North Korea's Two Korea Theory

Whither a Peace Regime? Kim Jong Un’s New Survival Strategy through Formalizing a Hostile Relationship with Seoul

By Minsung Kim [Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)]

► For North Korea, the ultimate and long-term national strategic goal is to secure and maintain its dominance over the South, which will ensure the regime’s survival. However, North Korea’s insistence on developing nuclear weapons for its own security and survival has created poor internal and external circumstances for the country, particularly in recent years.

► By defining inter-Korean relations as a “hostile two-state relationship,” the North appears to be pursuing three major strategic objectives with critical intentions: to further develop its nuclear capabilities for the status of a nuclear state, to expand its diplomatic horizons for international recognition as an active actor, and to overcome internal vulnerabilities for strengthening its control over the people and political consolidation, thereby achieving regime stability. 

► Despite the growing skepticism about denuclearization, peace regime and even reunification, we must continue to discuss the above issues as a future vision to strive for. In this process, it will be important for South Korea and the United States to agree on firm principles and consider flexible approaches.

 

North Korea’s Two-state Approach

 

In December 2023, North Korea officially defined its relationship with South Korea as a hostile two-state relationship through Kim Jong Un’s remarks at the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and has continuously escalated its offensive threats against South Korea. With this approach, the North seems to have changed its position from its unification and ethnic approach, which have been major milestones of North Korea. Pyongyang’s threats to Seoul have become a mix of military provocations, including missile tests and tactical nuclear threats, as well as a constant barrage of dirty balloons and GPS jamming. North Korea has also resumed strategic nuclear provocations against the U.S. On October 31, 2024, North Korea test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time in 10 months, announcing that the missile was a completed version of the Hwasong-19 weapon system that will operate alongside the Hwasong-18. North Korea’s aggressive moves remind us that it has been less than five years since the last time there were active discussions on establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula among the concerned parties such as South Korea and the U.S. Back then, two Koreas had considered each other as counterparts to establish a peace regime through various confidence-building measures to create a favorable environment on the Korean Peninsula. The North and the U.S. also included the content of the peace regime in the Singapore Joint Statement in 2018. The North’s stance on the two-state position reflects the changing dynamics of relations in recent years. At the same time, Pyongyang’s strategic approach to managing the situation on the Korean Peninsula seems to have changed. What is the ultimate reason for this North Korea's aggressive stance driven by the hostile two-state approach?

 

Three Strategic Objectives of ‘hostile two-state approach’

For North Korea, the ultimate and long-term strategic goal is to secure and maintain its dominance over the South, which will ensure the regime's survival. However, North Korea’s insistence on developing nuclear weapons for its own security and survival has created poor internal and external circumstances for the country, especially in recent years. For instance, the U.S. value-based approach to foreign and security policy has led to a strong coalition among its allies and partners, including South Korea and Japan, and created a more consolidated mechanism to deter North Korean nuclear threats. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation have been institutionalized and are expected to provide a more credible deterrent. On the domestic front, the prolonged economic sanctions imposed by the international community have pushed the structural limitation of economic development beyond the level of muddling through. The North closed its borders for nearly three years due to COVID-19, negatively impacting the unofficial markets that provided the functional space for the economy to operate. In addition, North Korea has faced repeated natural disasters, creating a continuous vicious circle for its recovery under the lack of its infrastructure to prevent other disasters. In addition, outside information among North Koreans is destabilizing consolidation of the regime. The execution of young people for accessing South Korean content or the defection of elite diplomats from North Korean missions abroad point to this situation. 

 

Under these circumstances, what aspects of its changed strategy can be considered? Before considering Pyongyang's strategic goals or intentions, it is necessary to reflect on the main premise implied by the two-state approach. It means not only state-to-state relations, but also "hostile" relations between two Koreas. Therefore, it is necessary to think about the two characteristics of “hostile” rather than peaceful or normal, and “two-state” rather than reunification. Against this background, the North’s two-state approach to inter-Korean relations has three major strategic objectives with critical intentions: to further develop its nuclear capabilities for the status of a nuclear state, to expand its diplomatic horizons for international recognition as an active actor, and to overcome internal vulnerabilities for strengthening its control over the people and political consolidation, thereby achieving regime stability. 

