► the conundrum is that an international system that has become unhinged requires more multilateral governance precisely at a time when the institutional mechanisms for this are at best contested and in many cases broken.

► South Korea has largely missed out on the recent minilateral expansion exemplified by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Australia-UK-US trilateral (AUKUS), and a host of other trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation mechanisms. 

► South Korea might also consider being more proactive in proposing its own minilaterals. South Korea has a lot to contribute in the civil nuclear engineering field, notably in new-generation SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) and nuclear plant decommissioning.

World disorder is greater than it has been in decades. An unstable multipolar system of states is rife with international crises, including hot wars in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine, a US-China Cold War 2.0, nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea, climate change (and associated intensification of natural disasters), human-made humanitarian catastrophes from Myanmar to Yemen to North Africa to Haiti, and more. Additionally, both symptom and cause of this disorder is the breakdown of post-World War II international organizations and institutions that were established to manage adjustments to the international system and prevent (or if necessary remedy) international crises. Just to take two of these international organizations, the United Nations (especially the Security Council) and World Trade Organization are weakened at best and outright dysfunctional at worst. 

In short, the conundrum is that an international system that has become unhinged requires more multilateral governance precisely at a time when the institutional mechanisms for this are at best contested and in many cases broken.

Moreover, global disarray is both complex and widespread, rendering unlikely any quick fix. It is complex in that many of the risks in the international system are inter-related, sometimes reinforcing each other (i.e., not solving one problem exacerbates another in a vicious circle) and sometimes in tension with each other (i.e., solving one problem means worsening another). It is widespread in that it touches on most functional areas of human affairs, and no region is spared. 

The Indo-Pacific is not the region experiencing this disarray most acutely—currently eastern Europe and the Middle East hold that dubious distinction—but the Indo-Pacific is where the most fundamental, systemically consequential risks are concentrated. This is encapsulated in two factors: (1) the region’s status as the primary site for US-China great power rivalry, and (2) the region’s overall importance, as measured by weight in population and economic output (60% of global total of both), preponderance of resident major states (US, China, India, Japan, Russia, France), number of nuclear weapon states (US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea), etc. 

Naturally the Indo-Pacific’s high-stakes, major power confrontations represent special risks for middle powers in the region, such as South Korea. This is due to the particular characteristics of middle powers. To begin with, middle powers can affect the international system, but cannot determine it decisively, much less unilaterally—that is, middle powers are highly dependent on relations with other, more powerful states to maintain international order and steer it as challenges emerge. Second, middle powers are limited in power projection, and thus in ambition, due to resource constraints. This means that middle power strategic success places great importance on selective resource allocation to ensure that realistic objectives are supported by necessary means. Third, middle powers place a premium on deterrence (rather than offensive behavior), and are reluctant to engage in coercion, choosing instead to deal with security risks through multilateral, non-military means. Lastly, middle powers prefer strategic action to pass through international organizations and institutions, and place great weight on international cooperation and law, and, undergirding that, normativity in international politics.

South Korea—qua middle power—thus faces headwinds, as the above characteristics are risk factors in the current environment. Dependence on major states (e.g., the US for security and China economically) during a time of great power competition imposes sometimes painful trade-offs. A fraying rules-based international order means more crises that have to be addressed with overburdened resources (financial, personnel, etc.). Weakened multilateral bodies—international organizations like the UN or the WTO—make it harder to reach consensus on how to effectively deal with critical problems like WMD proliferation or climate change. And widespread disrespect for international law (e.g., by Russia and China) emboldens rogue states (e.g., North Korea) to flaunt international sanctions and menace neighbors.

So, what should an Indo-Pacific middle power such as South Korea do to reduce the risks of such a difficult situation in which the typical go-to solutions—hedging between the US and China, and relying on multilateral bodies, such as the UN—are tendentially less effective? The rise of so-called “minilateral” groupings of states provides one answer. Minilaterals—groups of 3-6 states cooperating on specific problems in a weakly institutionalized format—are not new, but they have been experiencing a renaissance over the last 5-7 years, not coincidentally just as multilateralism was clearly failing to deliver. Although in fact some of the first modern minilaterals included arrangements in which South Korea was a participant (such as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) and the Four and Six Party Talks, all of which dealt with North Korea’s WMD programs), South Korea has largely missed out on the recent minilateral expansion exemplified by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Australia-UK-US trilateral (AUKUS), and a host of other trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation mechanisms. 

