► The war in Ukraine has been raging for eight months.  It is a war that has profoundly impacted the European continent, but also the world.  What are the consequences, for Europe, but also for international relations?

► Military security in Europe is inextricably linked to the geopolitics of major power relations.  How can the EU, even in a period of increased tension and minimal trust, increase its ability to design ways and means to co-exist in the space that binds them together, regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine?

► How do these developments reflect on the Korean peninsula?

► Dialogue, personal contact, exchanges, engagement and the willingness to listen to the other side.  This is what we need. 

The third millennium is re-shaping the world.  The global order has undergone tremendous shifts.  The 1990s saw the dissolution of the Soviet empire, war in the states of the former Yugoslavia, but also the expansion of the European Union and the adoption of a common currency – all accompanied by the hopeful sense of life becoming better. 

China made huge strides in its economy, became a world power on par with the United States. America is no longer the single most powerful player and exerting its unipolar influence and policies around the globe.

What happened since then?  First, Brexit upended our sense of complacency in Europe.  Then, our sense of security was profoundly shattered with the outbreak of COVID-19, which showed that we were woefully unprepared to respond to pandemics.  Over six million people lost their lives; two-and-a half years later, the disease is still with us. 

Geopolitical tensions increased during the pandemic, and climate change became a major disrupter.  In February, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, after having annexed Crimea in 2014.

The war in Ukraine has been raging for eight months.  It is a war that has profoundly impacted the European continent, but also the world.  What are the consequences, for Europe, but also for international relations?

Here is a worst-case scenario: the crisis escalating into nuclear warfare.  There are two possibilities: the first is focused on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant which supplied 30% of Ukraine’s electricity prior to Russia’s invasion.  Russian forces have been in control of the Nuclear Power Plant since March, while Ukrainian technicians continue to operate the facility, but shelling around the site– for which Russia and Ukraine blame each other – have raised concerns about a possible nuclear catastrophe. 

The second scenario focuses on the possible use of a nuclear weapon, as the taboo against a nuclear detonation appears to be losing salience.  The Russian invasion has upended what was left of 60 years of bilateral US-Russian arms control agreements, and Putin has recently made statements that he would be prepared to use a nuclear weapon in the event of a threat to (Russia’s) sovereignty.

The last time of such a danger was the Cuban Missile Crisis sixty years ago, but let us remember that at that time, only two players were involved: the US and the Soviet Union.  The crisis today involves multiple players, Europe but also NATO, whose Strategic Concept leaves no ambiguity that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of NATO security, though its use is seen as extremely remote. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not a global war. It is regional - but it could drag on for a very long time.

The war in Ukraine is, finally, a test of political will. Each side wants a “win”.  How resilient is Europe with regard to energy dependence?  How resistant is Russia against sanctions? Against political isolation from the West?  Against a brain drain of younger people leaving for the West?

The peaceful world we knew no longer exists. 

We are dealing now with a much more complex geopolitical environment. The US and China were superpowers in a bipolar world before the war broke out, and they will remain in those positions after the war ends.  Russia was a strong middle power before the invasion of Ukraine, with an overrated military, but using its veto power in the UN Security Council to great political effect, projecting the message that Russia counts on the world stage, no matter what.

Russia will, however, emerge from this war greatly diminished. 

Russia has been moving to align itself towards China. President Putin attended the Beijing Olympics only days before the Ukraine invasion, and both he and Chairman Xi Jinping signed an agreement declaring a friendship without limits.  The China-Russia economic and diplomatic cooperation expanded to the military field nearly ten years ago, fueled at that time by the stand-off in the UN Security Council over Syria. 

Having Russia as a junior partner strengthens China’s role and influence globally and confirms the current US-China bipolarity. 

What advantage will China draw from these developments? Risk conflict with the US over Taiwan now that the US/NATO is fully engaged with supporting Ukraine’s war effort?  Flex its muscles even more in the South China Sea?   Considerations not only revolve around geopolitics; growth in China has slowed sharply and an aging population, coupled with food insecurity and continuing COVID-19 lockdowns limit economic gain.

Europe is in an unstable situation.  With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the transatlantic military alliance will become more muscular and assertive, and also more robustly funded.  Neutrality, a long-cherished ideal in Europe, has receded into the background, as military threats have increased.

The rupture of ties with Russia carries great risk.  The war not only affects Ukraine: the states in the former Soviet Union or behind the Iron Curtain – Poland, Moldova, the Baltic States – fear that Russian aggression could next be directed against them.

Complicating the situation is the dependence of Europe on Russian energy supplies – no one had expected that the intertwining of pipelines, built with the expectation of reliable energy supplies for decades to come, would suddenly collapse, and that a scramble would ensue to find alternative energy resources while at the same time dealing with global warming and climate change, battering already weakened economies. 

