► U.S. foreign policy under Trump’s 2024 victory is expected to be more transactional, focusing on short-term political gains and breaking with Biden-era policies on climate, NATO, and energy.

► While bipartisan support exists for U.S. bases in South Korea and addressing North Korea’s nuclear threat, Trump’s unpredictable approach could lead to a reduced commitment to Taiwan and NATO.

► Trump’s return to office may roll back climate policies and tax incentives for green technology, while continuing a tough stance on China, affecting South Korea’s investments in clean energy.

Donald Trump’s 2024 electoral victory may have monumental consequences for the future of U.S. foreign policy and the governance of a variety of global problems. Some areas such as U.S. trade relations with China may, given relative bipartisan consensus, see a continuation or deepening of policies enacted by the Biden administration. In other areas such as climate change and energy policy, the Trump administration will likely break decisively with his predecessor.

For more than a decade, I have been part of a group surveying U.S. foreign policy leaders on behalf of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Texas. This year, prior to the election, we surveyed 471 U.S. leaders from a variety of professional backgrounds, including the Executive Branch, Congress, academia, think tanks, and a variety of interest groups (business, labor, churches, and non-profits).

With respect to U.S. policy vis a vis South Korea, U.S. foreign policy leaders have broadly similar views. Across all partisan stripes, there is strong support – more than 80% – for continued U.S. bases in South Korea. While a higher share of Republicans regard North Korea’s nuclear program as a critical threat (49% of Republican leaders compared to 30% of Democratic and Independent leaders), nearly 90% of all U.S. leaders of all partisan affiliations see North Korea’s nuclear program at least as an important threat.

The wild card in this scenario is President Trump himself who, during first administration, both traded insults with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then later praised him after a series of meetings. President Trump liked to cultivate a reputation for being unpredictable and for a willingness to escalate disputes in the hopes of forcing other actors to back down. However, other countries may have learned the playbook for how to placate him through personal flattery and his escalatory rhetoric may be seen as bluster.

There are sharper partisan divides between U.S. leaders on membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and how to respond to the Ukraine war. Recently, it was revealed that thousands of North Korean troops were sent to participate with the Russians in combat.  In our survey, a majority of leaders of all partisan stripes believed that a Trump victory would make U.S. withdrawal from NATO more likely but war with Russia less likely. President’s Trump weaker support for Ukraine than President Biden may lead to pressure on Ukraine to resolve the war with Russia, on terms more favorable to the Russians.

Weak support for allies may also shape how the U.S. approaches Taiwan. A large majority of Democrats (92%) and Independents (64%) were convinced the United States would more likely abandon Taiwan after a Trump victory. However, only about 1/3 of Republican leaders thought a Trump victory would lead to Taiwan being abandoned in the event of a conflict with China. Some of President-elect Trump’s nominees for his cabinet, including Senator Marco Rubio (nominated to be Secretary of State), are quite hawkish on China and perhaps would want to use U.S. bases in South Korea as a staging ground should conflict come to Taiwan.

On the other hand, President Trump himself may have limited appetite to come to the aid of allies more broadly should they face security threats, though this hypothesis may be tested in his second administration. In the face of potential escalation and weapons’ tests by North Korea, the Biden administration has coordinated with Japan and South Korea to ensure policies are aligned. With President-elect having nominated some inexperienced people to be play key national security roles in his administration such as his nominee for Secretary of Defense, it is not clear how these appointments might affect the administration wider posture vis a vis allies and partners.

On China more broadly, President-elect Trump has threatened hefty tariffs on a broad range of imported Chinese products. In his first administration, Trump levied extensive tariffs on Chinese imports. The Biden administration has also enacted tariffs and other measures to both reduce U.S. dependence on Chinese imports and restrict China’s access to cutting edge technologies such as high-end semiconductors. Such policies, particularly in the clean technology space, have created openings for South Korean companies to export lithium-ion batteries to the United States and to establish manufacturing facilities in the U.S. However, U.S. efforts to reduce its dependence on Chinese supply chains has also put pressure on allies to reduce their own exposure to China, more challenging given extensive private sector ties between Chinese and South Korean firms.

South Korean automakers have benefited from the passage of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which has incentives for consumers to purchase electric vehicles. Because the Act had strong standards for local manufacturing and domestic minerals content under Section 30D, South Korean electric vehicles were initially not eligible for the credits. However, a ruling under section 45W allowed leased vehicles to be eligible for credits, making several South Korean models from Kia and Hyundai eligible for credits. This led to a huge spike in leased South Korean electric vehicles in the U.S. market.

However, the election of Donald Trump and his party’s control of Congress may mean a rollback in climate and energy policies, particularly the tax incentives related to the Inflation Reduction Act. President Trump withdrew from the 2015 Paris climate agreement the last time he was in office and has promised to do so again. Trump’s election will likely signal limited support for providing global climate finance, including to the Green Climate Fund, which South Korea hosts.

While the Trump administration may may be expected to maintain policies to diminish its reliance on Chinese supply chains, efforts to rescind tax incentives for clean technology may diminish the viability of Korean foreign direct investment in batteries like Hyundai SK On’s battery plant in Georgia.

The upshot of these observations is that traditional alliances between democratic countries may not have as much meaning or significance to a second Trump administration. The Biden administration elevated the importance of defending democratic regimes around the world a key part of its approach to U.S. foreign policy.

A second Trump administration likely will exhibit a return to more transactional foreign policy, based on short-term calculations of how other countries can burnish or support the political objectives of President Trump himself. This creates openings for other countries, including South Korea but also North Korea, to provide political benefits to Trump should there be diplomatic or economic breakthroughs. This might create some openings for creative problem solving by South Korea to demonstrate its utility to President Trump but could also be seized upon by North Korea, Russia, or other countries just as easily.