This is a missed opportunity—and a real disadvantage for South Korea—as minilaterals can help with the set of problems (outlined above) attendant to the prevailing global disorder. In the first place, minilateral groupings of states can provide ad hoc solutions to specific problems—e.g., as Quad 1.0 did with HA/DR after the Boxing Day tsunami and Quad 2.0 did (partially successfully) with the COVID-19 vaccine partnership. Minilaterals can also contribute to the provision of public goods, as the France-UAE-India trilateral intends to do on energy, climate change, and Indian Ocean sustainability/biodiversity. Finally, minilaterals can help with international order-building, thus filling the gap left by receding multilaterals. Succeeding at problem-solving and public goods provision is an important part of minilateral order-building, of course, but, going beyond deliverables, minilateralism is more than the sum of its parts, as norms are created and reinforced by networks of cooperating states. 

South Korea’s weak representation in minilaterals arises from several factors: a tendency to lapse into inward-looking focus on the Korean Peninsula, often in connection with North Korea policy; worry about China, which takes a dim view of minilateralism, particularly when led by the US; and historically poor relations with Japan, which has been active in advancing minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. Taken together, Seoul has not appeared consistently to be a credible partner to potential minilateral counterparts.

Yet things have shifted over the last two years. Seoul joined the Asia-Pacific Four (AP4, South Korea-Japan-New Zealand-Australia), a potentially groundbreaking cross-regional security minilateral grouping together like-minded NATO Global Partners from the Asia-Pacific. These states’ leaders have now attended NATO summits in both Madrid (2022) and Vilnius (2023), and are collaborating to identify areas of collective value-added, such as cybersecurity. Albeit somewhat reluctantly, South Korea is also a member of the Chip-4 group (US, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan) cooperating on secure supply chains for high-end semiconductors. The most dramatic shift, however, has been the spectacular birth of a genuine trilateral security partnership among the US-South Korea-Japan. Following improvement in Seoul-Tokyo relations, the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral establishes cooperation in the military/security domain (intelligence, missile defense, joint exercises, cyber), economics/trade (especially in high-technology and supply chain security), and people-people exchanges. This was anchored in the August 2023 Camp David summit agreements, which also regularize ongoing leader- and senior-level engagement to create potential “lock-in” for this trilateral going forward. 

This initial shift in South Korea’s involvement in minilaterals provides a platform for future inclusion in other minilaterals, and indeed there is both need and room for South Korea’s growth as a pivotal minilateral state. Although it is unlikely that South Korea would be offered membership in the Quad—that train has sailed for various reasons—there might a place for Seoul to participate in certain “Quad Plus” working-group activities. That might potentially also be the case for AUKUS pillar 2 (quantum computing, AI, cyber, undersea technologies). In fact, many existing trilateral and quadrilateral groupings are already right-sized, such that adding South Korea would complicate decision-making without providing much value. Nonetheless, it is in South Korea’s interest to be attentive to joining already existing minilaterals, if the opportunity is presented, the functional logic is persuasive, and Seoul has the bandwidth.

South Korea might also consider being more proactive in proposing its own minilaterals. South Korea has a lot to contribute in the civil nuclear engineering field, notably in new-generation SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) and nuclear plant decommissioning. Why not explore if the US, Japan, France, Canada, or the UK would be interested in cooperating on best practices, benchmarking, nonproliferation, and research and development in these civil nuclear fields? As a burgeoning space power, South Korea may also advance its interests through cooperating with other states in space-related issues. Particularly important is counter-space capabilities, considering the pace of North Korea’s military space program and the stress it may place on deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. The maritime domain is another area in which South Korea has strengths. Within all of South Korea’s shipbuilding technology and capacity, surely there is something that could be synergistically combined with other provider states to assist with maritime security and maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the defense-industrial sector offers potential growth areas for South Korean minilateralism. Seoul is aiming to become a top five global arms supplier, and in that context might benefit from establishing partnerships for variegated future arms systems similar to what the UK, Italy, and Japan are doing in developing a next generation fighter under the Global Combat Air Program. 

South Korea is navigating a complex and dangerous world. Seizing the minilateral moment is one way to reduce risks and advance its interests.