► Although the summit lasted less than an hour and a half, it was a significant effort to secure dialogue channels that transcend national stances, especially as Japan and South Korea are intensifying their alliance networks for deterrence, while China is engaging in diplomacy to showcase its influence

► Concerns about the emergence of a bloc-structured future are growing. In such times, the recent summit demonstrated that it is possible to advance frameworks like the Japan-U.S.-South Korea and the China-Japan-Korea frameworks simultaneously.

► The recent China-Japan-Korea summit can be evaluated positively as it provided momentum for three countries with different systems and values to move forward.

In May 2024, the South Korean government hosted the China-Japan-Korea trilateral summit, which had not been held for four and a half years. Although the summit lasted less than an hour and a half, it was a significant effort to secure dialogue channels that transcend national stances, especially as Japan and South Korea are intensifying their alliance networks for deterrence, while China is engaging in diplomacy to showcase its influence. Additionally, the three countries were able to hold three bilateral meetings concurrently, making Seoul an important venue for Northeast Asian diplomacy. 

However, it is unlikely that the Japan-China-South Korea framework will become a game-changer capable of altering the structure of international politics in the region. On one hand, the United States is progressing with the reorganization of regional security architecture, an endeavor that can be termed the construction of an Indo-Pacific system. In this context, the United States and its allies are intensifying collaboration in military, political, and scientific domains, with a focus on two pillars: traditional security and economic security. Conversely, China is visibly fortifying its network with authoritarian countries such as Russia and expanding its influence across numerous regions, including Central Asia. The prevailing post- Cold War order in Asia and the world is undergoing a period of transition, marked by division and confrontation rather than international cooperation transcending stances. Concerns about the emergence of a bloc-structured future are growing. In such times, the recent summit demonstrated that it is possible to advance frameworks like the Japan-U.S.-South Korea and the China-Japan- Korea frameworks simultaneously.

China likely had its strategic calculations. Even though it was ultimately not adopted, China attempted to include in the joint document its intent to acquire advanced technologies from Japan and South Korea. In the context of the significant uncertainty surrounding the U.S. presidential election, China may have sought to exploit the anxieties of Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. by driving a wedge between them. Additionally, China itself is wary of a potential return of the Trump administration, which might have led it to consider mending its recently strained relationships with Japan and South Korea. China's interest in Japan and South Korea's advanced technologies is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, and China's diplomatic overtures to both countries are likely to continue, regardless of changes in the U.S. administration.

Given that Japan and South Korea are accelerating their economic security efforts with advanced nations, including the U.S., it is difficult to imagine them yielding to such overtures. Nevertheless, as long as the United States does not express opposition to the China-Japan- Korea framework itself, Japan and South Korea shall proceed with confidence in advancing this framework.

It is crucial that functional cooperation, as enumerated in the significantly longer joint declaration than the previous one, be implemented. The declaration lists cooperation in areas such as human exchanges, environmental cooperation, free trade, intellectual property rights, public health, and science and technology, and repeatedly references the "Plus X" approach for trilateral cooperation.

However, the challenge lies in making these efforts meaningful. For instance, human exchanges are limited to easier aspects such as exchanges among children, students, and cultural activities. Globally, not just in Japan and South Korea, companies and scholars are increasingly reluctant to travel to China due to fears of detention by Chinese authorities. Without assurances that can change this situation, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where bilateral human exchanges lead to spillover effects in economic activities or scientific and technological cooperation. Moreover, even if discussions to resume the trilateral free trade agreement negotiations are initiated, it is uncertain whether the three countries can reach an agreement that further enhances RCEP. While they may agree on the overarching goal of free trade, it does not necessarily mean that their individual interests align on further market liberalization. 

It is unclear whether China can be moved, even slightly, on its stance toward North Korea, which differs significantly from that of Japan and South Korea. According to reports, the section on North Korea did not reach a consensus with China, and the joint statement could only contain a vague expression: “We reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively.” In contrast, the trilateral summit hosted by China four and a half years ago declared, “We are committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This difference indicates Beijing’s backing away from the previous position. While it can be viewed positively as demonstrating to North Korea the existence of a framework distinct from the deterrence-based pressure applied by Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, China's excessive sensitivity to provoking North Korea remains evident. The substantial gap in positions among the three countries left dissatisfaction. Should China feel an increasing need to close the distance with Japan and South Korea, this might change, but currently, China's hesitancy stands out.

As the next chair country, along with South Korea, Japan will be tested on its ability to communicate its specific concerns to China in a proactive manner. While regularization does not guarantee annual meetings, with President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration in South Korea continuing until 2027, South Korea's stance will remain stable for a while. There is room for Japan and South Korea to strengthen their approach as a 2-to-1 dynamic. From a broader perspective on international politics, it is possible that China may become more willing to engage in neighborhood diplomacy with countries other than the United States. 

The recent China-Japan- Korea summit can be evaluated positively as it provided momentum for three countries with different systems and values to move forward. The expansion of such multilayered regional frameworks, in addition to alliance networks and structures designed to display influence, can help to mitigate tensions and conflicts associated with the transition of order. It can also contribute to the formulation of rules and diplomatic coordination, and it will benefit not only Japan, China, and South Korea but also the region itself.