► The NATO Vilnius Summit tested the alliance with the matter of how far the United States and its allies were in favour of offering Kyiv NATO membership now, all while it continues to fight and repel Russian forces. The answer to rapid membership: not quite yet Ukraine.
►Among the negative arguments, many argue that Ukraine cannot become a NATO member while it is still at war with Russia as certain allies believe that Kyiv would immediately trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to bring NATO into direct conflict with Russia. Furthermore, the Summit did not result any substantial pledges for more and new military aid.
► Positive take-aways from the Vilnius Summit were the further articulation of new regional defence plans, the new NATO Force Model as well as the decision by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to drop his objection to Sweden’s NATO accession.
The NATO Summit in Vilnius on 11-12 July 2023 came at a testing time for the alliance. With the Ukrainian offensive, Russia’s war on Ukraine has entered a delicate phase. NATO allies and EU member states are turning to questions about what the post-war settlement might look like, and there are strong calls for Ukraine to be admitted – as rapidly as possible – into both NATO and the EU. Thus, the Vilnius Summit was largely seen as a bellwether of how far the United States and its allies were in favour of offering Kyiv NATO membership now, all while it continues to fight and repel Russian forces. The answer to rapid membership: not quite yet Ukraine. Although the official communiqué stated that Ukraine’s “future is in NATO”, there are clear differences between NATO allies on when this future should begin and under what conditions.
A year earlier, at the Madrid Summit in 2022, things looked quite different. NATO allies and partners seized on the moment to show their unity in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine. That Summit was widely perceived to be a success, not least because leaders in Madrid underlined NATO’s commitment to the defence of Europe and deterrence, it saw the publication of a new NATO Strategic Concept (with the last one produced in 2010), NATO extended an invitation of membership to Sweden and Finland, allies decided to extensively increase their military presence in Europe and it was an opportunity to bring the “Asia Pacific 4” of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand together with NATO allies. At the 2022 Summit, leaders largely avoided the question of Ukraine’s NATO accession.
Many of the negative comments about NATO’s failure to provide Ukraine with a clear and more immediate path to membership in Vilnius should be put into context. There is this notion that every NATO Summit must be “historic” in order to be a success, but this fails to recognise the profoundly sensitive issue of Ukraine’s place in the Euro-Atlantic group of nations. Many argue that Ukraine cannot become a NATO member while it is still at war with Russia, not least because certain allies believe that Kyiv would immediately trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to bring NATO into direct conflict with Russia.
Yet, if NATO allies are only really willing to entertain Ukraine’s accession to NATO after the war, then one would assume that leaders would want to hasten a Ukrainian victory by supplying the country with more sophisticated and numerous weapons systems. However, even here, the Vilnius Summit did not result any substantial pledges for more and new military aid. True, promises were made on F-16 fighter training and the provision of cruise missiles, infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks. However, the equipment short falls in Ukraine have become apparent in light of the US’ decision to send cluster bombs to Ukraine. Whatever one thinks of their ethical use, the fact that they are being used as a stop gap until more conventional munitions can be manufactured for Ukraine is indicative of the health of defence industrial bases in the West.
However, the question of Ukraine’s NATO membership is not simply tied to its success on the battlefield. Indeed, there is the idea that certain NATO allies withheld a clear roadmap for Ukrainian membership at Vilnius in order to be able to have some sort of bargaining chip during any future peace negotiations – meaning, potentially, withholding NATO membership for Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees from Russia. Justifiably, this line of thinking can be criticised as a re-run of the approach taken before Russia’s fully-fledged invasion of Ukraine. The problem for NATO is that it is anticipating a highly symbolic Summit next year in Washington to mark 75 years of the alliance. While much can happen in Ukraine between now and the summer of 2024, the pressure to provide a clear timeline for Ukraine’s NATO membership will not abate. Not dealing with this question before the Washington Summit also runs the risk of Ukraine’s NATO membership becoming even more of an issue during the US’ presidential elections in 2024.
While the question about Ukraine’s NATO membership is fundamental for the alliance, it did somewhat overshadow some of the important initiatives agreed at Vilnius. As NATO has underlined its renewed focus on defence and deterrence, Vilnius delivered on further articulating new regional defence plans, the new NATO Force Model and bolstering command and control, combat ready forces and air and missile defence plans. The larger question here is whether, after Vilnius, the allies – particularly European ones – will step up efforts to meet the target of 300,000 troops needed on high readiness, with the required strategic enablers. Delivering on these targets has the potential to fundamentally reshape Europe’s contribution to its own defence and the Euro-Atlantic region.
The question of resources was also up for discussion at Vilnius. Here, Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised expectations regarding allied investment in defence. NATO has overseen an informal pledge for each ally to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO leaders underlined the need to treat 2% of GDP as a minimum requirement, but it only called on allies to “move towards” the guideline by 2024. At Vilnius, NATO repeated its call for a minimum 2% of GDP commitment from allies, but it removed any decade-long time horizon, calling the need for investment as urgent. Today, only 11 out of 31 allies spend more than 2% of GDP on defence. Additionally, while not overtly calling for a 3-4% of GDP spending on defence, the Vilnius Summit communiqué did state that in some cases more than 2% of GDP will be required to fill existing capability and force shortfalls.
Another key positive take-away from the Vilnius Summit was the decision by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to drop his objection to Sweden’s NATO accession. Just before the Vilnius Summit, and following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on 7 July, President Erdogan promised the Swedish premier and NATO Secretary General that he would send the accession protocol to the Turkish parliament. Barring any sudden changes of heart, NATO will see the completion of a process started at the Madrid Summit to welcome Finland and Sweden into NATO. This is perhaps one of the major success stories from the Vilnius Summit and it will allow the alliance to further strengthen its Northern flank and allow allies to further develop the newly agreed regional plans.
Even with these steps forward, however, the alliance will need to continue to develop its cooperation with close partners. For example, one has to scroll down to points 73 and 74 in the official communiqué of the Vilnius Summit (out of 90 points) to read about EU-NATO cooperation. While NATO acknowledges the EU as a “unique and essential partner”, there was a missed opportunity for NATO and the EU to outline a coherent plan and roadmap for how Europeans will take on more of the defence burden in Europe. Likewise, with the focus on Ukraine, the partnership with the AP4 was not developed any further than a desire to maintain dialogue. While having the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand the Republic of Korea in Vilnius was an important symbol, there will soon be a need to develop concrete examples of cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.