► Kishida will prefer the management of Japan-South Korea relations and not attempt the immediate improvement of the bilateral ties for the time being.

► However, the international environment surrounding Japan and South Korea under the U.S.-China strategic competition and the Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy surely encourage the cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul.

► It is time for Tokyo and Seoul to reactivate strategic dialogue and expand the foundation for strategic cooperation.

Fumio Kishida, the ruling party LDP’s new leader, was elected the prime minister of Japan in the Diet on October 4. Many observers expect that Prime Minister Kishida will follow the foreign and security policies of his predecessors, Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga. The fact that foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi and defense minister Nobuo Kishi were retained in the new cabinet indicates the continuity between Kishida and Suga in Japan’s foreign and security policies. Meanwhile Kishida’s pledges in the LDP leadership election suggest that his cabinet put more emphasis on three points.

First, diplomacy based on democracy, or “value-oriented diplomacy” will be promoted. Since the Abe cabinet, the Japanese government has been pursuing a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy aimed at maintaining and developing the rule-based liberal international order in the region. Kishida will continue to push ahead with the FOIP and focus more on protecting universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Kishida especially expressed in his pledges that he will appoint a prime minister’s aid for human rights issue.

Second, the Kishida cabinet continues to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and enhance Japan’s defense and deterrence capabilities to cope with the severe security environment in the region. China’s military expansion and assertive actions around the Senkaku islands require the build-up of Japan’s maritime security capability, and North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats press for the development of missile defense capability for Japan’s security.     

Third, Prime Minister Kishida has made it clear that he will place more importance on “economic security.” Kishida pointed out that securing a supply network of strategic materials, including semiconductors, and preventing the outflow of advanced technology are urgent priorities for Japan’s national security. Kishida created the new ministerial post for economic security in his cabinet.

It is clear that all these characteristics are consistent with the direction of the Biden administration’s foreign and security policies. The Biden administration values the solidarity among democracies to counter autocratic countries such as China and Russia and emphasizes the cooperation with the U.S. allies not only in military but also in economic security. Amid the U.S.-China strategic competition, the Biden administration pursues to cooperate and share responsibilities more with the U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea. In other words, the current security environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the U.S. foreign and security policies strongly demand cooperation between Japan and South Korea.

However, security cooperation between Japan and South Korea has been stagnant for the past decade due to “historical issues.” It’s true that Japan and South Korea signed the military information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) in February 2016, but there was the crisis of the termination of GSOMIA in August 2019 due to growing sense of distrust between Tokyo and Seoul. South Korea’s Supreme Court ruling over wartime labor issue in October 2018, which ordered Japanese companies to compensate South Korean plaintiffs for forced labor, has worsened the already strained relationship between Japan and South Korea. The Japanese government and companies have refused to accept the court ruling, saying that the issue has been settled “completely and finally” by the 1965 bilateral agreement, under which Japan provided grants and loans to South Korea. The Kishida cabinet is sure to sustain this position.

The Moon Jae-in administration has expressed respect for the Supreme Court’s ruling,; meanwhile President Moon stated in a news conference in January that the liquidation of seized assets of Japanese companies in South Korea was undesirable, showing his stance of seeking a diplomatic solution in the issue. Japan-South Korea relations will surely deteriorate further if the liquidation is realized. Neither the governments of Japan nor South Korea want that to happen. However, it’s quite difficult for both governments to persuade their domestic audiences for striking a deal on historical issues. With Japan’s general election and South Korea’s presidential election approaching in the end of October and March next year, a short-term solution is difficult. Therefore, Prime Minister Kishida will seek a diplomatic solution with the next South Korean president.

            Historical issues have obviously contributed to the deterioration of Japan-South Korea relations, but at this point, their North Korea policies and the Indo-Pacific strategies have also made it difficult to manage the bilateral ties between the two countries. When the “Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula” was activated in 2018 by the inter-Korean summit meetings and the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, Japanese and South Korean policies toward North Korea were divergent and there’s less effort of the U.S. to coordinate their policies under the Trump administration. This situation caused friction between Tokyo and Seoul over the North Korean issues. Fortunately, the Biden administration has been paying much attention to the close policy coordination among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and this provides more space for cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul than before. Regarding North Korean issues, three areas should be cautiously addressed in policy coordination between Tokyo and Seoul: (1) denuclearization of North Korea, (2) defense and deterrence capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and (3) human rights issues.

First, while South Korea prefers a step-by-step approach and a series of small deals, Japan takes the position that at least a comprehensive agreement on denuclearization should be reached first. Japan believes that a phased approach without an agreement on the end state of denuclearization is unacceptable. Japan and South Korea must make efforts to implement a well-coordinated policy by integrating the differences between the two countries together with the U.S.

Second, in view of the reality that the denuclearization of North Korea must be a long-term goal, it is essential to maintain a robust defense and deterrence capability against North Korea’s continuing nuclear and missile threats. North Korea has repeatedly test-fired missiles again and made efforts to develop “new strategic weapons” since May 2019 and this indicates that the security environment in Northeast Asia has deteriorated. In response to this situation, the Japanese government has decided to build two additional Aegis system-equipped ships and develop stand-off missiles. On the one hand, the deteriorating relationship between Tokyo and Seoul has led to a more critical view of Japan's enhanced defense posture in South Korea. However, on the other, some are critical of the scaling down of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises without reducing the military threats from the North, and South Korea’s rapid military build-up under the Moon administration has caused a sense of caution in Japan. Japan and South Korea need to make efforts to dispel concerns about the defense policies of the other country.

Third, regarding the human rights issues in North Korea, establishing a coordinated approach by the three countries is desirable. The Biden administration is emphasizing values of democracy and human rights in its diplomacy, which also apply to North Korean issues. Japan, which seeks to resolve the abduction issue, welcome the Biden administration’s emphasis on North Korean human rights issues and hopes that it will increase pressure on North Korea. On the other hand, South Korea, which places a high priority on improving inter-Korean relations, aim for a more balanced approach rather than focusing too much on human rights issues. There is a need for policy alignment among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on the issue.

Prime Minister Kishida must win the lower house election at the end of October and the upper house election next July to establish a stable foundation for his cabinet and to make bold decisions on difficult issues. Therefore, Kishida will prefer the management of Japan-South Korea relations and not attempt the immediate improvement of the bilateral ties for the time being. However, the international environment surrounding Japan and South Korea under the U.S.-China strategic competition and the Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy surely encourage the cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. If we focus too much on historical issues in Japan-South Korea relations, space for cooperation between the two countries become quite limited. However, Japan and South Korea need each other to pursue the goals of their respective national strategies. Japan needs South Korea to realize a "free and open Indo-Pacific," and Japan’s support is essential to establish and consolidate a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. It is time for Tokyo and Seoul to reactivate strategic dialogue and expand the foundation for strategic cooperation.