Author(s)
December 5, 2024
► The Russia-DPRK Treaty signed in June 2024 promises expanded cooperation across various sectors, but its immediate manifestation in military deployments raises concerns about the risks of this alliance both internationally and within North Korea.
► While North Korea’s economic hardships and need for foreign exchange partly explain its military support for Russia, the pursuit of military and technical assistance, including missile and nuclear technology, appears to be the primary motive behind this partnership.
► The covert deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, coupled with increasing casualties and dissatisfaction among soldiers, poses significant risks of social unrest, defections, and potential destabilization of the North Korean regime.
On June 19, 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (hereinafter referred to as the Russia-DPRK Treaty), promising to expand cooperation across various sectors, including the economy, culture, military, science, and technology. The treaty’s signing raised concerns about military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, which materialized sooner than expected with the deployment of North Korean troops. This article will briefly analyze the background of the close relationship between Russia and North Korea and the potential risks, focusing on North Korea's internal affairs. This close relationship is a significant issue at the international political level, with the possibility of a new Cold War or increased instability in Northeast Asia. At the domestic level in North Korea, it is also a major issue that can worsen instability in governance, such as creating social unrest and agitation among residents. This article explores the main issues surrounding the close relationship between Russia and North Korea by examining its background and potential risks.
Economic Purpose vs. Political/Military Purpose?
One reason North Korea is forcibly strengthening its ties with Russia by sending troops is economic. North Korea has been suffering from prolonged economic difficulties due to the deterioration of its foreign trade, caused by the sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. Recognizing the people's dissatisfaction with livelihood issues, the Kim Jong-un regime has recently implemented several social policies and produced a series of propaganda materials promising to improve these areas. Looking at the so-called "priority tasks" emphasized to the people, such as the "Local Development 20*10 Policy" and the "Construction of 10,000 Housing Units in Pyongyang," it is evident that the "improving people's livelihood" policy, focused on revitalizing the economy and stabilizing housing, is being touted as much more important than strengthening national defense capabilities such as developing weapons.[1] This also highlights the residents’ sensitivity to their living conditions.
It is well known that North Korea is currently utilizing the Russian-Ukrainian War to earn a considerable amount of foreign exchange, not only through the export of arms and ammunition to Russia but also by sending North Korean troops. In this regard, we can examine whether the economic or political/military purposes were more important to the North Korean regime in sending troops to the war. For more information, see the article by Lim Soo-ho (2024), which calculates the economic benefits of North Korea's troop deployment. Foreign mercenaries currently employed by the Russian army are known to receive a monthly salary of $2,000 to $3,000 per person and an additional $2,000 as a lump sum payment for enlistment.[2] The National Intelligence Service has similarly estimated a monthly payment of $2,000 per person with additional payments in return for the deployment of North Korean troops. Based on this, North Korea could earn $320 million annually in foreign exchange by sending 10,000 people as mercenaries each year.[3]
However, this amount is not much different from the income earned through cryptocurrency hacking or sending workers abroad.[4] Therefore, it would be inappropriate to attribute the main reason for sending troops to Russia only to economic factors, especially considering the risks of losing a large number of personnel at home and facing increasing international condemnation and sanctions. From a domestic perspective, it is more convincing to argue that expectations of military and technical assistance played a greater role. North Korea is strengthening its ties with Russia at the military level because the scope of technical assistance it can receive from Russia is extensive, including missiles, artificial reconnaissance satellites, and even nuclear submarines.[5] If North Korea receives even a small amount of strategic technical assistance from Russia, it will certainly justify the risks the country is currently facing at home and abroad. In other words, by strengthening its defense capabilities through closer ties with Russia, North Korea will be able to secure its legitimacy, both internally and externally, by emphasizing the regime's ability to enhance its defense capabilities.