 

 First, by formalizing the change in inter-Korean relations from special relations to hostile two-state relations, the North could obtain its justification for continuing and intensifying its nuclear weapons development. North Korea’s commitment to advancing its nuclear weapons capabilities is further reflected in its consistent legislative efforts, particularly through amendments to its nuclear doctrine. These changes suggest that North Korea is not merely content with possessing nuclear weapons but is increasingly signaling a readiness to use them. By designating the South as a hostile target, the North has a "sustainable" external threat to maintain its nuclear coercion. Moreover, the two-state approach could provide North Korea with better conditions for its continued development of nuclear capabilities, thereby completing the task of the Five-Year Plan for the development of defense science and weapons systems by at least 2025 and eventually achieving its status as a de facto nuclear state.

 

Second, North Korea could use this two-state approach to expand its diplomatic horizons and eventually would like to gain international recognition as a keen actor. Of course, North Korea has been engaged in its own diplomatic activities, but there are areas where it has been particularly depressed since the border closure due to COVID-19. However, it is worth keeping an eye on its actions to accelerate its close relations with Russia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In particular, it is showing energetic diplomatic moves by strengthening military and economic cooperation after signing the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia and actively opposing US-led cooperation by participating in the UN General Assembly and BRICS. From North Korea’s perspective, the position of two-state approach rather than a special relationship with South Korea can be used as an international basis for more active engagement in the international and regional communities.

 

Third, by defining inter-Korean relations as two separate countries, North Korea wants to move away from the ongoing inter-Korean systemic competition. In a situation where North Korea must maintain a competitive advantage over South Korea in order to survive its regime, the globalization of South Korea’s hard and soft power, and the influx of information in this regard become factors that highlight the vulnerability of North Korea’s internal situation. This, combined with the question of North Korea’s durability, acts as a factor that hinders social stability from the North Korean regime’s perspective. For example, while the UN Security Council has been unable to impose additional sanctions due to the non-cooperation of Russia and China, the existing sanctions mechanism remains in place and individual sanctions by the United States and South Korea are increasing. In addition, food insecurity due to ongoing natural disasters and chronic nutritional imbalances have been identified, leading to rationing problems in rural areas, corruption, etc. This is evident in the legal measures taken in recent years, such as the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture in 2020, the Law on Ensuring Youth Education in 2021, and the Law on Protecting Pyongyang Cultural Language in 2023, to strengthen internal control over the people of North Korea. Pursuing the permanent division of the Korean peninsula may be the way to maintain its regime and ensure its survival. From this point of view, the two-state approach seems to be useful to the regime.

 

New settings for discussing a peace regime 

Changes in the internal and external environment surrounding North Korea have forced the regime to consider new strategies, and one of the results can be seen in its two-state approach. This can strengthen the legitimacy and policy space of North Korea's expanding diplomatic, military, and domestic maneuvers and is expected to play a role for its regime survival. North Korea’s position marks a significant shift, fueling skepticism about denuclearization, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and even the reunification agenda. However, this assessment provides a narrow scope of understanding. Looking back at the 70 years of division and the past 30 years of North Korea's nuclear development, there has never been a perfect time for the above discussion. However, this does not mean that we should abandon the above-mentioned goals. It is worth pursuing first a peace order that establishes a security order on the Korean peninsula by strengthening the nuclear deterrence mechanism and making progress in denuclearization, and then considering the direction of establishing a peace regime by ensuring its stability and sustainability. In order to make progress in this long-term and forward-looking goal, we must continue to discuss a peace regime on the Korean peninsula for creating conditions and even reunification as a future vision we should strive for. In this process, it will be important for South Korea and the United States to agree on solid principles as well as to consider flexible approaches.

 

Author(s)

Dr. Minsung Kim is a Research Fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). Prior to her current position, Dr. Kim was a research professor at Ilmin International Relations Institute (IIRI), Korea University, and a researcher at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Her research interests include North Korean nuclear issue, economic sanctions, ROK-U.S. alliance, and U.S. foreign policy. Dr. Kim received her Ph.D. in International Relations from Korea University.