► South Korean governments have long considered defense industrial exports crucial to export-led growth and defense modernization.

► Under the Yoon administration, this has been complemented by a greater degree of strategic clarity about South Korea’s threat perceptions and partnerships.

► Linking South Korea’s arms exports to strategic clarity will be welcomed by many but also raise risks of entanglement that will need to be managed.

South Korea is enjoying a golden era in its defense industrial exports. In a 2022 article for War on the Rocks, my colleague Tom Corben and I characterized this as the rise of the “K-arsenal of democracy.” The United States famously became the world’s armorer in the struggle against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan months before it directly entered the Second World War. Similarly, South Korea has emerged as an arms supplier of choice for many US allies and partners around the world looking to build up their defense capabilities without seeking formal security commitments from South Korea. This strategy of quiet diplomacy and robust defense industrial exports enabled South Korea to grow into the world’s eighth largest arms exporter in 2022.

This article examines how the Yoon administration’s strategic clarity about threat perceptions and international conflicts may affect South Korea’s approach to arms exports. It argues that this new phase is an overdue update bringing South Korea into line with other US allies and partners for an era of major power competition and regional conflicts. At the same time, strategic clarity will face domestic opposition from those who believe it threatens South Korea’s need to ensure constructive relations with China and Russia as well as unnecessarily risks entangling South Korea in distant foreign rivalries and conflicts.

The K-Arsenal’s Golden Era

South Korean governments have long considered defense industrial exports crucial to export-led growth and defense modernization. In recent years, Korean defense firms have enjoyed unprecedented success in arms exports around the world. The 2021 contract for 30 self-propelled howitzers with Australia was followed up with a 2023 deal for 129 infantry fighting vehicles, marking the Australian Army’s largest ever acquisition. The 2022 mega deal with Poland has included 1,000 tanks, 672 self-propelled howitzers, and 48 light fighter jets. The United Arab Emirates purchased surface-to-air missiles and multiple rocket launchers in 2022 and discussions are continuing on air defense, guided weapon systems and airborne weapon systems. Malaysia signed a deal for 18 light fighter jets and the Philippines selected South Korea to build six offshore patrol vessels.

The nature of South Korea’s diplomatic relationships with each of these countries, while important, has not been the driving factor in any of these contracts, which are ultimately commercial deals with potential suppliers. As I have previously argued, “South Korea’s export success has been made possible by a combination of factors, including a robust domestic civil manufacturing base, competitive pricing, rapid delivery schedules, inclusive local industry participation, customization, and technology transfer arrangements to allow for subsequent production by partners themselves.”

To this, it should be added that patience and perseverance were critical in the Australian contract, following years of delays, changes in government, independent reviews, and reduced order sizes. Australia eventually chose Hanwha to supply both howitzers and infantry fighting vehicles over a German competitor, both of which had established a local subsidiary, built a domestic supply chain and international partners, and promised to build a local manufacturing facility to build the vehicles in Australia. In the Polish case, delivery speed seems to have been the decisive factor, with the first 10 K2 tanks and 24 K9 self-propelled howitzers being delivered less than five months after the deal was signed in December 2022. As then-Polish president Andrzej Duda stated, “the quick pace of this delivery is of crucial importance in the face of Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine.”

These recent big-ticket contracts are reminiscent of the so-called ‘sales diplomacy’ pursued under previous conservative South Korean leaders who successfully won overseas construction contracts. But South Korean administrations of both progressive and conservative orientations had historically shunned linking defense industrial exports to the country’s wider foreign and defense policy interests and relationships. This combination of ambitious commercial exports and strategic ambiguity was well-suited to South Korea’s developmental state model seeking profit without incurring reputational risks. In some respects, this ambiguity has echoed the approach of diplomatically neutral arms exporters such as Sweden and Switzerland.

From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity

Under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, this strategy has been replaced with a greater degree of strategic clarity about South Korea’s threat perceptions and partnerships. On US-China competition, President Yoon has sought to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and step up South Korea’s regional contributions as part of South Korea’s own Indo-Pacific Strategy. On North Korea, President Yoon has put the regime’s human rights violations back on the agenda. On Japan, he has ended the diplomatic impasse and pursued reconciliation and trilateral security cooperation, something that previous governments had reportedly promised Beijing they would not do during the 2016-17 THAAD crisis. On Taiwan, he has opposed any “changes to the status quo by force” and described the Cross-Strait relationship as a ‘global issue’ like the inter-Korean relationship. On Ukraine, he has left open the possibility of providing military assistance despite domestic legal restrictions. While visiting the UAE, he described Iran as that country’s ‘enemy’ and ‘biggest threat’ much like South Korea faces from North Korea, which was criticized for jeopardizing South Korea-Iran relations.

South Korean strategic clarity, both in terms of clearly identifying the threats facing the country as well as the measures it intends to implement to achieve its objectives, has been warmly welcomed by allies and partners including the United States. The tone and rhetoric of US policy towards China and Russia has coalesced in recent years around the reality of long-term strategic competition. The Yoon administration is integrating what has thus far been an industry-led export campaign to sell armaments with its broader foreign policy interest in solidarity with US allies and partners. The Yoon administration’s recent statements demonstrate this solidarity, even as they have been criticized by domestic opponents as “needlessly provocative.”

More advanced types of defense industrial cooperation will move beyond straightforward off-the-shelf deliveries from South Korea to in-country manufacturing and co-production of capabilities. This will also involve new legal arrangements for technology transfers, cross-national workforce, military-to-military cooperation for capability testing, offset arrangements for local content quotas and supply chain participation. All of this will represent a far more complex relationship between South Korean defense firms, the South Korean government which controls much of the intellectual property in key weapons capabilities, and partner countries.

As a result, the commercial relationship will increasingly affect the diplomatic relationship, and vice versa. Strategic clarity will lead to closer industrial cooperation and commercial opportunities with like-minded partners while alienating other possible customers. For example, South Korea will continue to prioritize the Gulf states as well as emerging non-democratic partners like Vietnam, requiring a more calibrated values-based diplomacy. South Korea’s current Foreign Trade Act restricts arms exports that would require legislative changes to help partners at war, but it exports will be used in conflicts around the world in the coming is almost certain that South Korea’s arms years.

These are new tasks that will come with greater strategic clarity, which other US allies have been grappling with for a long time. But they are needed for the K-arsenal to achieve its full potential befitting South Korea’s aspirations to become a global pivotal state that can turn the tide of wars to come.