All this makes for a volatile situation, as Europeans feel they now live in a dangerous world, beset by a variety of problems which are ever more complex and interdependent and over which they have very little agency.

At the same time, our existing collective security mechanisms are under strain: the agreements and crisis management tools that were developed in the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, are no longer fit for the task.  New domains of conflict have opened up, but we do not have strong sets of rules to govern them and need new rules.  The information space – and particularly social media – is increasingly being distorted and weaponized, dividing the political discourse.

Military security in Europe is inextricably linked to the geopolitics of major power relations.  How can the EU, even in a period of increased tension and minimal trust, increase its ability to design ways and means to co-exist in the space that binds them together, regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine?

The focus has to be wider than military and security issues, even if they are now the eye of the storm and will remain so for quite some time.  Yet the space for dialogue needs to be safeguarded, even if the space for diplomacy has shrunk.  Eventually, diplomats and politicians will sit around a table to define new borders, behaviours, rules and regulations, as unlikely as that seems now.

How do these developments reflect on the Korean peninsula?

In a bipolar world, states must take a position on where they stand: with the US or with China.  The Republic of Korea has already made its position clear: the US-South Korea Alliance has been a long-standing military alliance, but it is an alliance of two, even if high-level defense talks in July agreed to further strengthen trilateral security cooperation with Japan.  Korea’s concern is the DPRK’s nuclear threat and missile tests, as well as regional challenges which refer to the Indo-Pacific region and the Taiwan Strait.

With Chairman Xi Jinping having received an unprecedented third term in office, China is aggressively challenging the role of the US as the key economic and political power in Asia.  China is robustly asserting its regional influence, positioning itself as a power broker with North Korea and using its Belt and Road initiative to spread its influence well beyond Asia. 

History is important here. As the predominant global power for generations, the US has military bases in 85 countries; as a global latecomer, China has three.  This has formed China’s narrative and frequent complaints about the US meddling in regions far beyond North America.

Recognizing the challenge from China, the July US-RoK meeting reaffirmed the importance of adherence to a rules-based international order based on international laws and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight, and pledged close cooperation to meet regional challenges. 

The Alliance also affirmed the pivotal role of both countries as global leaders in democracy, economy, and technology, and agreed to deepen and broaden political, economic, security, and people-to-people ties.

This is an observation worth reflecting on.  In Asia, illiberal forces have risen: Prime Minister Modi has reshaped India and strengthened Hindu nationalism.  In the Philippines, former President Duterte has undermined the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law.  His successor’s policies, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., are still in the shaping.  Myanmar’s military seized power in February last year from a democratically elected government and is brutally cracking down on dissident voices.

In contrast, South Korea and Japan are models of democratic institutions and liberalism, though of course every democratically elected government faces challenges.

Looking at synergies between Europe and South Korea, I see important differences.  From a democratic standpoint, Europe is more cohesive in terms of democracy and respect for rule of law and human rights – though Hungary and Poland pose challenges to EU accepted norms.

Yet Europe’s security situation is exclusively linked to the transatlantic alliance – NATO – as the European Security Partnership (PESCO) has not matured.  The EU includes several neutral States, it surrounds Switzerland - not an EU member - while the Balkan states have EU candidate status, except for EU members Croatia and Slovenia.  While EU expansion was on hold, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new impetus for considering enlarging the Union.

None of this is happening in North-East Asia.  In Europe, cohesion started with economic cooperation, then broadened to security and human rights issues.  Ultimately, it became a dialogue of the similar-minded, between nations which had fought each other in war and which had the ultimate goal of avoiding carnage and death.  

In North-East Asia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a constant destabilizing factor, for the Republic of Korea as well as for Japan.  The DPRK is able to exert this outsize influence due to the support of China and Russia which are clearly not interested in curbing Kim Jong Un’s ambitions as a nuclear power.  The UN’s sanctions regime, the harshest for any country in the world, has not achieved its goal – and is unlikely to succeed in curbing DPRK’s political and nuclear aspirations.

What will the near future bring?  The G-20 Summit which will take place in Indonesia in November could be a venue for addressing joint concerns. 

Putin has indicated that he will participate, and while Indonesia has identified three priority topics for the event that are decidedly non-political (global health architecture, digital transformation, and sustainable energy transition), such a Summit is a prime opportunity for quiet diplomacy. I am sure that leaders will seize the moment to raise difficult issues that are not on the official agenda.  Having worked for many years in the United Nations, I know how effective such face-to-face meetings, outside the bright lights of the public and the press, can be.  Such discussions, even if not immediately successful, will bring results and more engagement in the longer run. 

Dialogue, personal contact, exchanges, engagement and the willingness to listen to the other side.  This is what we need. 

Let us hope that we do not have to go through the crucible of war to achieve a more peaceful world.