The Future of South Korea's Nuclear Diplomacy and Energy Policy

Approaches and Measures to Respond to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

By Jiyoung Park [Technology Policy Center Director, Research Institute for Economy and Society]

▶️ North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: As of 2024, North Korea has an estimated 50 nuclear warheads with materials to expand further, showcasing advanced missile capabilities and a growing nuclear arsenal. Its doctrine includes preemptive strike conditions, emphasizing regime survival and strategic leverage.

▶️ South Korea’s "Audacious Initiative": The Yoon administration’s plan integrates deterrence, sanctions, and dialogue to pursue phased denuclearization, offering economic and political incentives to North Korea while strengthening South Korea-U.S. military cooperation.

▶️ Challenges Ahead: North Korea’s deepened isolation, strengthened ties with Russia, and unwillingness to engage diplomatically highlight the difficulty of denuclearization, requiring sustained global cooperation and creative diplomacy.

 


 

1. Nuclear Status of North Korea

As of January 2024, North Korea is estimated to possess around 50 nuclear warheads and sufficient nuclear material to manufacture an additional 70–90 weapons. This includes approximately 60–80 kilograms of plutonium and between 280 and 1,500 kilograms of uranium. However, exact figures remain uncertain due to limited knowledge about the size and location of its uranium enrichment facilities. North Korea has continued testing a variety of ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), showcasing its ability to deliver nuclear payloads across various platforms.

 

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions trace back to the early 1960s when it established a research facility in Yongbyon with Soviet assistance. By the 1970s, it had acquired plutonium reprocessing capability. Though it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported inconsistencies in its plutonium declarations in 1993, highlighting its noncompliance. Efforts to curb its nuclear ambitions included a 1992 joint declaration with South Korea for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was never implemented, and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the U.S., which collapsed when North Korea resumed its nuclear activities and eventually withdrew from the NPT in 2003.

 

Since its NPT withdrawal, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017, defying numerous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. These resolutions, which imposed economic sanctions and demanded the cessation of its nuclear and missile programs, have been ineffective in halting North Korea’s progress. Diplomatic initiatives, including the Six-Party Talks and high-profile summits with South Korea and the United States, have similarly failed to yield significant results.

 

 

2. Potential and Objectives of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

North Korea’s six nuclear tests have demonstrated a steady progression in its nuclear capabilities. The 2017 test, believed to be a hydrogen bomb, had an explosive yield of approximately 140–250 kilotons. Earlier tests in 2006 and 2009 were likely plutonium-based. North Korea’s Yongbyon facility alone can produce 6 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually. In addition, its uranium enrichment infrastructure, which includes an estimated 4,000–5,000 centrifuges, has expanded since 2021, allowing for the production of more nuclear weapons annually. Reports also suggest potential uranium enrichment facilities in the Gangson area, further complicating efforts to assess North Korea’s full nuclear capacity.

 

Globally, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains modest compared to major nuclear powers like the U.S. and Russia, which each possess thousands of weapons. However, its estimated stockpile of 50–100 warheads places it in the range of regional nuclear states like India and Pakistan, both of which have approximately 170 warheads. North Korea’s advancing missile technology enhances its strategic reach, though challenges such as atmospheric re-entry for ICBMs persist. Additionally, its SLBM program, while developing, has yet to achieve full operational capability.

 

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine, announced in 2022, outlines conditions for preemptive nuclear strikes, including automatic retaliation if the regime’s leadership is attacked. In 2023, Kim Jong-un called for an exponential increase in nuclear warheads and emphasized developing tactical nuclear capabilities to deter neighboring countries like South Korea and Japan. These advancements underscore North Korea’s dual strategy: ensuring regime survival through nuclear deterrence while using its arsenal as leverage in international negotiations.

 

Internally, nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of strength, consolidating the Kim regime’s authority amidst economic hardship exacerbated by international sanctions. Externally, they are a tool for strategic bargaining, aimed at securing concessions and preserving the regime against perceived external threats.

