► On August 18, 2023, the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan “commit[ted] to strengthening cooperation to promote respect for human rights in the DPRK and reaffirm[ed] a shared commitment to the immediate resolution of the issues of abductees, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of war” in a summit statement, dramatically entitled “The Spirit of Camp David”.[1]

► However, translating rhetoric of North Korean human rights into action remains a challenge.

► What is necessary is the political will, not the technical or financial wherewithal. It is time for action at the UN and beyond to promote human rights in North Korea.

On August 18, 2023, the leaders of South Korea, the United States and Japan “commit[ted] to strengthening cooperation to promote respect for human rights in the DPRK and reaffirm[ed] a shared commitment to the immediate resolution of the issues of abductees, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of war” in a summit statement, dramatically entitled “The Spirit of Camp David”.[2] This was the first time that the three countries who will happen to be the members of the UN Security Council next year jointly announced the promotion of North Korean human rights as a policy goal.

The renewed emphasis on North Korean human rights is a sea change from just a few years ago, especially in Washington and Seoul. Previously, President Trump touted his “bromance” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un while South Korean President Moon Jae-in after threats by Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, signed into law a controversial bill criminalizing the sending of leaflets to North Korea which was struck down as unconstitutional by court last week.[3] Moon’s conservative successor, President Yoon Suk-yeol has been particularly vocal in his criticism of North Korea’s human-rights record.

The glaring gap between rhetoric and action

However, translating rhetoric of North Korean human rights into action remains a challenge. Even the messaging from the three capitals is far from convincing. President Biden has rarely spoken about North Korea in general let alone its gross human-rights violations. Julie Turner who was finally confirmed as the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues by the Senate on July 27, more than six months after her nomination on January 23, is still awaiting the formal appointment by the president. By comparison, her predecessor, Robert King, was nominated on September 24, 2009, confirmed on November, 20 and appointed on November 24—all in the first year of the Obama presidency.

South Korea’s talk of North Korean human rights also lacks consistency. President Yoon warned that his country “will not stand idly by” if North Korea receives Russian support to boost its WMD capabilities but failed to mention human-rights concerns in his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 21. Although the Yoon government began to co-sponsor UN North Korean human rights resolutions which the previous one stopped doing in 2019, it has been mum about calls for South Korea to become a co-penholder with the European Union (EU) to jointly draft such resolutions.

Japan’s position is also tricky as its interest is almost exclusively focused on the abduction issue, more specifically the case of Yokota Megumi who was kidnapped by North Korean agents in 1977. It has been revealed recently that Japan has been in secret talks with North Korea this spring over the issue and Prime Minister Kishida even mulled the idea of sending his officials to Pyongyang this fall to prepare for a possible summit.[4] It is not surprising then that Tokyo has shown little interest in becoming a co-penholder of North Korean resolutions at the UN, a role it forewent in 2019 to raise the chances of a bilateral settlement—to no avail.

Given such questionable political will, it is not surprising that few substantive measures have been taken individually or jointly by these three nations. Perhaps the only concrete action taken was the resumption of a public debate at the Security Council for the first time in six years on August 17, 2023.

Putting the money where the mouth is

To see more concrete actions, the first order of business is to have the necessary institutional set-up. The United States can start with the speedy, if not belated, appointment of Julie Turner as the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues. The post which had been left vacant by Trump for four years and has continued to remain unfilled under Biden’s watch for more than 2 years and 8 months although it has been reported that her appointment will finally happen next week.[5] Like her predecessor, Ambassador Turner will coordinate the work related to North Korean human rights within the administration and with America’s allies and partners.

Despite President Yoon’s recent shake-up of the ministry of unification (MOU) with the exhortation to focus on North Korean human rights, the MOU in practice has only limited competence in this field. Actions at the UN, dialogues including summits with South Korea’s allies and the work of Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights Lee Shin-wha all fall squarely under the ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA)’s jealously guarded bureaucratic turf. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) arguably has far more information about North Korea, including its human-rights situation but is loath to share sensitive information with the MOU.

The ministry of justice (MOJ), which many argue is better positioned to take on the task of North Korean human rights documentation and accountability work because of its legal expertise and lack of need to bargain with North Korean officials at the negotiation table, oversees preparing case files for North Korean perpetrators of grave human rights violations. The ministry of national defense (MND) has the primary jurisdiction over unrepatriated POWs as they are technically still active-duty servicemen.

To overcome this bureaucratic compartmentalization and implement a coherent policy, it is necessary to create an inter-ministerial task force akin to Japan’s headquarters for the abduction issue (拉致問題対策本部, rachimondai taisaku honbu) which is headed by the prime minister, followed by the chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister. Given the importance of international diplomacy, a reorganization at the MOFA may be in order either by creating a new office dedicated to North Korean human rights affair or by reorienting (and possibly renaming) the vice-ministerial Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, basically “an MOU within the MOFA” that has been left idle since the disastrous US-DPRK Hanoi summit in February 2019, to that end.[6]

At the international level, it would be desirable to revive South Korea’s bilateral “consultative meetings” on North Korean human rights with the US and expand it to include not only the EU, as the MOFA has suggested earlier this year,[7] but also Japan. Such meetings may be institutionalized and given higher profile by the creation of a working group of like-minded states.

