the South China Sea disputes can have negative ramifications in its fundamental national interests.

Indeed, it can be argued that South Korea’s increasing role in wider Indo-Pacific security matters is further manifested in the country’s increasing presence in the Southeast Asian arms market, especially Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. These weapons sales encompass air, land and naval domains: FA-50 and KF-21 combat aircraft, along with a range of other air combat systems; infantry fighting vehicles, towed artillery of varying calibers, and multiple rocket launch systems; and Type-209/1400 submarines, offshore patrol vessels, and the HHI-2600 frigates, along with a number of anti-submarine weapons systems. These weapons sales make South Korea a potentially positive influence on the regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia.

The SAF as a Strategic Partner for South Korea

What would be the strategic proposition for JMEs between the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and Singapore? At face value, the two countries are not only rather dissimilar, they also face significantly different security environments and vastly different security challenges. Nevertheless, there is increasing awareness amongst the policy elites of both countries that, despite being separated by more than 30 degrees of latitude, geopolitical developments in either region have far-reaching security ramifications. Singapore had hosted the 2018 summit meeting between former United States President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, even if the meeting did not deliver much in terms of the removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Both countries, despite their different geopolitical conditions, face not-too-dissimilar geostrategic conditions. Singapore, being one of the smallest countries in the world, lacks any sense of geostrategic depth. South Korea may be a much larger country, but its political and economic center of gravity lies 40-odd kilometers from North Korea. As such, both countries’ armed forces have had to seek creative strategic measures to address these geostrategic weaknesses.