 

 

3. Approaches and Measures

Addressing North Korea’s nuclear issue requires a long-term strategy, as short-term efforts are unlikely to produce meaningful results. Recognizing this, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea has proposed an "Audacious Initiative" designed to achieve the complete denuclearization of North Korea and establish sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Unlike past approaches, this initiative integrates economic, political, and military measures into a comprehensive and phased framework. It emphasizes deterrence, sanctions, and diplomacy as complementary tools to create a conducive environment for denuclearization talks.

 

The "Audacious Initiative" is structured around three key components: Deterrence, Dissuasion, and Dialogue. First, it seeks to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat by strengthening South Korea’s military readiness and its alliance with the United States. Second, it aims to dissuade North Korea from further nuclear development through robust international sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Finally, it emphasizes dialogue to encourage North Korea to return to negotiations. This approach adopts a flexible stance, offering phased economic and political incentives based on North Korea’s actions, a departure from the previous conservative “denuclearization first” stance.

 

Under this initiative, South Korea has outlined bold initial measures to demonstrate its commitment to peace. These include offering substantial economic aid, supporting infrastructure development, and facilitating improved U.S.-DPRK relations in exchange for tangible steps toward denuclearization. A comprehensive agreement, encompassing a roadmap for complete denuclearization and confidence-building measures, is envisioned as the ultimate goal.

 

International cooperation is critical to the success of the "Audacious Initiative." The initiative has received endorsements from key allies, including the U.S. and Japan, as affirmed during a trilateral summit in November 2022. Additionally, China, a key player in the region, has expressed support for the initiative during a South Korea-China summit. However, North Korea’s continued provocations, including ICBM and SLBM tests and legislative measures to enshrine its nuclear status, reflect its unwillingness to engage under current conditions.

 

The initiative’s flexibility is a strength, as it allows for partial progress to sustain dialogue continuity. By moving away from rigid preconditions, it seeks to maintain momentum even in the face of setbacks. However, its success will depend on North Korea’s willingness to engage, which remains uncertain given the regime’s historical reliance on nuclear weapons as a survival strategy.

 

 

4. Challenges and the Path Forward

North Korea’s nuclear issue is deeply intertwined with regional and global geopolitics. The strengthening of Russia-North Korea ties, ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition, and the durability of Kim Jong-un’s regime are all factors that will shape the future trajectory of the nuclear issue. While international sanctions have strained North Korea’s economy, they have also reinforced its isolation and control over its population, making denuclearization an even more challenging prospect.

 

For South Korea and its allies, the path forward requires a nuanced understanding of these dynamics. Beyond sanctions and military deterrence, efforts must focus on addressing the underlying motivations driving North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. This includes addressing the regime’s security concerns and providing pathways for economic and diplomatic engagement that align with international norms.

 

Additionally, fostering greater engagement with North Korean society could be a long-term strategy to encourage internal pressures for change. By highlighting the potential benefits of denuclearization, such as economic development and improved living standards, South Korea and the international community can present an alternative vision to the Kim regime’s narrative of survival through isolation.

 

The "Audacious Initiative" represents a significant step in this direction, offering a balanced approach that combines firmness with flexibility. However, achieving its goals will require sustained commitment, close coordination with international partners, and adaptability to shifting geopolitical conditions. Ultimately, denuclearization will likely be a protracted process, requiring patience, persistence, and creative diplomacy.

 

In conclusion, while the challenges are immense, the pursuit of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula remains an essential goal for regional and global security. Through comprehensive strategies like the "Audacious Initiative," South Korea can lead efforts to manage the North Korean nuclear issue, fostering an environment where meaningful progress toward peace and stability becomes achievable.

 

Author(s)

Jiyoung Park is the Director of the Technology Policy Center at the Research Institute for Economy and Society. Her main research area is science, technology, and security policy. Her current interests include policy and management issues related to nuclear technology, security challenges posed by emerging technologies, and evidence-based science and technology policies. Park holds a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering and radiological sciences.