► The utmost priority for TSC would be operationalizing the technical capabilities for real-time sharing of DPRK missile warning data by the end of this year.

► Institutionalization of the agendas would be inevitable for such endeavors

► TSC should be sustainable enough to endure the ebbs and flows of the three nations’ domestic politics and the dynamic international security environment…In this regard, establishing TSC secretariat is imperative.

Preoccupied by the US-China geopolitical rivalry, the Indo-Pacific region has captured global attention in various ways. At this critical juncture, the Camp David Summit has opened a new security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. In the meeting, the leaders of the ROK, the US, and Japan discussed the role of trilateral security cooperation (hereafter ‘TSC’) in the region. Formally establishing TSC, the three leaders set various agendas to preserve the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. This brief essay reviews and analyzes TSC’s past, present, and future.

Cooperation among the three nations is not something new. Over a few decades, the three made several attempts to draw cooperation in the face of DPRK’s missile and nuclear development and provocation. TCOG (Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group) and TISA (Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement) were typical trilateral cooperation mechanisms. Following the DPRK’s test launch of the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, the ROK, the US, and Japan established TCOG in 1999 to coordinate DPRK policy.

TCOG was founded on the principle that any member’s negotiation with DPRK would be subject to the standards agreed upon by the three countries. At this deputy secretary-level meeting, the three discussed DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats, as well as the issues concerning humanitarian assistance for DPRK people. It was the first comprehensive attempt to coordinate DPRK policy at the trilateral level. However, TCOG gradually faded away with the emergence of Six-Party Talks in the early 2000s. Although TCOG only lasted for a short period, it is significant because it achieved cooperation on a practical level.

TISA, signed in 2014, served as a hub for the ROK, the US, and Japan to exchange their military information regarding DPRK. The incentives for the three nations concluding TISA were twofold, primarily due to DPRK’s increased ballistic missile launches and third nuclear test on one hand and in response to the failure of the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) between the ROK and Japan in 2012 on another. However, unlike GSOMIA, TISA was not a direct information exchange between the ROK and Japan. Instead, the ROK military and Japan Self Defense Force exchanged information through the US Indo-Pacific Command. With its legal basis, TISA can be the foundation of the three nations’ DPRK missile data real-time sharing mechanism.

DTT (Defense Trilateral Talks) is a trilateral meeting that has been continued over the last decade. In the 13th DTT that was held in April this year, the three nations confirmed to remain “vigilant and enhance trilateral security cooperation to deter DPRK nuclear and missile threats,” reiterated “shared commitment to the rules-based international order,” and emphasized “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”[1] They are also the main objectives that TSC will pursue over the following decades.

Understanding TSC and what it attempts to accomplish in the region is essential. TSC is a mini-multilateral cooperation that the US initiated in the Indo-Pacific region along with Quad, composed of the US, Japan, Australia, and India, and AUKUS, comprising the US, UK, and Australia. TSC can be assessed in a conceptual framework of mini-multilateralism. On the one hand, mini-multilateralism is a mechanism for a few actors to discuss specific issues. This would avoid free-riding problems, which can be common in ordinary multilateral meetings.[2]  On the other hand, mini-multilateralism is helpful when responding to issues that are too complex to address in a multilateral framework such as international organizations.[3]

Undoubtedly, TSC is a venue where the three discuss the agendas concerning the Indo-Pacific region, as both conceptual definitions claim. The common objectives of TSC are specifically defined based on the three actors’ incentives to achieve them. If TSC is centered on coordinating DPRK policy, as settled by the three actors at Camp David, the cooperation can continue to develop. One caveat is that cooperation can become much more difficult if their goals are divergent. Thus, the three actors must closely talk to each other about each agenda before going forward.

Lively discussion and debate among the three actors would be the key to TSC’s success. In this respect, the agendas discussed at the Camp David Summit are desirable. The utmost priority for TSC would be operationalizing the technical capabilities for real-time sharing of DPRK missile warning data by the end of this year. It is the agenda first presented at the Phnom Penh meeting in November 2022 and has been the main topic for discussion among the three leaders since then. It is both empirical and symbolic measures and the foundation of TSC.

In addition, another critical TSC agenda from Camp David would be space security cooperation, especially on the responsible use of space. Trilateral cooperation in space would be boundless on both the security and economic front. The three also emphasized coordination with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries in the maritime security domain, which is critical for regional capacity-building efforts. Supply chain resilience on semiconductors and batteries is also a part of TSC agendas.[4] As previously mentioned, sustainability would be the key to the success of TSC. Institutionalization of the agendas would be inevitable for such endeavors. In this regard, the three agreeing to hold annual high-level talks, including summitry and regular multi-domain trilateral exercises, are desirable.

Institutionalization of the above-mentioned agenda would be critical for TSC to endure. However, the US and Japan may have different TSC strategies. For instance, the US and Japan may focus on agendas beyond the scope of the Korean Peninsula. While the ROK’s TSC policy primarily deals with deterring DPRK, if the US and Japan prioritize other regional agendas, TSC may not work. It is crucial for the three nations to clearly define their objectives and interests before internal conflicts are triggered.

Over several decades, trilateral cooperation has failed several times while DPRK advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities. It is finally the time for the three nations to cooperate to deter DPRK provocation and sustain peace and stability in the region. Sustainability is the key to making this happen. Again, for TSC to become more sustainable, institutionalizing each agenda and TSC itself is critical. TSC should be sustainable enough to endure the ebbs and flows of the three nations’ domestic politics and the dynamic international security environment.

In this regard, establishing TSC secretariat is imperative. TSC secretariat would manage various agendas of three nations and facilitate events such as annual high-level talks and exercises. It is time for the three nations to unfold the agendas discussed at Camp David and draw specific plans to process them. Completing the mechanism for sharing DPRK missile data in real-time by the end of the year should be the first step. At the same time, exploring and developing future agendas are also essential. Above all, an efficient and effective secretariat will be required for a successful TSC, a new Indo-Pacific security architecture.