► With all symbols and practices that laid the foundation for inter-Korean engagement completely gone, it is difficult to imagine North Korea accepting any future olive branch from South Korea

► With the ASEAN Regional Forum being the only multilateral mechanism that North Korea still engages with, South Korea may need to rely on third-party diplomacy

► CSCAP could serve as a potential third-party platform allowing North Korea to express its views and participate in closed-door discussions

Since 2020, significant shifts have occurred in inter-Korean relations. The changes began with the unilateral demolition of the Kaesong Industrial Complex building and the de facto inter-Korean liaison office after Kim Yo Jong declared that North Korea would no longer pursue reconciliation with the South.

After Yoon Seok-yeol was sworn into office, tit-for-tat responses between the two Koreas increased dramatically, with more frequent US-ROK joint military exercises and North Korean missile tests. Following North Korea’s “satellite” test in November 2023, South Korea suspended the inter-Korean joint military agreement and no longer adhered to the no-fly zone restrictions. This was followed by North Korea’s complete withdrawal from the agreement and Kim Jong Un’s January 2024 declaration of South Korea as the “number one hostile state.”

To emphasize that reunification between the two Koreas is no longer a viable option, the arc of reunification in Pyongyang was completely demolished by late January 2024. This stance has entrenched North Korea's position against further engagement with South Korea. With all symbols and practices that laid the foundation for inter-Korean engagement completely gone, it is difficult to imagine North Korea accepting any future olive branch from South Korea.

Since 2023, the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between the United States and South Korea has begun close consultations on extended nuclear deterrence and strategic planning. This development has elicited a strong response from North Korea, which has deepened its engagement with Russia, reaffirmed by the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in June 2024.

Given these developments, rooted in deep-seated mutual distrust and a strong intention to strengthen respective military capabilities, unilateral peace initiatives from South Korea are unlikely to succeed.

Regarding the US, with which North Korea insists on bilateral negotiations on equal footing: Kim Il Sung pursued negotiations leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework, followed by Kim Jong Il’s involvement in the multilateral Six-Party Talks, which ended with nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Kim Jong Un deliberately refused engagement with the Obama administration, beginning with the failure of the Leap Day Agreement in 2012.

In 2018, Kim Jong Un began engagement with Donald Trump but grew disillusioned after the Hanoi Summit 2019, leading to decreased belief in achieving a viable agreement with the US.

Yoon Seok-yeol announced the August 15 Unification Doctrine in 2024. However, most of the agenda consists of one-way condemnation of North Korea, which is more likely to elicit resistance than acceptance. As of August 26, North Korea has yet to respond to the doctrine.

With the ASEAN Regional Forum being the only multilateral mechanism that North Korea still engages with, South Korea may need to rely on third-party diplomacy. North Korea’s participation in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and other Track II platforms of ASEAN could provide a venue for dialogue.

CSCAP could serve as a potential third-party platform allowing North Korea to express its views and participate in closed-door discussions. The DPRK Institute for Peace and Disarmament, a think tank belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, is a member of CSCAP and has also participated in other regional multilateral forums, such as the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, and had been active in the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) network in the past.

There is a possibility that North Korea might reject participation if it perceives dialogue with South Korea is not in line with its official policy stance. However, the host country or organization should attempt to persuade their North Korean counterparts. For example, a roundtable between ASEAN and the two Koreas was held in a Southeast Asian capital two months before the Hanoi Summit, resulting in candid discussions between North and South Korean researchers in a setting both considered a safe space.

Rebuilding trust between North and South Korea is a daunting task, particularly given the current lack of dialogue and increasing military tensions. It is time for the two Koreas to confront their demons, addressing both nuclear and conventional arms expansions, with disarmament at the forefront and inter-Korean non-security issues as part of the broader discussion.