► As North Korea expands and diversifies its nuclear and missile arsenal, prospects for denuclearization of the DPRK become more remote and less realistic. Nonetheless, the goal of denuclearization should not be abandoned.

► Senior Biden administration officials suggested in March that consideration be given to “interim steps” to limit DPRK capabilities. These comments attracted substantial attention in Seoul, much of it critical.

► There is no ideal solution to the North Korea nuclear issue. But the most promising alternative is to pursue interim measures that can address the most immediate threats to the United States and its allies while keeping the door open to denuclearization when and if conditions materialize that can make that outcome more realistic than it is today.

As North Korea expands and diversifies its nuclear and missile arsenal, prospects for denuclearization of the DPRK become more remote and less realistic. Nonetheless, the goal of denuclearization should not be abandoned. But neither should it be the sole focus of U.S. and allied diplomacy, precluding any efforts to achieve near-term, partial measures that can arrest and reduce the rapidly growing nuclear threat posed by Pyongyang.

Don’t abandon denuclearization

Some observers say it is time to give up on the goal of denuclearization and accept the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea. To be sure, Kim Jong Un has no intention of getting rid of the nuclear capability he sees as crucial to the survival of his regime. As long as the Kim dynasty remains in power, it is hard to imagine the DPRK disarming voluntarily. But if (and when) that regime comes to an end – either as a result of domestic discontent and upheaval or of military defeat in a conflict foolishly initiated by the DPRK – denuclearization could again become a realistic possibility. However improbable and distant the goal of denuclearization may now appear, it should not be abandoned.

There are other reasons for maintaining that goal. Pyongyang acquired its nuclear capability through illegitimate means, joining the Nonproliferation Treaty with the intention to violate its obligations and pursue nuclear weapons illicitly. Accepting the DPRK as a legitimate nuclear-armed state would set a damaging precedent for the global nonproliferation regime. Moreover, recognizing the North as a permanent nuclear power would be demoralizing for South Korea and Japan and could increase domestic pressures for their own nuclear programs.

An “all or nothing” approach will produce nothing

Some other observers maintain that diplomacy with the North should be aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement that would result in complete denuclearization in a finite (and preferably short) time period. They argue that partial, stand-alone measures would provide no assurance of proceeding further down the path toward denuclearization. Indeed, they contend that sanctions relief provided in exchange for such measures could reduce DPRK incentives to continue along that path. In this view, partial measures would soon reach a dead end and could result in de facto or even de jure acceptance of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status.

The problem with resisting partial steps and holding out for a credible commitment to reach early and complete denuclearization in a single agreement is that such an “all or nothing” approach is likely to produce nothing. The Trump administration called for North Korea’s total and rapid abandonment of its nuclear weapons, even offering to help it achieve prosperity on par with that of South Korea. It was also prepared to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, including a peace treaty and pledges of non-hostile intent and non-interference in Pyongyang’s internal affairs. But such carrots were insufficient to convince North Korea to part with the capability it deems critical to regime survival. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s “audacious initiative” fared no better.

Sticks have been no more effective. North Korea has long been prepared to endure severe economic deprivation – including as a result of stiff U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions imposed in 2016-2017 as well as the wide-ranging unilateral sanctions adopted by successive U.S. administrations – rather than give up its “treasured sword.” Now that China and Russia are helping the DPRK evade existing sanctions and will veto any new UNSC sanctions – and especially now that North Korea has become an important supplier of arms to Russia for its war against Ukraine – prospects for mounting international pressures powerful enough to compel the DPRK to scrap its nuclear arsenal have diminished even further.

The critical disadvantage of a policy that opposes partial, near-term measures and presses instead for early DPRK denuclearization is not just that it will fail; its failure will leave North Korea free to continue the expansion of its destabilizing nuclear and missile capabilities and will forfeit opportunities to seek practical limits on those capabilities.

Pursuing interim measures while reaffirming denuclearization

Senior Biden administration officials suggested in March that consideration be given to “interim steps” to limit DPRK capabilities. These comments attracted substantial attention in Seoul, much of it critical. Concerns were raised that support for interim steps constituted a fundamental shift in U.S. policy – an indication that Washington is no longer committed to denuclearization and a harbinger of U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.

However, these concerns are unwarranted. In the first place, Biden administration interest in interim steps is nothing new. In the April 2021 rollout of its policy review on North Korea, the administration signaled that it would not seek an “everything for everything” grand bargain but would instead pursue an incremental approach involving practical, near-term limits to arrest the growth of DPRK nuclear and missile programs.

Moreover, interim steps and denuclearization are not separate, incompatible destinations. As the administration says, denuclearization is a lengthy process. It cannot happen “overnight.” It must logically begin somewhere – with initial, partial measures. As they pursue interim steps, the United States and its allies can and should remain both faithful to the goal of denuclearization and firmly opposed to acceptance of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-armed state.

More fundamentally, interim steps are in the allies’ security interest. With North Korea aggressively advancing its nuclear and missile programs, ramping up its belligerent rhetoric, and even threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons preemptively, the top priority now should be to reduce the risk of armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level. Together with determined efforts to boost the allies’ individual and collective deterrence capabilities, interim steps can help reduce that risk.

Risk reduction measures can reduce the growing threat that nuclear weapons may be used as the result of accident, misperception, or miscalculation. Bans on missile flight tests and nuclear tests can impede further qualitative advances in DPRK programs. A halt to further fissile material production can cap the quantitative expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

Better than the alternative

Of course, there is no guarantee that Pyongyang will agree to such interim measures.  In the last five years, it has been unwilling to engage, and that is unlikely to change for the remainder of 2024, not least because of the U.S. election. But once Kim Jong Un is satisfied with progress in fulfilling the ambitious programmatic goals he set in January 2021, he may be ready to negotiate.

And, of course, there is no guarantee that interim steps will lead to further progress toward denuclearization – no guarantee that the DPRK will not refuse to take additional steps or will not renege on existing steps when it suits its interests. Further progress will depend on the pressures that can be brought to bear on the North, and the incentives it can be offered, to continue down the path toward denuclearization.

But what is the alternative? The alternative is to insist on a mega-deal leading all the way to complete denuclearization. Given Kim Jong Un’s determination to retain his nuclear deterrent and the lack of sticks and carrots to persuade him to do otherwise – that approach will perpetuate stalemate and virtually ensure that the DPRK arsenal and its threat to allied interests will continue to grow.

There is no ideal solution to the North Korea nuclear issue. But the most promising alternative is to pursue interim measures that can address the most immediate threats to the United States and its allies while keeping the door open to denuclearization when and if conditions materialize that can make that outcome more realistic than it is today.