Japan’s Foreign Policy and Security Posture

The Ishiba Administration's North Korea Policy and Future Outlook

By Lee Kitae [Senior Fellow, Sejong Institute]

November 29, 2024

 The Ishiba administration is expected to adopt a passive stance toward North Korea due to its low domestic approval ratings.

 Prime Minister Ishiba views North Korea, alongside China and Russia, as a threat and is likely to focus on strengthening military security measures.

 While the administration will maintain the policy of "unconditional meetings with Kim Jong Un" championed by previous governments, it is unlikely to engage in informal contacts as actively as its predecessors.

 


 

Analysis of the Ishiba Administration’s North Korea Policy

 

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who assumed office in October 2024, is widely recognized for his expertise regarding security issues. During the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership race in September, Ishiba stood out with his proposals in foreign and security policy, including an “Asian NATO,” revision of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, and the establishment of liaison offices between Tokyo and Pyongyang. However, in his first parliamentary address after assuming office, Ishiba refrained from providing specific details about Japan’s security and foreign policy. In the absence of sufficient public discourse or a broad national consensus, Ishiba’s ambitious security initiatives have failed to garner broad support.

 

The Ishiba administration’s North Korea policy appears similarly constrained. Despite campaign promises made during the LDP leadership race, current conditions suggest that these pledges may not be implemented in actual policy. This article will examine the distinctions between Ishiba’s North Korea policy and those of previous administrations (Abe, Suga, and Kishida), outline current reactions to the administration’s approach—particularly from the families of Japanese abduction victims—and forecast the future trajectory of Japan-North Korea relations under Ishiba.

 


 

The Pursuit of “Unconditional Japan-North Korea Summits”

Since the 2010s, Japan-North Korea relations have been characterized by strong Japanese sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile launches, with little progress in diplomatic dialogue. However, driven by the aging of abductees' families, domestic sentiment has grown more sympathetic toward resolving the abduction issue in recent years. Successive Japanese governments have sought unofficial and secretive contacts with Pyongyang while maintaining a policy of "dialogue and pressure."

 

The Abe administration adopted a more proactive approach toward North Korea following the 2018 Singapore Summit between the United States and North Korea. In May 2018, Abe expressed willingness to meet Kim Jong Un unconditionally, a policy later upheld by Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida.

 

Kishida, for example, emphasized high-level consultations to facilitate a summit with Kim Jong Un. Reports by Asahi Shimbun indicated secret meetings between Japanese and North Korean officials in Southeast Asia in March and May 2023, suggesting progress in backchannel diplomacy. Furthermore, gestures such as Kim Jong Un’s letter of condolence to Kishida following a major earthquake in Ishikawa Prefecture and Kim Yo Jong’s statement implying a potential visit by Kishida to Pyongyang underscored the evolving dynamics of bilateral relations.

 

However, despite these developments, the Kishida administration faced setbacks, including North Korea’s rejection of Japan’s demands to address the abduction issue. High-level talks resumed briefly but ultimately collapsed following statements by North Korean officials opposing further engagement.

 


 

Proposal for Liaison Offices in Tokyo and Pyongyang

Before assuming office, Ishiba expressed a preference for incremental diplomacy with North Korea, emphasizing the establishment of liaison offices as a means of verifying information about abductees. Unlike the abrupt summit diplomacy pursued by previous administrations, Ishiba prioritized gradual engagement.

 

In October 2024, Ishiba communicated his resolve to address the abduction issue to the families of abductees and reiterated his intent to establish liaison offices. However, the families expressed strong opposition to the proposal, citing concerns that such offices could be exploited by North Korea to buy time or manipulate public opinion. Conservative hardliners in Japan have similarly criticized the plan, arguing that it lacks sufficient detail and could undermine Japan’s negotiating position.

 


 

Outlook for the Ishiba Administration’s North Korea Policy

 

The Ishiba administration is expected to adopt a more cautious approach toward North Korea, influenced by several factors:

 

  • Domestic Constraints: The LDP suffered significant losses in the October 27 general election, leaving Ishiba with limited political capital to pursue bold diplomatic initiatives.
  • Security Concerns: Ishiba views North Korea as part of a broader trilateral threat alongside China and Russia. Amid growing military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow, Japan is likely to prioritize bolstering its security through the U.S.-Japan alliance, trilateral cooperation with South Korea and the United States, and domestic military enhancements.
  • Limited Engagement: While Ishiba has retained the policy of unconditional summits with Kim Jong Un, his administration is unlikely to pursue informal contacts with North Korea as actively as the Kishida government.

 

Given these dynamics, South Korea should closely monitor the composition of Ishiba’s North Korea policy team and any changes in Japan’s approach to dialogue with Pyongyang, particularly concerning the abduction issue. Understanding these developments will be crucial for anticipating and responding to the Ishiba administration’s North Korea strategy.

 

 

Author(s)

Dr. Lee Kitae currently serves as a Senior Fellow at Sejong Institute in Seoul, South Korea. He obtained his Ph.D degree from Keio University, majoring in Political Science. He was a Post-doc fellow at BK21 Research Project for Department of Political Science & International Studies of Yonsei University from 2012 to 2013; a lecturer at Seoul National University, Yonsei University, Duksung Women’s University, and Korea Military Academy from 2012 to 2015; a research fellow at Yonsei Institute for North Korean Studies from 2013 to 2014; research fellow at Institute of Japanese Studies of Kookmin University from 2014 to 2015; a Director of Global Strategy Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification(KINU) from 2015-2024. His main area of research interest is Japanese Security Policy, International Relations in East Asia, and North Korea-Japan Relations.