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►  While the Audacious Initiative proposes a phased approach to achieving North Korean denuclearization, deterrence is essential throughout the process, and the Yoon administration has taken steps to bolster deterrence against North Korean threats under the Audacious Initiative.

► Strengthening existing ROK-US alliance mechanisms and bolstering trilateral cooperation is a form of deterrence by denial, since that denies North Korea’s strategic goal of isolating South Korea from external supporters.

► Yet, with dissuasion and dialogue struggling under the Audacious Initiative, the Yoon administration should focus more deterrence, particularly on how to innovate the ROK-US alliance and institutionalize trilateral cooperation to improve South Korea’s deterrence posture against future North Korean nuclear threats and military provocations.

ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol announced his policy toward North Korea’s nuclear program during his Liberation Day address in August 2022. The policy is called the Audacious Initiative, and a 3D principle of deterrence, dissuasion, and dialogue forms the foundation of the policy. While the Audacious Initiative proposes a phased approach to achieving North Korean denuclearization, deterrence is essential throughout the process, and the Yoon administration has taken steps to bolster deterrence against North Korean threats under the Audacious Initiative. Even though Pyongyang has yet to return to the negotiating table, it is prudent to take stock of deterrence under the Audacious Initiative so far and look at future deterrence needs. It may seem like deterrence against North Korean threats is holding now, but deterrence relationships are fluid and require constant assessment and adjustment.

To assess deterrence under the Audacious Initiative, it is first useful to define deterrence. Joseph Nye defined deterrence as “dissuading someone from doing something by making them believe that the costs to them will exceed their expected benefit.” Acting on this cost-benefit calculation by the adversary, deterrence scholars typically distinguish between punishment and denial. Deterrence by punishment works by increasing the cost of acting, and deterrence by denial works by decreasing the benefit of acting. Some deterrence scholars, like Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, include a second cost-benefit calculation by the adversary, the cost and benefit of not acting. The adversary may feel there will be high cost to not acting, but deterrent effects can be produced by increasing the benefit of not acting.

With these definitions set, the next step in assessing deterrence is to provide some clarity on what action is to be deterred. Too much specificity, such as setting so-called “red lines,” can lead to an adversary continually acting just below the line or make the defender feel a need to respond when it would prefer not to. Too much ambiguity also can lead to deterrence failure by making the adversary feel that the deterrence threat is not credible or trap the defender into responding to too many actions. A balance between ambiguity and specificity must be found. The Yoon government must strike this balance in setting a reasonable deterrence policy goal regarding unwanted North Korean actions and then effectively communicate that to North Korea, the United States, and all other interested parties. Ideally, how deterrence will be achieved, through punishment, denial, or inducement, should be set and communicated, too.

Yoon’s Liberation Day address in 2022 did not mention deterrence, but the Yoon administration’s deterrence goals under the Audacious Initiative were declared in a policy paper published by the ROK Ministry of Unification (MOU) in November 2022. The paper set a goal of deterring “North Korea’s nuclear threat based on a strong ROK-US alliance” under the Audacious Initiative, and it said a principle for the ROK government is to “effectively deter and respond to North Korea’s military provocations with its solid ROK-US alliance.” The former is more specific than the latter, but both deterrence statements set the ROK-US alliance as the tool to achieve deterrence. Furthermore, Seoul and Washington have repeatedly declared the past two years that any North Korean nuclear attack will result in the end of the Kim regime, which suggests the ROK-US alliance takes a deterrence by punishment posture.

The MOU policy paper also states the ROK government will dissuade “the North from developing nuclear weapons through sanctions and pressure.” This can be read as wanting to deter Pyongyang from pursuing further vertical proliferation, and even the Audacious Initiative’s offers of economic, political, and military measures to be provided to North Korea during a negotiated denuclearization process arguably could fit under the logic of deterring by increasing the benefit of not acting. Even if these goals are included in this deterrence assessment, it is apparent that these are the least successful goals for the Audacious Initiative so far. Since August 2022, North Korea has conducted dozens of missile tests, announced aggressive nuclear policies for preemptive strikes and mass production of tactical weapons, likely continued to produce weapons usable nuclear materials, disavowed any attempts at denuclearization, and rejected the Audacious Initiative. It is possible that these moves increase the domestic cost of not acting for Kim Jong Un, which would make it harder for Seoul or Washington to deter Kim Jong Un by increasing the benefit of not acting.

Deterring nuclear threats and military provocations arguably has been more successful. While Pyongyang continues to provoke through the ways listed above and through rhetorical statements, there have been no kinetic military strikes on South Korea, and the Yoon administration has worked to strengthen both the ROK-US alliance and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Seoul and Washington have taken measures to strengthen deterrence against North Korean nuclear threats, such as by establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group and updating the alliance’s Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and Yoon should get much credit for pushing to improve ties with Tokyo, leading to Spirit of Camp David statement that aims to improve trilateral military coordination against North Korean threats. Japan and the United States also have officially endorsed the Audacious Initiative.

Yet, this also is where the Audacious Initiative may not be ambitious enough to ensure that deterrence against North Korean nuclear threats continues to hold. As detailed in an Atlantic Council study, the ROK-US alliance’s command structure and reliance on deterrence by punishment may not be ideally suited to deter North Korean nuclear threats as Pyongyang further develops its military capabilities in the coming years. North Korea is developing tools to defeat existing ROK-US alliance denial capabilities, such as maneuverable cruise missiles and advanced cyber weapons, and Pyongyang’s increasingly robust second-strike capabilities raises the potential cost that South Korea or the United States could face for responding to North Korean provocations. Moreover, North Korea is most likely to pursue a coercive strategy involving nuclear threats combined with gray zone tactics to gain bargaining leverage and put itself in a position of advantage on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear threats and gray zone tactics must be viewed as working together, and deterrence failure could come from not properly addressing the range of threats presented by Pyongyang’s strategy.

The ROK-US alliance’s command structure must be adapted to deal with this, such as by updating notions of wartime and peacetime and implementing multidomain operations concepts. More denial capabilities also are needed to complement the alliance’s punishment posture, address the lower-level threats that work in concert with North Korea’s nuclear threats, and reduce reliance on needing the political will to punish. Strengthening existing ROK-US alliance mechanisms and bolstering trilateral cooperation is a form of deterrence by denial, since that denies North Korea’s strategic goal of isolating South Korea from external supporters. Yet, with dissuasion and dialogue struggling under the Audacious Initiative, the Yoon administration should focus more deterrence, particularly on how to innovate the ROK-US alliance and institutionalize trilateral cooperation to improve South Korea’s deterrence posture against future North Korean nuclear threats and military provocations. As Lawrence Freedman said, deterrence is working until it is not, and Seoul cannot afford to wait for its current deterrence posture to not work against North Korea’s increasing threat.