► While there is still an ingrained wariness of Russia in contemporary Finnish society, the possibility of a return to Russo-Finnish hostilities has been typically viewed as remote.

► For Finland, its geopolitical environment was profoundly changed by both Russia’s actions and its subsequent application for NATO membership.

► The invasion of Ukraine almost guaranteed that Finland would apply for NATO membership, erasing the buffer zone that had previously existed – yet another strategic blunder on the part of Russia.

► No matter the reason, Finland swiftly realised that military non-alignment no longer ensures its security in a new world of belligerently nationalistic multipolarity.

The Finland-Russia border runs north to south and spans 1340 kilometres, making it not only Finland’s longest border but also one of the longest external borders in the European Union. The security of this border is not taken for granted by Finnish political and military leaders; Finland has both the largest reserves of trained military personnel and the strongest artillery force in Europe.

Given it was once a part of the Russian Empire, Finland not only has a shared geography, but also an entangled history with Russia. This includes an experience of invasion by the Red Army in 1939, known as the Winter War, which saw Finland repel the attack albeit with territorial concessions to the Soviet Union that notably included part of Finnish Karelia. Finland then engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to regain these lost territories by joining forces with Nazi Germany to invade the Soviet Union in the Continuation War, fought from 1941 to 1944.

While there is still an ingrained wariness of Russia in contemporary Finnish society, the possibility of a return to Russo-Finnish hostilities has been typically viewed as remote. It was only in August last year, during my visit to a friend’s summer cottage in the idyllic Finnish lake district located in Eastern Finland that I asked my Finnish hosts whether they ever considered the possibility of future Russian aggression towards Finland. This question was met with bemused expressions and the response that while anything was possible, they considered it highly unlikely.

Less than a year later this illusion would be shattered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022. The mood in Helsinki transformed overnight as daily conversations abruptly turned towards locating the nearest bomb shelters, purchasing iodine pills, and, of course, the option of Finland joining NATO. A measure of calm was restored following Finland’s application for NATO membership on 17th May 2022, ending seventy-seven years of Finnish military neutrality. Before Russia’s attack on Ukraine the majority of Finns opposed NATO membership however, according to a poll conducted in June a dramatic turnaround had occurred with 80% of Finns in support of Finland’s application.

Russia’s expansionist agenda

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and going back even earlier to its invasion of Georgia in 2008, it is puzzling as to why there remained among European leaders (except for those in Poland and the Baltic states) a sense of apathy and failure to recognise the expansionist military threat that Russia posed. Despite the West’s disapproval of Russia’s actions in Crimea, the economic sanctions enacted at that time were weak and ineffectual, evidence that Russia’s longer-term intentions were neither understood nor taken seriously. The subsequent expansion of European, and notably Germany’s, already heavy reliance on Russian energy supplies, primarily gas, is indicative of significant complacency within the European political arena.

Underestimation of Russia’s strategic intentions arguably emboldened Putin to undertake increasingly open acts of military aggression, culminating in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In addition, it has contributed not only to the energy crisis that plagues Europe going into winter but to the growing specter of nuclear war on the continent. For Finland, its geopolitical environment was profoundly changed by both Russia’s actions and its subsequent application for NATO membership. The net benefit of membership for Finland in terms of its own security and survival is obvious. Opponents of Finland’s membership are in the minority and are largely comprised by those on the far left. They claim that NATO is an imperialist alliance led by the US, hence by joining NATO Finland will potentially be drawn into future imperial wars, an argument that makes little sense since NATO is a defensive military alliance.

A new Cold War

Does this new world resemble a new Cold War between Russia and the West as some observers suggest? Regardless of the outcome of the current ‘hot’ war in Ukraine, increasingly the answer appears to be yes, and certainly for as long as Putin remains in power. Realpolitik has undoubtedly returned and is disrupting Europe’s post-Westphalian existence. Traditionally Cold War phenomena such as nuclear weapons and military alliances now feature prominently in European foreign and security policy discussions. Defense budgets are rapidly increasing, energy security is once again at the top of on the political agenda, and economic decoupling from Russia proceeds apace. Given the swift and comprehensive response to Putin’s war in the terms of strong condemnation and extensive economic and financial sanctions designed to isolate Russia, Western unity also looks surprisingly robust.

At the same time, the world has changed and looks markedly different to that of the twentieth century. Today’s world is multipolar, rather than bipolar or unipolar as was the case immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed, and a united West does not have the clout it once did. For instance, attempts to isolate Russia and cripple its economy have been stymied to some extent by China and India. Russia-China relations have been strengthening for some time, a situation that reached its zenith at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, when the two countries declared their ‘friendship with no limits’ partnership. This occurred less than three weeks prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A sanctioned Russia has since become China’s main source of oil. India has also undercut the sanctions against Russia by purchasing discounted Russian oil and other commodities such as coal and fertiliser. Although prime minister Modi criticised the Russian invasion at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Samarkand in September, Delhi wishes to maintain a positive relationship with Moscow. The global shift in economic power to emerging economies complicates the strategic landscape in ways not seen during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the Russian state looks increasingly fragile due mainly to its own domestic and foreign policy failures. Large-scale Russian military defeats, accompanied by very heavy losses of both men and equipment in Ukraine along with the introduction of a military draft has catalysed political, economic, and societal instability within Russia. The invasion of Ukraine almost guaranteed that Finland would apply for NATO membership, erasing the buffer zone that had previously existed – yet another strategic blunder on the part of Russia. As the war rolls on, some experts suggest that Putin will, in desperation, resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, breaking the nuclear taboo that has held since 1945.

Finland’s decoupling from Russia

In addition to the impacts on its security environment, Finland is also affected economically in the short-term by its decoupling from Russia. Extricating itself from its economic ties with Russia, although not a painless experience for Finland, is manageable. In 2021 almost 12% of its imports came from Russia, and 5.4% of its total exports went to Russia. Compared to other EU economies, Finland is hit harder with the loss of trade with Russia, but its energy supply is less vulnerable.

Although 34% of Finland’s energy supplies, including 10% of electricity, came from Russia in 2021 other suppliers can be found to replace most types of Russian energy. At question is the speed at which this replacement can be achieved before the winter of 2022-23 – price increases are occurring and electricity shortages during the winter months, when electricity is required for heating, remain a possibility.

As elsewhere in Europe, the main problem is natural gas supply. Natural gas accounts for only 6% of total energy consumption in Finland, most of it used by industry. Nearly 70% of Finland’s natural gas consumption was supplied by Russia; this supply was brought to a halt by Russian state oil producer Gazprom on 21st May 2022. This has sharpened Finland and Europe’s resolve to phase out fossil fuels more rapidly and speed up the green transition.

There are differing perspectives on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For some it is an imperial war of conquest whereby Putin aims to restore the Russian Empire, which, of course, included Finland. On the other hand, the realist scholar Mearsheimer insists that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russia into invading Ukraine. This argument assumes that expansion was a deliberate strategy but ignores the fact that Eastern European countries have been requesting NATO membership since the 1990s, mainly driven by the perception of a Russia threat. No matter the reason, Finland swiftly realised that military non-alignment no longer ensures its security in a new world of belligerently nationalistic multipolarity.