► The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), where leaders of approximately 50 countries gathered every two years from 2010 to 2016, emphasized the importance of nuclear security and allowed for a collaborative effort to establish goals and implement activities to achieve them.

► At the 2012 Seoul Summit, ROK made significant contributions to nuclear security by introducing the safety and security interface- the recognition that safety and security measures should be integrated and mutually reinforcing to effectively safeguard nuclear facilities.

►Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to new nuclear-related security issues in the international community, and these issues cannot be addressed by the efforts of a single country alone. As shown in the ministerial-level meetings during the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS), responsible officials should gather together to engage in discussions and establish a mechanism to track the progress and implementation of the outcomes.

Nuclear security in the past and ROK’s contribution

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process was commenced by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2010. It first aimed to secure vulnerable nuclear material worldwide within four years. It emphasized the importance of nuclear security and addressed various nuclear security issues. The leaders of approximately 50 countries gathered every two years from 2010 to 2016 to discuss nuclear security measures of their respective nations.

The summit process was not merely a series of discussions, but a collaborative effort to establish goals and implement activities to achieve them. Starting from the 2012 summit in Seoul, countries formed multinational commitments known as "gift baskets" that targeted key areas of nuclear security. Progress on these commitments was assessed at subsequent meetings, and participating countries faithfully carried out their committed tasks. The international community actively participated in making various nuclear security pledges and worked to enhance related capabilities.

During this time, the Republic of Korea (ROK) made significant contributions to nuclear security. In the 2012 Seoul Summit, the ROK introduced the agenda on the safety and security interface. The safety-security interface, particularly in the context of nuclear power plants, was an important topic discussed in Seoul and subsequent meetings. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011 served as a catalyst for emphasizing the interconnection between safety and security in the nuclear sector. The Fukushima accident highlighted the need to address vulnerabilities in nuclear power plants and ensure that they are adequately protected against both natural disasters and intentional malicious acts. The safety-security interface refers to the recognition that safety and security measures should be integrated and mutually reinforcing to effectively safeguard nuclear facilities. It's important to note that the safety and security of nuclear facilities remain ongoing concerns, and subsequent initiatives and forums have continued to address the safety-security interface to strengthen nuclear safety and security worldwide.

Changing environment in the Nuclear security landscape: evolution of threat and response

After the conclusion of the NSS (Nuclear Security Summit) in 2016, the international nuclear security environment has significantly changed.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to new nuclear-related security issues in the international community including the possibility of nuclear weapons being used again for the first time since 1945 and attacks on nuclear power plants. The reason it is described as a ‘security issue related to nuclear’ is that the use of nuclear weapons is not subject to nuclear security, and the threat to nuclear security is terrorists who intentionally harm nuclear facilities, not the state.

For the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant at war, the IAEA proposed the establishment of a safety and security zone. Strictly speaking, however, the IAEA is not a competent authority for national safety or security, and it has no legal status to affect it. International law prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities and is the extent of the Vienna Convention's additional protocol. However, it is not enough. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is in danger, and the current international norms that are difficult to take any measures have many implications and will continue to be discussed.

Now, we need to look back at the current nuclear security system. As confirmed by the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant case, we need to add more elements or strengthen measures compared with the traditional nuclear security approach. For nuclear facilities, nuclear security level is typically determined by considering the Design Basis Threat (DBT), which takes into account the threat specific to each country. Also, the DBT is updated periodically to reflect the current situation at the time. In the case of countries that have experienced military attacks like Ukraine, I believe that the level of nuclear security measures for nuclear facilities will drastically change. The configuration of the DBT as well as the delay time until the arrival of the response forces will be significantly different from the current situation. Neighboring countries to Ukraine, if they plan to adopt nuclear power, would need to consider to what extent they should strengthen their nuclear security. If the ROK considers nuclear power plant exports to this region, prior discussions on establishing physical protection measures tailored to that region would be necessary.

Furthermore, with the development of technology, nuclear security threats continue to evolve, including threats such as drones, cyber-attacks, and others. Especially with the rise of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), concerns about cyber threats have also increased due to factors including remote area construction and load follow capabilities. Dealing with these nuclear security threats has become a challenging situation that cannot be solely addressed by individual countries.

Necessity of the international nuclear security cooperation and feasible mechanism

During the NSS process, the necessity of international cooperation against common threats was emphasized. Still, there is a need to explore international collaborative approaches for this aspect as well. Above all, a core institution is necessary to concentrate these efforts. Even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tries its best, it does not have the proper authority to cope with unthinkable situations. It is believed that more support should be given to strengthen the IAEA. These issues cannot be addressed by the efforts of a single country alone. Responsible officials in many countries should gather together to engage in discussions and establish a mechanism to track the progress and implementation of the outcomes.

In this changed situation, there is still a mechanism to pay attention to and consult on nuclear security. At the end of the NSS process, it was decided to hold ministerial-level meetings during the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) regularly held by the IAEA as a high-level cooperation mechanism to discuss nuclear security. The first ICONS Ministerial meeting was held in December of the same year. At that time, South Korea took the position of the conference president. The 3rd Ministerial meeting is planned for May 2024 in line with the ICONS. Through this, high-level consultations between governments can be made. It is hoped that the international community will not miss this opportunity to discuss pending nuclear security issues and unravel clues to the derivation of a new nuclear security mechanism that reflects the changing nuclear security environment.

One more thing we can note is that ROK and US have been operating the Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG) under the HLBC (High-Level Bilateral Commission) since the revision of the US-Korea Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement in 2015. The ROK, United States, along with the Netherlands hosted the NSS, representing the troika countries responsible for international nuclear security. We can utilize the current cooperation mechanism with the US to move forward to restore the nuclear security regime. It is time to react.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evolving landscape of nuclear security demands that we constantly reassess and update our approaches and protocols. While the NSS process has concluded, the lessons learned during this time and the commitments made by nations across the world to enhance nuclear security remain pivotal. It is essential that countries continue to cooperate and collaborate, ensuring that international nuclear security mechanisms adapt to the changing security environment.

As we step into an era marked by increased reliance on nuclear power and the corresponding rise in security challenges, our collective focus should be on fostering international cooperation and advancing nuclear security mechanisms. This is not the time for complacency, but a call to action to strengthen the existing nuclear security system for a safer, more secure future.