►Will the actions of Donald Trump's administration in the Indo-Pacific be a continuation of the dynamics created by previous US administrations?

►Will the mechanisms for regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, in particular the Aukus and the Quad, withstand a new Donald Trump presidency?

►A return to power by Donald Trump could weaken ongoing efforts to build a coherent and resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific unless he realises the importance of ‘smart power’ for 21st century geopolitics.

In recent years, the rise of China and its A2/D2 denial of access strategy in the Indo-Pacific have led to the strengthening of existing security agreements and mechanisms, but also to the search for new minilateral frameworks between the United States and its partners. Rivalry with China is the main challenge identified by the United States since the Obama administration and its Asian pivot. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy published in 2017 stated that China was a ‘revisionist power’ and that one of its objectives was to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific region. The US Indo-Pacific strategy adopted the following year and the change in the name of the US command for the region, from USPACOM to USINDOPACOM, clearly demonstrate the strategic priority given by Washington to the Indo-Pacific and its desire to preserve an international order there based on respect for international law and standards, in particular freedom of navigation and overflight. The first Trump administration, from 2017 to 2022, set out to counter China through increased competition, particularly in the military, economic and commercial spheres. It has reorganised alliances and partnerships to develop a network architecture capable of ensuring free access to global commons, including maritime spaces. According to the US National Security Strategy published in 2022, the People's Republic of China is the ‘only competitor’ that intends to reshape the international order, and it possesses all the economic, diplomatic, military and technological capabilities to realise this ambition. The Biden administration has stepped up strategic competition with China, adding the technological dimension, the importance of innovation and the decoupling of supply chains. It has strengthened bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines. It has re-engaged within ASEAN, notably within ADMM plus (the Meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers and Major Regional Powers) and focused on two specific security mechanisms: QUAD and AUKUS.

QUAD and AUKUS are two specific mechanisms designed to increase the operational posture and projection capabilities of the United States and its Pacific allies, primarily Japan, India, Australia and the United Kingdom. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was established in 2004 in the aftermath of a major tsunami in the Indian Ocean. It led to cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the United States on maritime security issues, notably Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, before being extended to other thematic areas such as cyber security, infrastructure and economic cooperation. The Biden administration has considerably strengthened the mechanism's maritime cooperation by emphasising the status of its 4 founding members as ‘maritime democracies’ and by creating an annual meeting of QUAD heads of government. The AUKUS, a security pact concluded in 2021 between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, ensures close military and industrial cooperation between its three members, providing for the acquisition by the Australian Navy of 8 nuclear-powered submarines of American origin (Virginia class). The Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) between the United States, Japan and Australia, which has been in existence for 7 years, and the Trilateral Dialogue between the United States, Japan and South Korea initiated at Camp David in August 2023, are also important ‘minilateral’ arrangements for the region. The advantage of this minilateralism, or the creation of small groups of allies, is that it enables like-minded partners to work together on specific security issues in a more targeted and therefore more effective manner. But the future of these agreements and arrangements appears uncertain with a new Republican administration and Donald Trump, given that his first term in office, from 2017 to 2022, was marked by an unpredictable and sometimes even brutal Asian policy for Washington's closest allies, such as Japan and South Korea. Regarding the QUAD, Donald Trump may be disappointed by the attitude of India, a partner much courted by the United States as a counterweight to China, but whose multi-alignment policy is perceived as highly ambiguous. As for the AUKUS, the construction programme is behind schedule, costs are rising for Canberra and US shipyards are proving unable to build the number of submarines promised within a reasonable timescale.

The question of Donald Trump's attitude to US alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is all the more serious given the unprecedented and significant security developments in the region over the past two years. Many coastal countries, as well as the European powers, are rightly concerned about the increase in maritime tensions with Chinese forces at sea, but also about the new threats posed to regional and international balances by the rapprochement between China and Russia, and between Russia and North Korea. Indeed, interactions between European and Asian security systems have never been so sensitive, particularly since North Korea has been supplying ammunition and weapons to Russian forces waging a war of aggression in Ukraine, and especially since it has also been sending North Korean soldiers to fight alongside them. In addition, powers such as Japan and South Korea have drawn very close to NATO and are supporting Ukraine by providing humanitarian, medical and economic assistance,

Donald Trump's vision of international positioning, symbolised by his ‘America First’, may once again prove to be at odds with the historical tradition of the nature of American involvement and its active multilateralism since the Second World War. This lack of understanding of the global nature of Washington's commitment and of the importance of pre-positioning and forward bases for American forces, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, has been reflected under the first Trump presidency in requests for increased contributions to the stationing of American forces in South Korea and Japan. Similarly, there has been a cooling of US relations with the European Union and NATO, whose members have been accused of not contributing enough to the Alliance's military efforts. Finally, the previous Trump administration was notable for its unproductive rapprochement with North Korea, to the detriment of South Korea's security interests. Moreover, Donald Trump's confrontational stance towards China has not diminished the latter's capabilities. On the contrary, the result has been a perceived weakening of US diplomacy, particularly in the face of the early successes of China's Silk Roads project. Donald Trump's first presidency was marked by a profound misunderstanding of what constitutes the roots of American power and what made it possible to accept a certain degree of asymmetry in the relationship between many countries and the United States. Indeed, the Trump administration has confused the notions of strength and power in its relations with other states, including its close partners. Even if the gap between American and Chinese GDP is narrowing, it is undeniable that the United States, thanks in particular to its network of alliances and partnerships, retains the preponderance of force and hard power. However, its capacity to influence and seduce, i.e. its soft power, is based on liberal norms and values that are slowly but profoundly being eroded. Now is the time for ‘smart power’, i.e. according to Joseph Nye, powers that can combine the two dimensions of power, i.e. material capabilities and the ability to persuade and influence.

Donald Trump will inaugurate his new presidency in January 2025 against a backdrop of rising regional and international tensions that closely link the security challenges of Europe and Indo-Pacific. The crisis of values and multilateralism is compounded by crucial issues such as climate change, the sustainable economy and health. The Biden administration tried to put the United States back at the heart of multilateral action. The Trump administration, on the other hand, will have to be flexible and adaptable to a fragmented world, i.e. it will have to know how to balance force and military power, but also engage in a multidimensional political-military dynamic based on recognised and shared values and objectives. More than ever, therefore, it will need to rely on its allies and close partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.