▶ Nearly all agree that Trump will be unpredictable throughout his four years and will maintain a transactional approach to issues and nations.

▶China is a common threat for USA, India and South Korea... The three countries have been trying to address their insecurities through military modernisation, bilateral agreements among themselves, and political engagement with China where possible.

▶As is evident from the above, besides potential for technological collaboration between USA, India and South Korea amid Trump’s anticipated economic hard bargaining, there are also security and particularly nuclear related issues that offer issues for cooperation.

With the expected entry of Donald Trump into the White House in January 2025, every nation is contemplating the implications of this development for themselves. In his last tenure as President, Trump had withdrawn the USA from many bilateral and multilateral treaties and upended many relationships, including with American allies and partners.  It is therefore not surprising that every nation is anticipating what it may face from the new US administration. Nearly all agree that Trump will be unpredictable throughout his four years and will maintain a transactional approach to issues and nations. How will India and ROK individually fare with the new US administration and are there any issues that might bring the two or even the three closer? The article briefly examines this question.

India has reason to believe that the fundamentals of its relationship with the USA are strong. Both have convergent security concerns, especially from China. These are expected to keep President Trump suitably engaged in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, it may be recalled that some of the elements of institutionalization of US-India ties took place under the previous Trump administration. Today, the bilateral relationship is built on the bedrock of 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, India’s status as a Major Defense Partner, four foundational agreements, and arrangements that enable real-time intelligence sharing in the Indo-Pacific. President Trump is unlikely to disturb these. Of course, there is an apprehension that the economic relations might be rocked by his repeated statements on raising tariffs. But, the overall American interest in India is unlikely to faze given its market size and value, as also the position, reach and influence of the Indian diaspora in the US.

South Korea is a long-standing ally of the US. Normally, it should have few concerns about the change of administration given the bipartisan support for the alliance. But given that in his last term, President Trump had been harsh in his approach to the allies, often admonishing them to spend more to take care of their own security or recompense USA for it, it is not surprising that Seoul has its worries. These are exacerbated by the fact that its security environment has only become more challenging in the last few years. Sandwiched between China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), both of whom have been increasing their military and nuclear capabilities, and both of whom have been undertaking more assertive and provocative behaviour, Seoul is acutely aware of its challenging security circumstances.

The Common China Threat

China is a common threat for USA, India and South Korea. Within the Asia-Pacific, its direct assertive actions have been faced by India in the Himalayas and by ROK in the economic and maritime domains. Its indirect activities such as providing material, economic and psychological support to Pakistan’s (against India) and DPRK’s (against ROK) nuclear and missile capability development and behaviour of nuclear brinkmanship are other issues of wider concern. The three countries have been trying to address their insecurities through military modernisation, bilateral agreements among themselves, and political engagement with China where possible.

As regards the ROK, the outgoing Biden administration had managed to address Seoul’s apprehensions through joint efforts such as those envisaged in the Washington Declaration. It had committed to an enhanced U.S. military presence in the region, deployment of more American military assets, including SSBNs, and better integration of Seoul into America’s nuclear planning with the institution of the “Nuclear Consultative Group''. On July 11, 2024, both sides concluded the establishment of “Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula”. These have enabled conduct of nuclear-based table-top exercises to enhance decision-making about nuclear deterrence and operations and planning for potential nuclear contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the Security Consultative Meeting has also been key to implement the "Defense Vision of the US - ROK Alliance". This aims to enhance extended deterrence based on the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities; increased science and technology cooperation to modernize alliance capabilities; and strengthened regional security cooperation with like-minded partners.

But will all this continue under the new administration and will it prove to be sufficient in the face of growing security concerns and the fear of possibility of fraying of US commitments?  Such doubts continue to trouble the ROK strategic community fuelling debate on whether the country should reassess its nuclear policies -- either getting Washington to bring back into South Korea the nuclear weapons it had removed in 1991, or developing own nuclear weapons. Interestingly, a poll conducted in 2023 by South Korea’s Asan Institute had found that 64% of the public supported acquiring nuclear weapons, compared to 33% who didn’t. Would a poll in 2025 yield different results especially since prominent American strategists aligned with Trump, such as Elbridge Colby of the Marathon Institute, have spoken in favour of South Korean nuclear weapons. While that is a call for ROK to make based on its own cost benefit calculations as a non-nuclear weapon state of the NPT, some Korean analysts have made comparisons with the strategic autonomy that India enjoys with its own nuclear capability.

At a more trilateral level in 2024, in a pioneering effort, the US-India-ROK Trilateral Technology Initiative was inaugurated. This offers scope for joint activities on building new technologies and securing resilient supply chains for critical industries, especially semiconductors. Cooperation is also envisaged in telecommunications and digital public infrastructure, artificial intelligence, quantum, space, and clean energy. Such collaborative endeavours are expected to advance common and individual economic goals of the three, while also restraining China’s hegemony in advanced technologies.

India-ROK and the Trump administration

Amongst the early tasks that Trump is expected to prioritise as president is to find a resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Seoul and New Delhi must encourage efforts in this direction since US involvement in this theatre distracts it from handling the China threat.  It also tends to push Moscow closer to Beijing and strengthens the likelihood of an alliance between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Such a development could jeopardise the security of the rules-based order of which India and ROK are beneficiaries.

A second initiative that President Trump may be encouraged is towards addressing the growing nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea. While a fresh re-engagement of Trump with Kim Jong-un, the DPRK leader, is expected to be difficult given that both sides will be hesitant to meet without the promise of some tangible deliverable for their domestic and international audiences, the prospects of the meeting are not impossible if approached with adequate preparation. If such a development were to come to pass, it would be a win-win for Seoul and India. Even if as a first step, Trump was able to secure a freeze on further nuclear and missile capability build-up under international inspections, it would also help address the risk of illicit proliferation of nuclear material, equipment or technology to non-state or other state actors. 

Thirdly, it should be of common interest to Seoul and New Delhi to underscore Trump’s desire to strengthen the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons. Given their common threat perception of inadvertent or accidental escalation owing to risky nuclear strategies pursued by their respective adversaries, both should find it prudent to join hands in discrediting nuclear brinkmanship behaviour.

Trump could also be encouraged to try to bring China into some sort of nuclear arms control, either bilaterally with USA or at a more multilateral level. He had focused on this during his last administration. A give and take relationship on economic and security issues between US and China can be expected under Trump. And, if he could find a way to check China’s unbridled nuclear excesses that create security concerns for India and ROK, it would be a benign development for both.

As is evident from the above, besides potential for technological collaboration between USA, India and South Korea amid Trump’s anticipated economic hard bargaining, there are also security and particularly nuclear related issues that offer issues for cooperation. New Delhi and Seoul should aim to use the Trump administration as a factor for stability in the Asia-Pacific.