Potential Internal Risks for North Korea
From the perspective of internal governance, however, strengthening ties with Russia through military deployments entails various risks. In this regard, it is worth noting that the deployment of the North Korean military to Russia is thoroughly concealed from the North Korean people. It is reported that 12,000 North Korean soldiers have been sent to the city of Kursk alone.[6] Most of them are regular troops, and given the actual strength of the North Korean army and the strategic value between the Russian and North Korean armies, it is unlikely that the North Korean army will play any role other than that of a "bullet catcher" for the Russian army. In fact, the U.S. military media outlet Global Defense Corp. reported that 500 North Korean soldiers have already died in the Kursk region.[7] According to some reports, the North Korean regime conceals the deployment of soldiers to the region by telling their families that they are going to regional training or social mobilization, or even by isolating the families of soldiers sent there and completely blocking outside information to cover up the deployment.[8] It has also been reported that there is an internal rule classifying the disappearance or death of troops sent abroad as a top secret matter.[9] This demonstrates that the North Korean regime is extremely wary of the internal spread of information regarding the North Korean troops sent to the front.
As revealed by the media, defectors have already appeared among the North Korean troops sent to Russia, indicating that there is considerable dissatisfaction with the Russian deployment among troops. In a situation where the collapse of rations due to economic difficulties is causing dissatisfaction among soldiers in North Korea, leading to desertion and even defection, this suggests that there could be significant unrest in the country if the deployment of North Korean troops as "human shields" to foreign militaries becomes known to the North Korean people. In particular, if casualties among the deployed troops continue to occur as reported, this could trigger dissatisfaction or opposition to the regime, both within the North Korean military and among the North Korean people as a whole. Due to the unique nature of the "overseas deployment," there is also potential for it to evolve into a more widespread and rapid change in the situation, such as a large-scale defection of North Korean troops in the Russian region.
At present, North Korea is attempting to solve its internal political, economic, and social difficulties by strengthening relations with Russia, taking advantage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The North Korean regime is currently “using” its own people including soldiers, to gain political and economic benefits for itself. In this process, the North Korean regime is trying to control its people by creating a sense of crisis through the distortion of the external war situation while thoroughly concealing the reality from its people. It is necessary to continue to monitor how long the regime, which is trying to address current problems by appealing to the ideology of the Cold War, can continue to maintain control and sustain itself by relying on its past ruling strategies in an era where completely blocking external information is increasingly impossible.
[1] For example, on 16 March 2024, when Kim Jong-un visited the Kangdong Greenhouse Farm with Kim Ju-ae, he also inspected the training of the Airborne Infantry Brigade, a paratrooper unit. On the front page of Rodong Sinmun, the Kangdong Greenhouse Farm is reported first, and the military inspection is reported on the second page. In the past, media such as the Rodong Sinmun always reported military-related content first, but under the Kim Jong-un regime, content related to ‘people's livelihood’ is more emphasized. Rodong Sinmun, 16 March 2024.
[2] Jeong Seung-im, ‘’Bulletproof‘ Russian mercenary's monthly salary of 2.75 million won... What about the North Korean soldiers deployed?’ Hankook Ilbo, 23 October 2024, cited in Lim Soo-ho, 2024, “Mercenaries or allies: The benefits and harms of the North Korean military's deployment to Russia,” Issue Brief No. 627, INSS.
[3] Lim, 2024, “Mercenaries or allies: The benefits and harms of the North Korean military's deployment to Russia.”
[4] Ibid.
[5] “U.S. ‘Kim Jong-un Expects Significant Military Technology Support from Russia in exchange for Dispatch’,” YTN International, 11 Nov 2024. https://m.ytn.co.kr/en/news_view.php?key=202411110557403527&s_mcd=0104#return
[6] BBC, “Ros Atkins On... Are North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine?,” https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/cx2d2kxlgnjo
[7] There is no official recognition of this by the US State Department. Global Defense Corp., “More than 500 North Korean Troops Killed in Strom Shadow Missile Strikes in Kursk Region,” 21 Nov 2024. https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2024/11/21/more-than-500-north-korean-troops-killed-in-storm-shadow-missile-strikes-in-kursk-region/; RFA, “US official confirms North Korean casualties in Russia’s Kursk,” 27 Nov 2024. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2024/11/27/north-korea-soldier-casualty-russia/
[8] “North Korea isolates families of soldiers sent to fight in Ukraine – South Korea,” The New Voice of Ukraine, 24 Oct 2024.
[9] Yoo Min-joo, " Missing North Korean soldiers in Russia to be treated as top secret...internal principles established," News1, 23 Nov 2024. https://www.news1.kr/nk/military/5609280