► Over the past three decades, the EU’s approach towards North Korea has shifted from a policy of “critical engagement” to a “standstill”, and is now on the verge of irrelevance. 

► As recent developments have brought the North Korea problem closer to Europe, a renewed approach to North Korea is needed based on a comprehensive evaluation of the EU’s critical engagement strategy.

► The EU must utilize its unique capacity to carry out a series of outreach initiatives, along with arranging a network of like-minded partners. 

► However, given that an opportunity for renewed engagement and exercising leverage over North Korea is narrowing, the EU might not be able to extend its geopolitical prowess to it.

Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy wrote that “the 2022 Ukraine war saw the belated birth of a geopolitical EU.” Indeed, while Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have expedited the EU’s turn to realpolitik, there has been a growing momentum towards greater pragmatism and the need to broaden the EU’s geopolitical reach. This is evident in the publication of documents such as the 2018 Europe and Asia Connectivity Strategy and the 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy which highlights the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a region directly affecting the EU’s interests. To this end, the EU has kept a close watch on the potential flashpoints in the region, specifically, tensions on the Taiwan Strait and North Korea’s nuclear weapons development.

Of the two, the EU’s official policy towards North Korea is particularly underdeveloped and outdated. This is unfortunate given the rosy start of the EU’s relations with North Korea in the early 1990s. To elaborate, following the publication of the EU’s Asia strategy in 1994, the EU committed to increasing its presence in Asia. This led to the EU promoting a policy of active engagement towards North Korea, including trade relations, humanitarian aid, and political and human rights dialogue.

Formal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang were established in 2001 and the EU consolidated its approach towards North Korea with the publication of a DPRK Country Strategy Paper for 2001-2004 which focused on humanitarian aid and sustainable development as key priorities.

The EU was also engaged in the security of the Korean Peninsula. In 1997, the EU joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), set up in 1995 to provide two light water reactors to North Korea. The EU’s engagement with North Korea was reinforced by South Korea’s Sunshine Policy and the optimism stemming from the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. However, relations began to sour when the EU sponsored a human rights resolution against North Korea at the UNHCR in 2003, after which North Korea suspended its human rights dialogue.

Around this time, the EU’s approach towards North Korea shifted to a policy of “critical engagement.”  The objective of critical engagement was to help reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, uphold the non-proliferation regime, and improve the human rights situation in North Korea. While it is true that such a hardened policy was a response to North Korea’s continued nuclear development, culminating in the nuclear test in 2006, the policy shift was also affected by the EU’s internal developments. Namely, in 2003, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy which pinpointed proliferation as “potentially the greatest threat to EU security.” To address security concerns, the EU highlighted the importance of working with partners, particularly the US. In effect, this led to very similar pressures on North Korea, such as sanctions. 

Consequently, the period that followed saw a drastic decline in the EU’s relations with North Korea. Furthermore, the demise of KEDO in 2006 ended the EU’s participation in the region’s security framework, as the EU did not become a member of the following Six-Party Talks. Hereon, the EU gradually disengaged from dialogue with North Korea with the last political dialogue held in 2015. During the past few years, the EU has been only marginally engaged, through the provision of a significantly reduced amount of humanitarian aid.

In sum, the past three decades of the EU’s relations with North Korea have gone from one marked by promising prospects of economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian engagement to a standstill and now is on the verge of irrelevance.

A renewed approach to North Korea is needed, based on a comprehensive evaluation of the EU’s critical engagement strategy. The new approach must recognize two crucial facts: all three objectives of critical engagement (reducing tensions, preventing non-proliferation, and improving the human rights situation) have been unsuccessful, and recent developments have brought the North Korea problem closer to Europe, with North Korea made weapons used by Russia against Ukraine and also by Hamas, according to Israel.

A renewed approach should echo the language in the EU’s recently published documents such as the Strategic Compass; example, highlighting that while the EU favors dialogue, it has defensive capabilities with a credible threat of the use of force. It needs to identify areas of concern with specific action points. These include, for example, concerning human rights, the EU should further urge China to stop repatriating North Korean defectors, in addition to its practice of drafting UN resolutions on this issue. The EU can also double down on its efforts to locate those responsible for sanctions evasion and urge China and Russia to stop helping North Korea evade sanctions. To respond to North Korea’s growing cyber-attacks, the EU should focus on establishing a shared threat assessment among its members and further develop its nascent cyber sanctions regime. To address the threat of proliferation, the EU should consider arranging a network of like-minded partners to strengthen collective capacities to prevent the passage of WMD, similar to the Proliferation Security Initiative. This will signal a clear message that the EU is serious about preventing North Korean weapons from reaching Europe.

The EU should also utilize its unique capacity to carry out a series of outreach initiatives, made possible due to its reputation as an honest broker.  There are some cases of successful projects between North Korea and other countries; the US-North Korea Science Engagement Consortium set up in 2007 or the collaboration between North Korean and French musicians in 2012 are some examples. Similar exchanges in the field of sports or art can be some of the low-hanging fruit to get exchanges started. Over time, as the two establish patterns of cooperation, the two can embark on longer-term projects such as public health or deforestation/climate change. The provision of humanitarian aid, which is difficult at present due to North Korea’s refusal to accept foreign aid, can also be a longer-term objective.

With such engagement efforts, there is the risk of giving undue legitimacy to the Kim regime or weakening the effectiveness of sanctions, and thus should be handled with sensitivity. However, there are important reasons why outreach is necessary and long overdue. First, engagement is not simply for engagement’s sake. North Korean weapons have already found their way to Russia, and it is a known unknown where they might end up next. A stream of pre-existing exchanges makes it more difficult for North Korea to send weapons that will end up in a European city. Second, having an available channel of communication at their disposal can be a very important tool in case of contingency. Here, the EU can consider supporting a range of Track II dialogues of former officials who worked in North Korea. Third, over time, these activities build up the EU’s reputation as a reliable partner. This will be necessary for the EU to be perceived as a valuable player in the denuclearisation process.

Such a renewed strategy should be spearheaded by a Special Representative to North Korea. Doing so signals that the EU has the political will to propel its North Korea policy as well as its intention to stay in it for the long haul. 

Understandably, these are ambitious goals. The EU is a very large organisation, and its structural and legal institutions limit how quickly the EU can act. Furthermore, establishing consensus among member states will also require time and debate, which will be divided based on the question of how much the EU can stretch itself amid the ongoing conflicts geographically closer to Europe.

However, the window of opportunity for renewed engagement and subsequently exercising leverage over North Korea is narrowing. Pyongyang’s closure of its diplomatic mission in Spain is a case in point. Unless the EU carries out a comprehensive reassessment of its critical engagement strategy, its geopolitical prowess will not extend to North Korea.