►  China quickly embraced the notion of “BRICS Plus” as a convenient tool to advance an alternative worldview even as Beijing developed a “new form of imperialism” in Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

►  A larger and more diverse membership will easily hinder consensus when it matters.

►  It neither shares our sense of urgency in Ukraine nor prioritizes the revival of the rules-based order.

►  In that, allies such as South Korea can play a pivotal role in advocating for reform, particularly in multilateral forums.

Every year, the conclusion of the United Nations General Assembly is followed by a customary stock-taking of what has, and more importantly, what has not been accomplished or said. This time, beyond reproaches of irrelevance, remarkably little has emerged by way of recaps or major takeaways. In fact, the collective expectations seem to have fallen even shorter than the modest hopes pinned on the multilateral system. 

If there were any doubts about the erosion of the old framework, the recent proliferation of new formations serves as further evidence, casting profound doubts on the nature of alliances and the future of the global order. None of this should come as a surprise. The moribund state of the multilateral system has been on full display for a while. 

Apart from the non-binding Paris Climate Accords and the equally disheartening progress on the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals, it has been decades, experts point out, since the last globally binding multilateral accord. In the face of intensifying rivalries, old grievances and new schisms, novel actors have tried to fill the emerging void.

Old geographies are increasingly being drawn into the fray – as evidenced by news of Cuban fighters in Ukraine or the recent summit between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.  And while the trans-Atlantic community remains absorbed in responding to Russia's aggression, Western allies are increasingly confronted with the intricate task of navigating the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. 

Many of these countries, South Korea being a notable example, find themselves at a crossroads, torn between enduring alliances and shared values with Washington on one side and aversion to unleashing a new Cold War on the other. These fissures present unique challenges when it comes to the Global South. A denomination that seems to obscure more than it reveals, this agglomeration is now a key swing vote in the new geopolitical equation - multiple entities and countries vying to represent its voice.

Key among these entities is the BRICS (presently composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) whose meteoric rise to fame in the early 2000s was followed by an abrupt decline, only to have the group re-emerge in the spotlight recently.

Even before their recent decision to expand, the BRICS wielded significant economic influence, representing 42% of the global population and over a quarter of the world's GDP (although driven in large measure by China’s size). The formation, which made a comeback as a platform for cooperation on a range of issues, including climate change, global governance, and development, has forged several institutions to support this cooperation, including a New Development Bank, launched in 2014 as an alternative to the World Bank, and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement a year later.

While these initiatives have not fully flourished, they serve as important indicators of ongoing trends and dynamics that are unlikely to fade away in the foreseeable future. This is especially so considering the recent decision to add six new states to the mix - Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have been invited to join as full members from January 1 next year.

This is not to overstate the global importance of the BRICS, where the primacy of national interests has repeatedly held it back. With Xi Jinping at the helm, China quickly embraced the notion of “BRICS Plus” as a convenient tool to advance an alternative worldview even as Beijing developed a “new form of imperialism” in Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For Beijing, which alone accounts for more than 70% of the group’s GDP, the BRICS has always been a convenient platform. Yet, this year’s meeting held particular geo-political importance, especially in light of U.S. President Biden hosting in August the leaders of Japan and South Korea at Camp David - a symbolic trilateral alliance at China's doorstep.

Even before this expansion, the staggering economic differences and sheer diversity of the BRICS - a mix of feckless democracies and outright autocracies – seemed to defy the impulse to clump them together into a single category. Adding a slew of new members appeared to back predictions that the BRICS will overhaul the world order. Yet, such views may appear to be premature.  The recent BRICS summit held in Johannesburg in August under the theme: “BRICS and Africa” was a case in point.

When it came to addressing the numerous complex global challenges demanding immediate attention, the gathering offered little in terms of solutions. Even before the decision to expand, the BRICS were pulled apart by its more authoritarian wing, comprising of Russia and China, who remain keen to use the group’s platform in opposition to the West by supplanting the rules-based order and the more independent-minded members, such as India, Brazil and South Africa who seek to chart a more independent course.  

This trend is likely to persist and, beyond struggles to come up with a new acronym to capture its growing membership, the group will discover that its heterogeneity, while no obstacle to voicing discontent with the global world order, offers little by way of forging a constructive path forward or shaping the global discourse. A larger and more diverse membership will easily hinder consensus when it matters.

This is not to deny the obsolescence of the international system– there are enduring systemic problems within the current global framework that impede and disadvantage the impoverished and vulnerable, obstructing their progress. Western failure to effectively reform the global rules-based system has not only deepened existing fissures. More importantly, inaction has given credibility to alternatives offered from unlikely corners, such as Russia’s suggestion for a substitute reserve currency.

Seen from Europe, the most significant divergence with the BRICS rests with the latter’s stance on energy and reliance on fossil fuels, considered crucial for the development and economic growth of low- and middle-income nations. Despite efforts by Brussels to moderate its posture, this point of friction is unlikely to disappear. The European Union should nevertheless pursue viable avenues for trilateral cooperation by focusing on common objectives.

In that, allies such as South Korea can play a pivotal role in advocating for reform, particularly in multilateral forums. An expanded BRICS can provide additional entry points for practical engagement, and by leveraging its diplomatic acumen, economic strength, and technological expertise, Seoul can contribute to bridging existing gaps. Recent overtures by President Xi to promote a closer partnership between the two countries underscore this need. 

Today, the Global South, regardless of the forum, perceives the world differently from the West. It neither shares our sense of urgency in Ukraine nor prioritizes the revival of the rules-based order. However, blaming the West alone will not grant the BRICS or any other group the legitimacy or influence needed to sustain a new order. Western nations and their allies must engage in creative diplomacy promptly. The alternative may be too dire to contemplate.