Time for action

With the international coordination between Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels and other like-minded actors, it may be possible to push more robust action on North Korean human rights at the UN and elsewhere. For a starter, the UN Security Council’s open discussions can focus on the security and human rights such as the risk of radiation leakage from North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site that can have cross-border ramifications for China, South Korea and Japan[8] or North Korea’s systematic use of prison labor and other forms of slave labor to produce weapons.[9] The latter is particularly relevant as North Korea ramps up its transfer of artillery in support of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.[10]

If North Korea dramatically escalates the situation with the resumption of nuclear test(s) or other military provocations and the Security Council fails to act because of Russian or Chinese veto, the debate can continue at the General Assembly under the Ukraine precedent.[11] In such a scenario, issues related to human rights should also be discussed.

The UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council, where North Korea has few friends and is not shielded by the Russian or Chinese veto, can take measures such as the creation of a UN accountability mechanism to prepare case files like the ones existing for Syria[12] and Myanmar[13], or a UN repository of missing persons.[14] The UN Human Rights Office in Seoul can also be asked to adopt and publicize terms of reference to clarify and strengthen its mandate to ensure accountability for North Korea’s crimes against humanity and other grave violations.

The like-minded countries and NGOs should also urge UN Secretary-General António Guterres, his successor as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Filippo Grandi, and an old UNHCR hand turned UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, to speak up about China’s forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees without the refugee determination process.[15] There have been public calls for Grandi[16] and Türk[17] to end their silence.

South Korea and its allies can also contribute by releasing crucial information like the changing location, size and satellite imagery of political prison camps, the structure and key personnel of the Ministry of State Security and other security services, and the reported number of North Korean refugees in China and their repatriations. While there may be understandable concerns about exposing the sources of such information, the United States used timely information disclosure to foil Russia’s false-flag operations against Ukraine and (less successfully) to deter Kim Jong-un from meeting with Putin and supplying artillery to the Russian forces. The like-minded states also have at their disposal cutting-edge technology such as satellite-based communication to dramatically expand the North Korean people’s information access.[18]

What is necessary is the political will, not the technical or financial wherewithal. It is time for action at the UN and beyond to promote human rights in North Korea.

[1] The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States (AUGUST 18, 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states

[2] The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States (AUGUST 18, 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states

[3] Hyunsu Yim, "South Korea court strikes down ban on anti-North Korea propaganda leaflets", Reuters (September 26, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-court-strikes-down-ban-anti-north-korea-propaganda-leaflets-2023-09-26

[4] 鈴木拓也, "日朝、東南アジアで今春に2回秘密接触　高官の平壌派遣も一時検討" (2023年9月29日), https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR9X6KR7R9XUTFK019.html

[5] 하만주, "공석 6년만 지명 터너 신임 미 북한인권특사, 이달 중순 한국 방문" (2023. 10. 05.), https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20231005010001442

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, "Organizational Chart", https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5745/contents.do

[7] 김효정, "정부, 美·EU와 연내 북한인권 협의채널 가동 추진", 연합뉴스(2023. 1. 15.), https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20230114037800504

[8] KIM TONG-HYUNG, "Group urges radiation tests for 900 North Korean escapees" (February 21, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/science-politics-south-korea-government-north-public-health-90bcb507a1fd1941009672c7d855ca14

[9] Hyonhee Shin, "North Korea enslaving political prisoners to fund weapons programme: South Korea rights group" (FEBRUARY 25, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-rights-idUSKBN2AO20

[10] RAMY INOCENCIO, JUSTINE REDMAN, TUCKER REALS, "North Korea provides Russia artillery for the Ukraine war as U.S. hands Kyiv ammunition seized from Iran", CBS (OCTOBER 5, 2023), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-war-russia-north-korea-artillery-us-gives-kyiv-siezed-iran-ammunition

[11] UN MEETINGS COVERAGE, "General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Aimed at Holding Five Permanent Security Council Members Accountable for Use of Veto", GA/12417 (26 APRIL 2022), https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12417.doc.htm

[12] International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria since March 2011, https://iiim.un.org

[13] Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, https://iimm.un.org

[14] UN MEETINGS COVERAGE, "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Establishing Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria, as Speakers Debate Text’s Merit", GA/12514 (29 JUNE 2023), https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12514.doc.ht

[15] 김영권, "UNHCR “탈북민 강제북송 안 돼”…유엔 인권기구 대표 “면밀히 감시할 것”", VOA (2023.9.1), https://www.voakorea.com/a/7249465.html

[16] Jung Min-ho, "Rights watchdog chief calls for active UN involvement in saving NK refugees", Korea Times (2023. 10. 5), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/10/103_360536.html

[17] JAMEY KEATEN, "UN affirms concern over forced repatriation of North Koreans following criticism from rights groups" AP (August 12, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/06c1753de9c06d2dab0fdb22bbf0aaba

[18] MARTYN WILLIAMS, "Satellites Can’t Get Information Into North Korea Now, but Could Have 20 Years Ago", 38 North (OCTOBER 6, 2022), https://www.38north.org/2022/10/satellites-cant-get-information-into-north-korea-now-but-could-have-20-years-ag