► Comments by two U.S. officials that Washington would accept “interim steps” toward North Korea denuclearization triggered concern, primarily in South Korea, that the U.S. had abandoned denuclearization as a policy objective.

► However, a closer examination indicates the remarks were misinterpreted and reflected greater policy continuity than change. That said, in recent years North Korea has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal and engaged in increasingly provocative behavior which increased doubts about U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense.

►  [G]iven the South Korea’s president’s primacy in security policies, Yoon will likely be able to maintain his policies that closely align with U.S. strategic interests.

Comments by two U.S. officials that Washington would accept “interim steps” toward North Korea denuclearization triggered concern, primarily in South Korea, that the U.S. had abandoned denuclearization as a policy objective. Speculation ensued that the Biden Administration had shifted to an arms control approach that could accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and lead Washington to focus only on reducing threats to the American homeland.

However, a closer examination indicates the remarks were misinterpreted and reflected greater policy continuity than change. That said, in recent years North Korea has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal and engaged in increasingly provocative behavior which increased doubts about U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense.

In March 2024, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania, commented that the Biden Administration would consider “interim steps on that pathway to denuclearization” as well as a willingness to engage in threat reduction talks with Pyongyang.[1] The same month, Jung Pak, U.S. Senior Official for North Korea, reiterated that the U.S. would accept “interim steps to be taken on a path towards North Korea's ultimate denuclearization [which] would not happen "overnight.”[2]

Pak subsequently emphasized that the complete denuclearization of North Korean remained the goal and, in talking about interim steps, “we’re making explicit what has always been implicit, which is a complete denuclearization will not occur overnight.”[3]

For decades, successive U.S. administrations posited that North Korean denuclearization would be a lengthy process dependent on reciprocal measures taken in response to actions by all involved nations. The 1994 Agreed Framework and the 2003-2009 Six Party Talks were premised on incremental steps to be taken by both sides in a manner similar to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Any benefits provided to Pyongyang would be conditioned on progress toward denuclearization.

It was long understood that the expansive North Korean nuclear arsenal and network of production facilities could not be dismantled overnight. Moreover, distrust created by previous failed agreements and conflicting accusations that each side had cheated or not fulfilled commitments would also necessitate a series of sequential steps dependent on confirmation of completed actions.

Despite repeated U.S. attempts, North Korea has rejected all entreaties for dialogue since the last bilateral talks collapsed in October 2019. Pyongyang also refuses diplomatic engagement with South Korea which the regime has now deemed a hostile nation. Nascent North Korean-Japanese efforts at scheduling a summit meeting have since foundered after Tokyo refused to acquiesce to regime demands on agenda topics.

The U.S. must maintain pressure on the recalcitrant regime to induce it back to negotiations as well as punish Pyongyang for repeated violations of UN resolutions and international law. However, the Biden Administration has failed to fully enforce required sanctions as well as U.S. laws, including those protecting the U.S. financial system against money laundering crimes.

Most notably, the United States refrains from targeting Chinese banks and businesses that facilitate North Korean violations. In the past, the U.S. imposed extensive in fines on British and French banks for money laundering for Iran but has yet to impose similar fines on Chinese banks.

The Biden Administration must enforce U.S. laws more diligently by targeting any entity abetting North Korean nuclear, missile, and conventional arms development; criminal activities; money laundering; or import of luxury goods. Such targeted financial measures should include freezing and seizing assets, imposing significant fines, and precluding their access to the U.S. financial system as well as targeting overseas assets, business ventures, and bank accounts associated with any prohibited or illegal activity.

Russia recently refused to renew the annual mandate for the UN Panel of Experts which had produced reports identifying violations by North Korea and other entities and highlighted shortcomings in enforcement of required sanctions. During the panel’s tenure, Russia and China habitually watered down or rejected evidence of North Korean violations. In recent years, Russia and China became even more obstructionist on the U.N. Security Council and more blatantly shielded Pyongyang from any additional resolutions or sanctions.

With U.N. action hindered, the Biden Administration should take the lead in leading an international coalition to monitor compliance with U.N. resolutions and target infractions by China, North Korea, and Russia.  

U.S. efforts will be aided in its efforts against North Korean violations by President Yoon Suk Yeol’s efforts to bring South Korea into greater policy alignment with Washington. When elected in 2022, Yoon pledged to implement principled security policies to strengthen South Korea’s alliance with the United States and push back against the rising threats from China and North Korea. He pledged to increase defense spending and improve South Korea’s military.

Yoon has delivered on his promises, enabling a resurgence in allied deterrence and defense capabilities against North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile arsenals. The U.S. and South Korea resumed large-scale military exercises and Washington restarted rotational deployments of strategic assets (bombers, submarines, and aircraft carriers), both after a four-year hiatus. Unlike his predecessors, Yoon also imposed South Korean sanctions on North Korean and other entities that violated South Korean law or UN resolutions.

However, Yoon’s ruling party suffered a resounding defeat in the National Assembly election in April and he will now face greater challenges in implementing his policies due to an energized opposition party and his own party’s distancing itself from an unpopular president.

The opposition party is expected to step up its criticism of Yoon’s foreign policies, since it favors a more accommodating stance toward Pyongyang and Beijing, resistance to improving relations with Japan, and greater independence from U.S. policies. However, given the South Korea’s president’s primacy in security policies, Yoon will likely be able to maintain his policies that closely align with U.S. strategic interests.